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This dissertation seeks to understand one of the most perplexing statements uttered by 
the Platonic Socrates, the so-called Socratic Paradox that no one voluntarily does 
wrong.  In such dialogues as the Gorgias and the Protagoras, Socrates famously, or 
infamously, declared that all wrongdoing is a result of ignorance and is therefore not 
culpable.  While the beginning point for this investigation is Socrates, this dissertation 
turns for the most part to Aristotle as the first and foremost commentator on the 
Platonic dialogues, guided by the belief that Aristotle can aid in the discovery of what 
Socrates’ outlandish assertion means.  In Books III and VII of the Nicomachean 
Ethics, Aristotle takes up the questions on which the Socratic Paradox touches, 
submitting the so-called paradox to scrutiny in Book VII.  While much research has 
focused on the Socratic Paradox, the contribution of this work is to exploit the 
intellectual genius Aristotle has brought to bear on this question.  Turning to Aristotle 
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Then Jesus said, “Father, forgive them, for they do not know what they do.” 
Luke 23:34 
 
I count religion but a childish toy,  
And hold there is no sin but ignorance. 
Machevill, speaker in “Prologue” 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 
The Problem of Moral Responsibility 
There is a problem that emerges when one asks the question “How ought I to 
live?” which is the guiding question of political philosophy.  For the question is both 
theoretical and practical.  That is, it is theoretical insofar as it is a question to which 
we seek an answer.  But at the same time, it is a practical, somewhat urgent, question 
whose aim is to tell us how we ought to behave in the world.  The answer to this 
question, supposing there is one, will tell us what we have to do or how we are to 
live.  But what is the relationship of the practical question to the theoretical question?  
Is there any relationship whatsoever between them?  Do they come about 
conterminously, does one lead to the other, or are they completely independent of one 
another? Must one know the right thing in order to do it, or is the performance simply 
enough?  What, in sum, is the relationship between knowing and doing or between 
intellectual and moral virtue?   
As we begin to work through the question, “How ought I to live?” we cannot 
help but notice a myriad of other questions that immediately spring to mind and must 
be examined out in the open:  What is the good life for a human being, the virtuous 
way of life?  Is there such a thing as human excellence or virtue?  Even if there is a 
human good, to what extent is it accessible?  There is great variety in the types of 
lives that human beings lead, that much is clear.  But less clear is the degree to which 




the question “How ought I to live?” implies that we are somehow capable of choosing 
how we live, that we are in some way free to live one way instead of another.  We 
even praise those human beings who we think live in a good way and blame those 
who we think live badly.  But whenever we praise or blame the way of life of a given 
human being, even in the abstract, we implicitly acknowledge that that human being 
could have lived another way.  Praise or blame rests upon the conviction that human 
beings are morally responsible for the choices that they make.  Virtue, moral virtue, 
presupposes, to an extent, moral responsibility.  If the question “How ought I to 
live?” is to have any real meaning, we must be able to change the way we live.  
Otherwise, it is a futile question.  Moral responsibility touches on the related 
questions of knowledge, virtue, and freedom, and they are united, in a sense, by a 
question concerning moral responsibility. 
We cannot begin to talk about living morally or virtuously without some 
understanding, however dim, of moral responsibility.  If praise and blame are to have 
any coherence, human beings must be capable of acting differently, and they must be 
able to choose amongst competing actions, ends, and ways of life.  “Since virtue,” as 
Aristotle says, “is concerned with feelings and actions, and praise and blame come 
about for voluntary actions… it is no doubt a necessary thing for those who inquire 
about virtue to distinguish what is a voluntary act and what is an involuntary 
act…”(Nicomachean Ethics VII. 1 1109b30-34).1  To speak about living virtuously or 
                                                 
1 References to the text of the Nicomachean Ethics are by book, chapter, and, where applicable, Bekker 
number.  Roman and Arabic numerals refer to book and chapter respectively.  I have made extensive 
use of Joe Sachs’ translation of the Nicomachean Ethics (Focus, 2002), modifying the translation 
where I have seen fit based on the L. Bywater edition (Oxford Classical Texts, 1988 imprint).  All 
unmodified instances of the Ethics refer to the Nicomachean Ethics.  The Eudemian Ethics will be 




morally, it is necessary to distinguish voluntary from involuntary acts; it is necessary 
to understand responsibility, moral responsibility. 
When do we hold or deem someone to be responsible for the things, especially 
the bad things one has done?  Moral responsibility, as the name implies, intimates to 
us the picture of a responsible human being, someone who knows what he is doing.  
That knowledge consists both of the particulars or details of the action and 
consequences as well as some more general conception of what is right or good.  
Alasdair MacIntyre, speaking of Aristotle, says, “The educated moral agent must of 
course know what he is doing when he judges or acts virtuously.”2  And this is 
something we also recognize from common opinion.  Moral responsibility has some 
connection, at first glance, with knowledge. 
What then, of wrongdoing?  Our common sense understanding of intentional 
wrongdoing also carries with it the assumption that the actor knows in some sense.  
We blame especially—or even only—those persons who know what they are doing.  
Knowledge is somehow necessary if the act is to be voluntary and therefore culpable 
or blameworthy.  Frequently, to use a rather anecdotal example, one hears a mother 
scold her child with the rebuke, “You should have known better!”, perhaps betraying 
a certain confusion: the knowledge is and is not there.  And often a regret or 
lamentation is expressed with the words, “If I had only known better.”  Alternatively, 
one hears the regret, “I knew what I was doing was wrong when I did it.”  These 
common sayings bespeak a notion that right action is bound up inextricably and 
perhaps inexplicably with knowledge, even if the how of the relationship has not been 
entirely worked out.   
                                                 




This notion of the connection between knowledge and moral responsibility 
isn’t limited to expressions of common opinion; it is also reflected in correctional 
systems, theories of punishment, and carries over to education.  In other words, this 
debate has real world implications.  In fact, criminal matters touch on precisely these 
questions of moral responsibility.  If knowledge is implied in responsibility, in what 
sense is knowledge really meant?  Is it what a rational person would do in such a 
circumstance?  And what of the morally vicious agent, must he too act knowingly?  In 
general, vice is what is knowingly and deliberately chosen for its own sake.  The 
person must have intended to do what he in fact did, and anticipated, to a degree, the 
consequences that followed.  He must have intended the means and the ends.  How, 
then, does the defense of insanity factor into a debate about moral responsibility?  It is 
somehow believed that a criminal must know what he is doing in order to be held 
accountable for his actions, but does a criminal—or better, a criminally insane 
person—ever know right from wrong?  As David Schaefer pointedly asks, “If we 
assert that the criminal is responsible for his conduct only if it is not the product of a 
mental defect, are we not implying that crime per se may be the product of a simply 
healthy psyche?”3  Are we willing, as Schaefer asks, to admit that criminals are 
healthy and sane?  Or would we say that all criminals lack in a decisive respect some 
knowledge or characteristic?  Or perhaps it is simply the case that common sense 
holds contradictory opinions regarding the sanity of criminals, since we believe that 
criminals both know and do not know.  Or are we only attributing a calculating sort of 
rationality to criminals or knowledge of the details of what they have done?  An 
affirmative answer to these questions seems to be avoiding the crux of the problem.  
                                                 




Of course we demand these types of knowledge, if they can be so-called.  The heart 
of the issue is whether a cool, calculating criminal who is fully aware of the 
particulars and the goal in mind can possess a healthy psyche—or, to use an old 
fashioned term, soul.  To say that an answer to this question is not ready at hand, or 
that common opinion is mixed or contradictory, would not be controversial. 
It is clear, then, that we cannot get away from the notion that somehow, in 
some way, responsibility is wedded to knowledge.  If someone does not know what 
he is doing, we do not find him responsible or culpable for his actions.  Any 
wrongdoing that is involuntary is excused, and ignorance implies involuntariness.  
Only wrongs committed voluntarily and knowingly are culpable.4   
A most radical objection to this common understanding of moral 
responsibility, if not the most radical challenge, comes from Socrates.  Socrates is 
famous for having asserted that all wrongdoing is a result of ignorance and is 
therefore not culpable.5  No one, therefore, knowingly or voluntarily does wrong.  
The radical nature of this assertion cannot be overstated.  Socrates’ thesis that all 
wrongdoing is involuntary and therefore not culpable threatens the core of morality or 
moral responsibility as it is commonly understood.  But Socrates’ assertion 
contradicts the way things appear to us; it appears paradoxical or runs contrary to the 
way the world is ordinarily understood.  Is Socrates’ statement, then, meant to be 
taken seriously, literally, as Socrates’ genuine attempt to provide an accurate account 
of reality and of human decision making?  At first glance, perhaps even at second or 
                                                 
4 Occasionally, ignorance is not an acceptable excuse, it is true.  But in these cases, there is a 
reasonable expectation that someone should have known.  This rebuke carries with it an implication of 
willful or intentional ignorance.   




third glance, we cannot help but shake our heads in bewilderment.  In some cases, 
pondering Socrates’ thesis can even lead to moral outrage and indignation.  No one 
who does wrong is responsible for his actions?  By all appearances, the way human 
beings act reveals to us the falsity, and perhaps even the moral depravity, of such a 
statement.   
Socrates’ Strange Dictum 
Did Socrates, then, intend the remarks as they stand?  There has been a great 
deal of scholarly debate on the question of this Socratic thesis, commonly known as 
the Socratic Paradox, and a great deal of conflicting textual analysis has been offered 
on both sides of the debate.  There are essentially two grounds on which the debate 
focuses.  In the first place, it is debated whether Socrates genuinely subscribes to the 
paradox.  And the second question is whether the paradox is indeed accurate as an 
account of human activity.  The answer to the second question often determines the 
answer to the former: if the paradox is false then it must not have been what Socrates 
truly meant.  It is interesting to note that not many scholars take Socrates at his word 
and simultaneously think he is wrong.  There is instead a large cadre of scholars who 
want to hold fast to Socrates but reject his paradox, so distance must be placed 
between the two and attempts are made to show that the paradox is not really 
Socrates’ own.  R.E. Allen, for example, says that it is incredible that Socrates 
actually believed in the paradox, because, “The man does not exist whose principles, 
at some time, have not been corrupted by his passions.”6  Surely Socrates could not 
have been so foolish not to recognize that no such man exists.  C. G. Lukhardt argues 
                                                 




that, taken literally, the Socratic Paradox is “patently false,” because there are clearly 
people who act in ways other than they think that they ought to.7  For the most part, 
these scholars reject the Socratic thesis on the basis of experience—that is, seeing the 
way the world appears to the senses.  In addition to these appeals to the world as it 
appears to us, the paradox is rejected because Socrates’ thesis is outrageous on moral 
grounds.  Common opinion rejects the paradox as wrong and pernicious, so either 
Socrates is wrong and pernicious or—because Socrates is good—he cannot seriously 
believe that the paradox is true.  Yet the fact that the paradox runs contrary to the way 
the world appears and often meets with moral indignation is certainly not proof that 
this was not, in the end, Socrates’ reasoned account.  Appearances may in the end be 
just that, appearances, and we certainly cannot accept moral indignation as proof of 
the falsity of a claim even if it does reveal something.  Nonetheless, many attempts 
are made to reconcile Socrates’ opinions with common sense, arguing that the 
paradox is not really Socrates’ true opinion on the matter.   
Most recently, Roslyn Weiss makes such an attempt to reconcile Socrates’ 
paradox with conventional opinion in her book titled The Socratic Paradox and Its 
Enemies.  There, Professor Weiss argues that Socrates did not believe in the Socratic 
Paradox.  The paradox was rather Socrates’ reaction against the prevailing intellectual 
climate as it was manifested particularly in the sophists and rhetoricians, and Socrates 
pushed his Paradox as a view that “runs para (counter to) a particular contemporary 
doxa (belief or opinion).”8  Moreover, according to Weiss, Socrates’ ultimate goal is 
“to eradicate the false beliefs and puncture the bloated self-image of others [namely, 
                                                 
7 Luckhardt, “Remorse, Regret, and the Socratic Paradox,” p. 159. 




the sophists and rhetoricians],” and the paradox was his tool of choice for 
undermining those beliefs.9  Socrates does not mean his Paradox to be taken 
seriously; it is merely a dialectical weapon wielded to bring his sophistic and 
rhetorical enemies to confusion and contradiction.   
Professor Weiss argues that Socrates wields these dialectical weapons for the 
sake of victory in argument; his goal is not correct understanding but vanquishing 
others with his wit.  It is mere vain vaunting for the sake of verbal victory.  In other 
words, Professor Weiss depreciates the role of wisdom or knowledge for Socrates; 
winning an argument is the primary goal.  Yet Socrates says very clearly that the 
opposite is the case.  He chides love of victory in argument for its own sake and 
asserts that he engages in dialogue or dialectic inquiry in order to arrive at something 
true.  Simply put, dialectic is not eristic.10  In fact, Socrates says that he believes it is a 
great good to be shown to be false insofar is it releases one from a great evil, and he 
thinks that holding a false opinion—especially about the good, the just, and the 
noble—is among the greatest of evils.11  So if one in fact holds a false opinion and 
that opinion is shown to be false, it is better to lose an argument and be refuted, as it 
removes this greatest of evils from one’s soul. 
Through the paradox, we begin to see what was so dangerous about Socrates’ 
thought, and why Weiss and others would attempt to disarm it and render Socrates’ 
words worthless.  If Professor Weiss is correct, however, the paradox ceases to be 
paradoxical.  The Socratic Paradox is no longer a fundamental problem to be grappled 
                                                 
9 Ibid, p. 4. 
10 Weiss argues strongly for the position that Socrates is simply arguing with the sophists and 
rhetoricians for the sake of winning an argument.  In the Euthydemus, however, Socrates chides two 
sophists for the eristic tendency of wielding words simply for love of victory.   




with and examined; it’s a playful ruse.  If it’s a playful ruse, it no longer contradicts 
common opinion in any serious way, and it is certainly devoid of any controversial 
implications.  It is merely a tool used to make others look foolish.  It is simply a 
playful ruse—nonsense.  Socrates, rendered harmless and uncontroversial, can safely 
be brought back into the fold of conventional opinion.  Why, though, would Socrates 
merely wield these unconventional tools simply to settle back into an opinion of 
moral responsibility that is perfectly conventional?  And where, for that matter, does 
he ever assert that there is intentional wrongdoing or deny that knowledge equals 
virtue? 
Most scholars address the Socratic controversy by trying to minimize it or 
show that it is not Socrates’ final word on the matter.  My hope, contrary to the 
intention of other scholars, is to resurrect the controversial nature of the Socratic 
thesis and lay bare its teaching and consequences.  Let us see what is so radical about 
the thesis.  Is virtue knowledge indeed?  Is all wrongdoing involuntary and therefore 
not culpable?  If the paradox is true, it essentially renders all morality senseless, as it 
makes little sense to assign blame to someone who commits an involuntary crime—
and all crime is involuntary.  Moral theory rests upon the notion that the person who 
committed the crime knew what he was doing and was free to do otherwise, and 
Socrates removes the grounds upon which morality stands.  Can morality be rescued 
on Socratic grounds?   
Understanding this paradox is essential to understanding Plato’s Socrates.  
Through the paradox, we can get a handle on what Socrates means by his two other 




paradox ties these statements together—or rather is a logical consequence of them—
and can help us penetrate through to the core of Plato’s Socrates.  These statements 
are necessarily related, like opposite sides of the same coin.  If we want to argue that 
Socrates was not serious about the paradox, we have to be willing to accept that he 
was not serious in asserting that knowledge is virtue.   
Socrates asserts his famous paradoxes that no one voluntarily does wrong and 
that virtue is knowledge in many places, and often as a seeming side-thought or 
throw-away. His most notable and explicit claim that no one voluntarily does wrong 
is found particularly in two dialogues, the Gorgias and the Protagoras.  Thus, one 
turns to these two dialogues in an attempt to understand Socrates’ understanding of 
moral responsibility, even though there are certainly many other pieces of the puzzle.  
In the Gorgias, Socrates states in the course of a conversation with Callicles that “no 
one does injustice wishing (boulomenon) to do so, but all the ones doing injustice do 
injustice (adikein) involuntarily.”12  His remarks to Protagoras in the dialogue named 
for him are even more telling: 
“For I pretty much think that none of the wise men holds that any 
human being willingly errs or carries out any shameful and bad deeds.  
Rather, they well know that all those who do the shameful (ta aischra) 
and bad things (ta kaka) do them involuntarily (akontes).”13 
 
Despite positing these paradoxical statements here and less explicitly in 
multiple other dialogues, Plato’s Socrates never offers his reader a thematic treatment 
of the relationship between knowledge and virtue.14  The arguments always take place 
                                                 
12 Gorgias, 509e 
13 Protagoras, 345d9-345e4.  Please note that this is the only place in this section where Socrates 
speaks in his own name. 
14 Consider, in addition to Gorgias and Protagoras, Meno 77b-78d, Timaeus 86b-e. Laws V 731c-d 




in a context and are offered to a particular human type.  Moreover, Socrates 
frequently uses intentionally bad arguments in order to lay bare his interlocutors’ 
confusion.  The problem, then, is that although Plato’s Socrates states explicitly many 
times in his own name that no one voluntarily does wrong, he denies giving the 
readers a thematic treatment of the question and refuses even to say what it means.  
One suspects that a proper inquiry would require a monumental work dealing with a 
large number, if not all, of Plato’s Socratic dialogues.  For they are all partial stories, 
and therefore only partially reveal any answers.  When one recognizes the scope that 
is necessary for such an inquiry, and given the bounds of a doctoral dissertation, one 
is forced to make decisions.  In order to limit the scope of the dissertation, a limited 
number of possibilities present themselves.  The first way to proceed would be to 
treat many dialogues in a rather cursory manner, picking and choosing amongst the 
corpus, in order to weave an argument together.  While I think there are perhaps 
scholars who can do this well, I am not sure that the result would hold up to serious 
scrutiny.  Another way to proceed would be to subject one Platonic dialogue to 
exceedingly thorough analysis.  Admittedly, this would be an excellent way to 
proceed.  The problem is that there is no dialogue which has the Socratic thesis that 
no one does wrong voluntarily as its guiding theme, although it certainly lurks in the 
background of many dialogues.  Many dialogues raise the question explicitly, and are 
worthy of investigation, but the mention always takes place within the context of a 
distinct inquiry.15  This is certainly true of the two dialogues that make explicit 
mention of Socrates’ thesis that no one willingly does wrong.  So, for example, the 
                                                 
15 Consider Laws IX 859c-864c, where the Athenian Stranger discusses voluntary wrongdoing in what 




Gorgias is thought to be about rhetoric, or at least somehow about rhetoric and 
justice.  And the Protagoras takes up the question of sophistry as well as questions of 
the unity of the virtues, courage, pleasure, and the teachability of virtue.  Admittedly, 
the Socratic Paradox remains in the background of these two dialogues.  But I would 
like to examine the question in the foreground, out in the open.  
Moreover, if Plato’s Socratic works can collectively be said to be his apology 
of philosophy generally and of Socrates particularly, we can see why he might want 
to obscure the most radical aspects of Socratic philosophy.  There is good reason to 
avoid articulating clearly, in one’s own name, the argument behind the thesis that no 
one willingly does wrong if indeed it is as radical and threatening to morality as I 
have suggested.  Instead of acting as an apology, a clear articulation of this thesis way 
well serve as an indictment of Socratic philosophy.  There is good reason why this 
radical statement might remain, then, in the background for Plato’s Socrates, and 
never rise to the surface.  It is an opinion directly opposed to that of the city, for the 
city’s laws stand, in some important respects, upon a notion of wrongdoing that 
assigns responsibility to the wrongdoer.  Thus the Socratic thesis may truly be radical 
in its rebuke of the city’s opinion or understanding of moral responsibility and, by 
extension, its criminal system.16  Perhaps Plato has Socrates assert these paradoxes, 
but refuses to allow him to elaborate what that means for a dual purpose, first, out of 
a respect for the city and secondly out of a need for self-protection from that very 
city.   
                                                 
16 Consider also Socrates’ rebuke of the City of Athens in the Apology of Socrates, where he says that 
chastisement or education is the proper response to someone who has done wrong before proceeding to 





As Plato never has Socrates discuss this question out in the open, we are, to 
say the least, in need of guidance.  As fortune would have it, we have one in Aristotle, 
for Aristotle offers the first attempt to hold up the Socratic thesis to investigation.  
Moreover, Aristotle has the additional distinction of having near-direct experience 
with the man and his argument.  Plato presented Socrates’ thesis, but Aristotle 
examined it thematically and scrutinized it in his usual way of examining opinions.  
There is less danger to Aristotle in his treatment of the question, if for no other reason 
than that he can begin by treating it as the opinion of someone else, namely Socrates.  
Being removed from the original position grants him some leeway in rationally 
examining Socrates’ thesis.  Moreover, his treatment of the relationship between 
virtue and knowledge takes place within his wider discussion of ethics, which by all 
outward appearances is a defense of traditional ethics or morality.  His discussion of 
Socrates’ radical thesis is both at a remove and in the course of an argument that 
explicitly intends to support common opinion—it is by far less dangerous by outward 
appearance.  So does Socrates’ understanding of the relationship between virtue and 
knowledge, of moral responsibility, withstand Aristotle’s rational scrutiny, and what 
light can Aristotle’s thematic treatment shed on the investigation at hand?  In an 
attempt to get a better hold of the Socratic thesis that all wrongdoing is done out of 
ignorance and therefore involuntary, we would do well, then, to turn to Aristotle.  It is 
with this opinion or hope in mind that we bring Aristotle to bear on this question of 






Rather than try to enter the labyrinth of the Socratic Paradox through the 
Platonic dialogues, turning to Aristotle seems more practical.  Due to the frequent, 
calculated references to Socrates and the Socratic Paradox that Aristotle makes in the 
Nicomachean Ethics, attention to that work promises to offer a much more fruitful 
path.  Moreover, Aristotle’s references to Socrates in the Nicomachean Ethics 
consistently reinforce the notion that the central argument between Aristotle and 
Socrates has to do with the Socratic Paradox.17  In her new book, Aristotle’s Dialogue 
with Socrates: On the Nicomachean Ethics, Ronna Burger argues—persuasively, in 
my opinion—that the Nicomachean Ethics is Aristotle’s prolonged dialogue with 
Socrates, and that considerable insights may be drawn from the Nicomachean Ethics 
keeping its dialogical nature in mind. Indeed, in the Nicomachean Ethics, “Aristotle 
stages a debate with Socrates, represented as the proponent of a teaching that puts 
into question the common understanding of virtue.  Over against this teaching, the 
Ethics sets out to develop a non-Socratic account [of virtue]…”18  Burger uses the 
notion that the Ethics is best conceived as a dialogue between Aristotle and Socrates 
as a heuristic device to interpret the work, and her method, she says, should be judged 
“by the philosophical results it yields.”19  In my analysis of Aristotle’s treatment of 
Socrates in the Nicomachean Ethics, I will follow Ronna Burger’s lead in utilizing the 
                                                 
17 See III.8.1116b3-5, VI.13.1144b17-21; VI.13.1144b28-30; VII.2.1145b23-27; VII.3.1147b13-17.  
The only reference to Socrates in the Nicomachean Ethics that does not deal with the Socratic Paradox 
would seem to be IV.1127b22-26, but even this example points to the tension between Socratic virtue 
and the common understanding of virtue. 
18 Burger, Aristotle’s Dialogue with Socrates: On the Nicomachean Ethics, p. 4. 




heuristic that the Nicomachean Ethics is best viewed as a dialogue or conversation 
with Socrates.   
In other words, Aristotle takes Socratic philosophy to task in the Ethics, and 
this means, above all else, taking Socrates to task on his paradoxical identification of 
virtue and knowledge.  Since Aristotle acts as the arbiter between the man of moral 
virtue, or the gentleman, and the Socratic philosopher in the Nicomachean Ethics, he 
can make Socrates’ case more openly without exposing himself to some of the more 
radical charges that were leveled against Socrates.  And if the virtues of character and 
the life devoted to it are to be saved, Aristotle must show the problems with Socrates’ 
understanding of virtue.  In turning to Aristotle, I am guided by the belief that he will 
act as an intelligent, critical interpreter of the Socratic thesis that virtue is knowledge. 
Nor is Burger alone in turning to Aristotle to understand Socrates.  Martin 
Heidegger makes frequent recourse to Aristotle in an attempt to understand the 
Platonic dialogues, arguing that Aristotle makes clear what Plato leaves obscure.20  
Alfarabi enigmatically claims that Aristotle sees the perfection of man as Plato does, 
and more.21  While everyone may not view Aristotle’s work as a dialogue with 
Plato’s Socrates, there is clearly room for this method of interpretation.  Scholars and 
even philosophers at various times and places have had recourse to Aristotle, Plato’s 
star pupil, in an attempt better to understand the teaching of Plato’s Socrates.   
With specific reference to my thesis topic, it will become quite clear that 
Aristotle, too, is concerned with the strange Socratic assertion that virtue is 
knowledge, an assertion so at odds with the way that we ordinarily understand the 
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world.  We most certainly want to be able to hold people accountable for the wrongs 
that they commit for reasons other than inculpable ignorance.  Aristotle gives full 
voice to this sentiment, while not shrinking away from the profound challenge that 
Socrates offers to the ordinary understanding of virtue and vice.  Indeed, this rift is 
central to the debate between Aristotle and Socrates in the Nicomachean Ethics—all 
of the other arguments point back to this central question.  Is virtue knowledge, and, 
if so, what might that mean?  The test case for Socrates’ thesis, according to Aristotle, 
is the phenomenon of incontinence, and I will accordingly devote considerable 
attention to Aristotle’s analysis of Socrates’ denial of this phenomenon, a denial 
which springs from the roots of the Socratic thesis that knowledge equals virtue.  
Indeed, there is a vast literature that treats of Aristotle’s account of Socrates’ denial of 
incontinence in VII.3.  Many scholars have turned to Aristotle to understand Socrates’ 
denial of this phenomenon.22  My thesis will expand upon this scholarly literature, 
however, by situating the apparent disagreement between Socrates and Aristotle in 
Book VII within the larger structure of the Ethics.  The entire analysis of Aristotle 
which follows is all done with a view toward understanding the Socratic thesis that 
knowledge equals virtue, and, while the topic is most clearly on the table in Book VII, 
our analysis must not be limited to this part of the work. 
Aristotle details, in part, Socrates’ thesis from Protagoras for us in Book VII, 
Chapter 2 of the Ethics.  While many scholars deny that Socrates actually believed 
that no one does wrong, Aristotle is not among them.  Aristotle does not hesitate to 
treat Socrates’ thesis that no one voluntarily does wrong as indeed Socrates’ genuine 
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understanding of the way things are, and he treats this thesis with the seriousness with 
which such a radical statement, offered by a serious thinker, demands.  All the while, 
Aristotle reminds us of the very clear objection that Socrates’ thesis does indeed 
contradict the way the world appears to us—the thesis, therefore, appears non-
sensical.  In a discussion of vice and lack of self-restraint, Aristotle counts Socrates 
amongst some (he does not say who the others are) who deny that it is possible for 
those who conceive things correctly to behave incontinently (akrasia).  It would be 
terrible if one could know and do otherwise, as if knowledge were dragged around 
like a slave by something else, as the common opinion of the matter stands.  It is this 
type of speech against which Socrates used to do battle (machein).  No one acts 
contrary to what seems to him or her to be best, but rather all wrongdoing comes 
about as a result of ignorance, ignorance of what is truly best.  Aristotle then goes on 
to say that it is necessary to seek or investigate the argument (logos) concerning this 
event or occurrence (pathos), because it clearly disputes things appearing 
(phainomenoi) to be manifest.  If one objection to the Socratic thesis is that it 
contradicts the world as it appears, Aristotle will certainly not overlook this objection. 
Upon investigation of the matter, Aristotle ends up in agreement with the 
Socratic thesis that virtue is knowledge in the Nicomachean Ethics (VII.3).  There 
Aristotle says,  
And since the ultimate term is not a universal and does not seem to pertain to 
knowledge in the same was as something universal does, it also appears that 
what Socrates was looking for turns out to be the case.  For it is not when 
knowledge in the governing sense seems to be present that the experience of 
unrestraint occurs, nor is it this that is dragged around by passion, but a 
knowledge involving sense-perception.  So about its being someone who 




restraint, let it have been discussed to this extent (Nicomachean Ethics: VII.3 
1147b10-20.). 
 
To be sure, it is difficult to take any one thing Aristotle says and offer it as his final 
word on the matter, due to his style of writing.  This conclusion, however tentative, is 
arrived at in Book VII after an analysis of wrongdoing in Book III and a search for 
the intellectual virtues in Book VI (and what do we make of the account of the moral 
virtues that falls between these topics?).  In order to understand Aristotle’s agreement 
with Socrates in this matter, it is imperative to go back and analyze these two books 
as they bear so directly on the heart of the matter.  What is the relationship between 
moral responsibility and knowledge, according to Aristotle, and, by extension, 
Socrates?  We can only begin to know after an examination of the relevant books 
have been discussed. 
Aristotle, I believe, can be especially helpful in understanding Socrates’ 
strange thesis regarding moral responsibility and its relationship to knowledge and 
virtue.  During the course of this investigation, therefore, I will turn for the most part 
to Aristotle in an effort better to understand Socrates’ strange theses that virtue is 
knowledge and that all wrongdoing is involuntary.  My focus in using Aristotle will 
be on his Nicomachean Ethics, particularly Books III and VII, as I will describe in the 
outline of the thesis that follows.   If we really want to understand Aristotle’s account 
of voluntary actions, it is necessary to begin with his discussion of the subject in 
Book III, which also appears to treat issues discussed by Socrates and Plato.  Thus, 
Chapter Three of this thesis will be an investigation of Aristotle’s account of moral 




helpful occasionally to return to Plato’s Socrates as well as to Aristotle’s other works, 
namely his Eudemian Ethics as well as some of his works on logic.   
I will use Aristotle fully aware that it is commonly argued that Aristotle and 
Socrates differ fundamentally on the question of ignorance and vice.23  While 
recognizing the objection of identifying Aristotle and Socrates and even being open to 
the validity of such an objection, I do hope to investigate the matter and remain open 
to the possibility that they ultimately share many of the same considered opinions.  
Consider the following by means of example.  In Book I of the Nicomachean Ethics, 
we get the pronouncement from Aristotle that it has been beautifully said that the 
good is the thing at which all things aim; it would follow that all human beings aim at 
the good.  Whether they attain the good or miss the mark is another matter.   In a 
similar vein, Socrates says that no one is content to have the appearance of the good; 
we all want the real good.24  No one would voluntarily be deprived of the good things.  
Stating this positively instead of negatively shows the agreement with Aristotle: 
everyone wants the good.  It follows that anyone who does wrong must believe that 
those actions are good in themselves or that those actions are perfectly acceptable, 
excusable, or justifiable means to another good.  My contention is that Aristotle 
reaffirms Plato’s—or Plato’s Socrates’—conception of the good as that at which all 
human beings aim.  To say that everyone aims at the good is the same as declaring 
that no one aims at the bad.  While there are many who argue that Plato and Aristotle 
differ on the fundamental questions, others do see similarities.  No less of an authority 
than Alfarabi, for that matter, argues that Plato and Aristotle presented the same 
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theory.  “So let it be clear to you,” he says, “that, in what they presented, their 
purpose is the same, and that they intended to offer one and the same philosophy.”25  
Alasdair MacIntyre, to offer another example, claims that “Aristotle’s belief in the 
unity of the virtues is one of the few parts of his moral philosophy which he inherits 
directly from Plato.”26  While I would not go so far as to say that Aristotle’s moral 
thought is simply inherited from his teacher Plato, I do hope to show that in fact 
Aristotle and Socrates, Plato’s teacher, end up with quite similar positions with regard 
to moral responsibility.  I concede that this harmony is not readily apparent, and 
David L. Schaefer, speaking with reference to this very matter of knowledge and 
virtue, states that “only a thorough scrutiny of Aristotle’s argument reveals his deeper 
agreement with the Socratic thesis.”27   
Assuming perfect, or even partial, harmony between Socrates and Aristotle is 
in no way essential to proceed in the manner that I have proposed.  Even if, in the 
end, the ultimate conclusion finds significant differences between Aristotle and 
Socrates regarding knowledge and virtue, the use of Aristotle to understand Socrates 
is warranted: Aristotle still treated the Socratic theses regarding knowledge and virtue 
systematically and is therefore suitable to the investigation as an intelligent 
commentator.   
Martin Heidegger, moreover, argued that Aristotle made clear what Plato left 
obscure and he also holds it as a reasonable assumption that Aristotle understood 
Plato.28  His examination of Plato’s Sophist begins and makes frequent return to 
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Aristotle in an attempt to understand that dialogue.  I will therefore attempt a 
thorough scrutiny of Book III and VII of the Nicomachean Ethics, because I believe 
that such an investigation can inform our understanding of moral responsibility and 
the radical relationship suggested by Socrates between wisdom or knowledge and 
virtue. Even at the beginning of his Nicomachean Ethics, we get an early indication 
that Aristotle is sensitive to the problem of virtue and knowledge.  He suggests that 
they are somehow related, or at least that knowledge is in some way connected to the 
human end or goal (telos).  He indicates early on that one must possess awareness or 
recognition (gnōsis) of the end in order to aim at it (1094a23), and that humans ought 
to get a grasp, at least in outline, as to what the end is and to which of the sciences 
(epistēmai) or powers (dunamai) it belongs (1094a25-26).  From the very beginning 
of Book I, Aristotle raises the question of the relationship between knowledge and 
living well.  Aristotle displays his sensitivity to the question of the relationship of 
knowledge to virtue throughout the Ethics, and, although he treats many questions in 
his great ethical work, he never strays too far from this all important question.    
Turning to the Classics 
Before turning to outline the chapters, perhaps a defense of the following two 
questions is in order.  First, why go back to Aristotle and Socrates in the first place, 
and secondly why go back to their moral theory in a dissertation that is supposed to 
be dedicated to political philosophy?  
After many years, perhaps many hundreds of years, it became acceptable in 
the Twentieth Century to turn to the thought of the Classics in matters of morality and 




Classics is based at least partly on the conditional opinion, certainly open to being 
rejected later, that Aristotle and Plato actually have something to teach regarding 
political and moral matters.  Stated differently, we face the same problems that they 
faced.  And this openness is related to dissatisfaction with or a rejection of the 
culmination of the political and moral thought that sought to displace the earlier, 
classical way of thinking that has roots at least as early as Niccolò Machiavelli.29  
Many faults or shortcomings emerged in Modern Rationalism, as its promises to 
usher in an era of reason and solutions to the political problems proved to be 
unfulfilled.  A universally valid set of rules discernable to unaided human reason that 
will solve all of our problems is no longer believed in or even hoped for in the post-
modern world.  Enlightenment rationalism has been killed by post-moderns, revealing 
the flaws in a rationalism that did not recognize its own limits.  Everything is a 
possibility now, and political and moral philosophy is badly in search of an answer to 
the question of how to ground answers to these questions, or even if a grounding is 
necessary or desirable.30  But if everything is once again a possibility, and all bets are 
truly off, then the Classics are back on the table a as a means for helping us to think 
seriously about politics and morality.  After all, classical rationalism is quite distinct 
from modern, Enlightenment rationalism.  Reason, at least in its modern or 
Enlightened form, has been pronounced dead, which has led some hopefuls to search 
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Strauss' Indictment of Christian Philosophy.”    
30 MacIntyre, After Virtue, p. 117.  With the failure of modern rationalism, MacIntyre argues, the only 
remaining choices are Nietzsche or Aristotle.  “Hence the defensibility of the Nietzschean position ,” 





for rationalism of a different stripe: “In light of all these problems,” Franco Volpi 
says, “the recovery of the practical philosophy of the Aristotelian tradition offered 
itself as an alternative solution insofar as it was recovered as an alternative paradigm 
of knowledge for modernity and for the unitary notion of science that characterizes 
modernity.”31 
Many thinkers, scholars, and philosophers have returned to the thought of 
Plato and Aristotle in the wake of Nietzsche’s devastating attack on the 
Enlightenment.  The number of scholars and serious thinkers who have returned to 
the Classics in order to reflect on politics, morality, and philosophy in the twentieth 
century is quite remarkable. And the scholars are quite diverse, coming, as Aristide 
Tessitore notes, “from a number of different disciplines and from a number of 
different perspectives within those disciplines.”32  Scholars, commentators, and 
thinkers are on the right and on the left, communitarian and liberal, religious and 
secular, and the list of scholars spans America and the continent.  A return is in many 
ways an appropriate response for thinkers who hold reason in high regard and 
recognize the success of Nietzsche’s project.  Alasdair MacIntyre has pronounced 
Aristotle to be the only viable option to Nietzsche for intelligent human beings living 
in the age in which we find ourselves; the Enlightenment is dead, and our only 
options are Aristotle and Nietzsche. 33 
The fact that many thinkers have returned to Aristotle and Socrates by itself is 
not sufficient justification to join this recovery effort; the return is warranted only if 
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there is actually something to learn from Aristotle and Socrates regarding the 
fundamental human problems.  Or to state it slightly differently, there are permanent 
human problems that continue to occupy the minds of intelligent men; inquiry into 
political and moral matters stems from a genuine concern with the nature of the best 
life and the best regime.  The problems we have mentioned thus far are problems not 
only for Aristotle, but also for any serious student of political philosophy.  The 
relationship of knowledge to virtue, or of intellectual to moral virtue, remains a 
question worth asking, as no definitive answer has been reached.  In fact, as the 
answer reached in the Enlightenment has now been rejected, and we are left to 
understand this question anew.   
The age in which we find ourselves is one doubting all answers to the 
permanent questions, but it is not necessary to think that Aristotle, or Socrates for that 
matter, possesses definitive answers in order to proceed with an investigation of his 
thought.  Rather, this dissertation takes as its fundamental aim making clear the 
questions related to moral responsibility or more accurately to the problem of moral 
responsibility.  My working assumption is that the relationship between knowledge 
and morality is problematic and worthy of investigation, but it remains to be shown 
precisely how it is a problem.  What questions ought to be asked as one tries to move 
forward, and what ought to be taken into consideration?  What are the sources of 
tension in a discussion of morality and knowledge, and what are the perplexities or 
impasses that we will reach?  Before one goes about answering questions, one must 
first make clear the questions.  And to assert that Socrates or Aristotle came up with 




response as to why we ought to turn to the thought of Aristotle and Socrates is that 
the problem of moral responsibility was precisely that for these thinkers, a problem, 
an alive, genuine, urgent problem that demands our attention as thinking human 
beings, human beings alive and open to the question of how we ought to live our 
lives.  Perplexed, we turn to the thinkers who saw virtue as a question, a point of 
inquiry, in order to clarify our thinking.  Clarity about the terms of the debate, or the 
perennial issues, must be met, and this dissertation is guided by the assumption, 
certainly open to qualification or rejection, that Aristotle and Socrates can aid us to 
see the nature of the problem more clearly. 
Within the discipline of morality or ethics, it has been especially fashionable 
to turn to the thought of Aristotle.  Indeed, many philosophers, as Amélie Oksenberg 
Rorty says, “have recently turned their attentions to Aristotle’s ethics, particularly to 
the Nicomachean Ethics… [And] Some of the impetus for the return to Aristotelian 
scholarship in ethics has come from a sense of the impoverishment of recent moral 
philosophy.”34  In part, the return to Aristotle in ethics comes about not only as a 
result of a rejection of an earlier way of thinking but also from a profound 
dissatisfaction with a discipline that is dominated by two schools of thought.  For 
quite some time, ethical theory has come to be dominated by either Kantian 
(deontological) or Utilitarian ethics.  Both of these approaches to ethics stress specific 
actions, or try to prescribe definite, discernable rules for how one ought to act that 
hold in all cases.  Dissatisfied with these choices, moral theorists have turned to the 
thought of Aristotle if for no other reason than to examine or to elaborate an 
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alternative account of how human beings ought to live.  This endeavor is guided by 
the hope of finding an alternative to these two schools.  Virtue ethics, in its Twentieth 
Century form, has tried to revive interest in Aristotle’s way of thinking.  Indeed, 
virtue ethics seems to be quite in vogue, thanks, in large part, to the Alasdair 
MacIntyre’s widely successful work, After Virtue.  Within ethics as a sub-discipline 
of academic philosophy, Aristotle has once again garnered serious attention. 
But why is it appropriate for students of political philosophy to follow this 
lead?  Perhaps the most compelling reason is that Aristotle himself treated ethics as a 
part of political science or philosophy (Nicomachean Ethics I.2 1094a-1094b).  That 
is, according to Aristotle, ethics or morality is properly the domain of political 
science or political philosophy.  Any inquiry into Aristotle’s ethics that hopes to do it 
justice, therefore, must remain sensitive to the political nature of the inquiry.  If 
ethical theory has treated Aristotle’s ethics as a distinct course of inquiry separate 
from political concerns, it has failed to understand the nature of the problem for 
Aristotle and thus misrepresented his thought.  For Aristotle, an investigation of 
morality necessarily falls under political philosophy.  Any effort to separate morality 
from politics is mistaken insofar as questions of morality necessarily take place 
within the political community and that community claims to offer the most definitive 
answer to the question of what the good life is.  As Aristide Tessitore states, “Studies 
of Aristotle’s ethics, although often excellent, typically lack a deep appreciation for 
the political dimension within which that teaching is presented.”35  With respect to 
morality, politics must remain on the table.  The virtues are necessary for us living 
together well.  This seems to be especially true of the moral virtues, as these are those 
                                                 




virtues that dictate how a good human being acts with respect to other human beings.  
Going forward, however, we have to recognize an important division.  Aristotle 
divides the virtues into two categories, moral and intellectual, and an important 
question is what is the relationship between the two.  The political nature of the first, 
moral virtue, is evident, but what is the relationship between politics and intellectual 
virtue.  Or, what is the relationship between the moral and the intellectual virtues?  
Are they completely independent, is there perfect harmony, does one depend upon the 
prior establishment of the other, or are the coterminous?  Can one possess the moral 
virtues without possessing the intellectual virtues and vice-versa?  What is the 
relationship between knowledge and virtue, especially given Socrates’ claim that 
knowledge is the sum of virtue?  Again we have run into the same impasse: what is 
the relationship of knowledge to virtue?  I intend to investigate these questions 
through an examination of Aristotle’s ethics, especially in the Nicomachean Ethics, 
and I intend to do so keeping the political dimension of the work central.  Aristide 
Tessitore’s Reading Aristotle’s Ethics has paved the way for this work by 
highlighting the political nature of Aristotle’s writing, but in this work Tessitore only 
sketches out an interpretive framework for reading the Ethics and leaves particular 
themes or problems for other authors.  He does this with the “expectation that an 
awareness of this unjustly neglected component of the Ethics will prove useful in 
subsequent attempts to clarify and disentangle its particular themes and notorious 
problems.”36  I intend to follow Tessitore, taking up his charge, and bring the 
awareness to bear on the question of moral responsibility especially as it relates to 
knowledge and virtue. 
                                                 





General Outline of the Dissertation  
Briefly, let me state the structure of the thesis as I intend to treat the questions 
at hand.  The current chapter hopefully has served as an introduction to the problem 
of moral responsibility especially as it relates to the relationship of knowledge and 
virtue.  I hope to have shown this truly to be a problem that is alive and well and to 
have pointed to Aristotle and Socrates as two thinkers who have understood the 
problem well.  I also hope to have shown sufficient justification for going back to the 
Classics in an attempt better to understand morality. 
Proceeding with the understanding that I have shown Socrates as well as 
Aristotle to be of help in thinking clearly about these matters, I will turn in Chapter 
Two to an introduction to the investigation of Aristotle’s moral philosophy.  Such an 
investigation must situate Aristotle’s moral, or as he would call them, ethical writings 
within his larger corpus and attempt to ascertain what sort of an aim the Nicomachean 
Ethics has.  As we are considering what sort of a work the Ethics is, we try to make 
clear Aristotle’s style of writing.  Who is the intended audience of the Ethics?  What 
sort of a study is it?   What type of knowledge does it hope to impart, and what sort of 
knowledge is even possible of the matters under consideration?  This is, I believe, a 
necessary preliminary before one can move to the substantive discussion.  
Understanding the aim of the entire work will greatly aid understanding the aim or 
intent of any of the parts. 
Relying on the method of interpretation that is to be worked out in Chapter 




responsibility found in Book III of his Ethics, as this is the part of the Ethics generally 
agreed to treat of the subject.  There, Aristotle takes up the question of voluntary 
versus involuntary acts, proceeding from the premise that only voluntary acts can be 
blamed or praised.  As virtue is under consideration, Aristotle tells us that a virtuous 
act must be voluntarily performed.  My suggestion is that a conception of voluntary 
versus involuntary will hinge, in part, on knowledge or knowing.  Somehow, 
knowledge, or intellectual virtue, becomes inextricably linked with moral virtue. 
Aristotle’s investigation of the intellectual virtues is found at the end of Book 
VI and then sustained throughout Book VII of the Ethics.  An investigation of these 
chapters is pertinent to the investigation at hand, as Book VI ends and Book VII 
begins with references to Socrates and variations of his famous thesis that knowledge 
is virtue.  An investigation of Book VII should, therefore, tie together the questions 
raised at the outset.  What is the relationship between virtue and knowledge, and how 
does Aristotle arrive at the understanding he has come to hold?  By this point, we 
should have some very clear conclusions to draw, which will lead into the final 
chapter. 
The final chapter will hopefully present the conclusions from the previous 
chapters as well as articulate whatever new perplexities or impasses have arisen, as 
there no doubt will be.  Even if we have reached the conclusion that virtue is 
knowledge and vice ignorance, what then?  What ought human beings to do?  Does 
the dictum knowledge is virtue give us any guidance into the question of how we 
ought to live?  Can we really excuse all wrong-doing on the basis of ignorance alone?  




be responsible for one’s own ignorance?  Or, differently stated, how can one take up 
the responsibility of pursuing knowledge?  Hopefully, I will be able to provide some 
insights into how Aristotle understood these question.  And in so doing, hopefully we 
will have gained some insight into the permanent question that man perpetually poses 






Chapter 2: Interpreting Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics 
 
 
Turning to the Nicomachean Ethics 
Turning to Aristotle to aid in understanding the Socratic Paradox means 
turning, above all, to his Nicomachean Ethics, for it is here that Aristotle addresses 
Socrates’ paradox regarding knowledge and virtue directly.  Yet even as we turn to 
Aristotle guided by the initial consideration that it may be useful for understanding 
Plato’s Socrates, or enlightening in its own right, we have to recognize that this 
endeavor is also fraught with difficulties.  To begin with, Aristotle’s discussion of 
Socrates’ thesis takes place over halfway through the book, in Book VII.  
Additionally,  Aristotle’s discussion of Socrates on moral responsibility in Book VII 
is Aristotle’s second account of moral responsibility, the first taking place in Book 
III.  So if Books VII depends on Book III, and both or either of these books depends 
in any way on what comes before, some understanding of the previous books is in 
order.   
First and foremost, Aristotle’s intention and manner of writing in this work 
must be determined before any interpretation of that writing can be proffered.  
Situating the work within his writings can also aid in that endeavor.  This means 
determining, in the first place, what type of work the Nicomachean Ethics is.  
Additionally, Aristotle’s audience must be identified: for whom is this work written?  




of different groups or types of human beings.  These and related questions are of 
immediate importance, because our answers to these questions will dictate, in part, 
the method of interpreting this work.  A private letter to a friend would be interpreted 
differently than the public speech of a politician.  Dialogues are written differently 
from essays, and should accordingly be read differently.  Before proceeding to treat 
Aristotle’s account of moral responsibility, then, we are compelled to give an account 
of the Ethics as a whole that pays proper attention to its political, practical, dialectical 
nature, and identifies its primary audience or audiences. 
An objection may immediately be made to this proposed method: why 
shouldn’t the work be read straightforwardly?  Why not turn directly to what Aristotle 
says in Books III and VII to discern his teaching on moral responsibility?  And 
doesn’t what has been said thus far imply a method of writing that is overly 
convoluted, difficult to interpret, or even deceitful?  The easiest defense to these 
objections is to indicate the contradictory conclusions reached in Aristotle’s accounts 
of moral responsibility in Book III and VII.  That is, Book III offers an account of 
moral responsibility that mostly accords with convention: both virtue and vice, 
Aristotle tells us, are things that are voluntary (III.5.1114b21-25).  In other words, 
people voluntarily do wrong or vicious things.  But in his analysis of the Socratic 
thesis, Aristotle ends by telling us that it appears Socrates was correct 
(VII.3.1147b13-15).  And, to restate, Socrates’ position is that all wrongdoing is the 
result of ignorance and therefore involuntary (VII.2.1145b21-35).  Thus, Books III 
and VII seem to be in contradiction.  The question on the table then is: what has 




Before diving into that particularly complex example, which is the core of this 
dissertation, I would first like to establish, in the present chapter, that Aristotle does 
indeed write in this particularly perplexing manner by offering other, earlier 
examples.  I will also argue that these perplexities are not the result of carelessness 
but are carefully and deliberately made.  Additionally, I will offer some suggestions 
as to why Aristotle would have chosen to write in this deliberately perplexing 
manner.   
With respect to the first matter, even a superficial reading of the Ethics 
supports the claim that Aristotle’s manner of writing is unusually perplexing.  Many 
commentators readily admit as much.  Terrence Irwin, for example, states that, “Often 
Aristotle’s own argument is brief, inexplicit and incomplete on some important 
issues.”37  Robert C. Bartlett calls Aristotle’s manner of writing “unusually complex 
and subtle.”38   Aristotle, according to Jonathan Barnes, is “terse, compact, abrupt, his 
arguments condensed, his thought dense.”39  With specific reference to the 
Nicomachean Ethics, as a result of these seeming inconsistencies, Barnes proclaims 
that it is “evidently not a unitary work.”40 Aristotle’s writing is indeed difficult to 
make sense of, as a quick glance at the scholarship reveals, but I do hope to show that 
the Ethics is in fact a unitary work. 
Indeed, beginning at the very outset, the reader is struck by Aristotle’s 
perplexing style of writing that he will use throughout the text. The oft-quoted 
opening lines of the Ethics show very clearly Aristotle’s lack of clarity: 
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Every art and every inquiry, and likewise every action and choice, 
seems to aim at some good, and hence it has been beautifully [or 
nobly, kalōs] said that the good is that at which all things aim (I.1. 
1094a1-3). 
 
One could certainly take Aristotle here to be asserting, in his own name, that all 
things aim at the good, but this is not at all what he in fact says.  Every art, inquiry, 
action and choice seem to aim at some unspecified good.  And hence, it has been 
beautifully or nobly (kalōs) said that all things aim at the good.  But something that 
has been beautifully said is by no means necessarily truly or correctly said.  In fact, 
there may be beautiful stories, myths, untruths, or even beautiful or well-born lies. 41  
Moreover, we have jumped from some unspecified good (agathou tinos) to the good 
simply (t’agathon).  Lastly, it has been beautifully said that the good is that at which 
all things aim, but this construction is in the middle voice in the Greek, a voice 
between active and passive, and it thus leaves the speaker unidentified.  It seems 
presumptuous to assume that it is Aristotle speaking in his own name, even if, in the 
end, one does conclude that.  If nothing else, the opening lines of the Nicomachean 
Ethics ought to alert the careful reader to be on his toes, so to speak.   
Aristotle proceeds here on the basis of conditional clauses, as opposed to 
direct declarations: 
 “If there is some end of the things we do that we want on account of 
itself, and the rest on account of this one, and we do not choose 
everything on account of something else (for in that way the choices 
would go beyond all bounds, so that desire would be empty and 
pointless), it is clear that this would be the good, even the best.” 
(I.2.1094a18-22). 
 
On the surface of things, Aristotle here appears to tell the reader that there is an end 
for human beings, and that it is the highest good.  Yet a closer reading reveals just 
                                                 




how tentative this statement really is.  It asserts absolutely nothing: if there is some 
end (telos) in question then that end is the best (ariston) thing.  Aristotle also raises 
the possibility, only immediately to discard it without evidence, that human desire 
may in fact be pointless.   
Aristotle occasionally contradicts himself, frequently hesitates, and constantly 
reminds the audience of the limits to his investigation.  Aristotle couches his 
assertions in uncertainty, using the construction that something seems or is held to be 
so (dokei) with great frequency.  Some of his arguments are asserted, and others 
rejected, without anything approaching a logical argument (consider I.11.1101b5-9).  
Sometimes Aristotle appeals to popular opinion either to support what he says or to 
reject an alternative opinion (I.41095a16-28, I.5.1095b14-22), and at other times he 
makes such appeals to the “refined” (I.4.1095a17-20, 1.5.1095b22-23), and on 
occasion he appeals to the opinion of the wise (I.4.1095a20-21).  Aristotle refuses to 
review all opinions, saying that it would be rather pointless, and chooses to examine 
only those opinions that have prominence (I.4.1095a28-30).  But obscurity alone is 
insufficient ground for rejecting an opinion.  In addition to the opinions of those 
mentioned, Aristotle also cites the authority of poets (I.4.1095b10-14).  Aristotle also 
tells his audience that his arguments in Book I are imprecise or simply a sketch 
(I.3.1094b11-27, and I.7.1098a21-1098b8), and frequently he drops a line of 
argument.  Moreover, he often tells the reader that the argument under consideration 
would be more appropriate in another type of inquiry or speech (logos) (e.g., 
I.6.1096b7-8).  In one telling case, when trying to rule out the possibility of the 




reader simply to let the matter drop, “since to be precise about them [the forms] 
would be more at home in another sort of philosophy” (I.6.1096b30-31).  In the 
context of his investigation of the human end or the human good, Aristotle relegates a 
discussion of the good to another philosophic inquiry, a philosophic inquiry different 
in kind from the one presented here.  Again in Chapter Eleven, when discussing 
whether the fortune of one’s descendents has any influence upon one’s happiness 
after death, Aristotle allows there to be some such influence because to deny it would 
be too unfeeling and contrary to people’s opinions (I.11.1101a22-24).  It seems as 
though every time he encounters a touchy subject, Aristotle demurs.  
Aristotle’s contradictions and peculiarities in argument are often found within 
the same book, often within the same chapter, and sometimes even within the space 
of a few lines.  The difficulty of interpreting Aristotle reflects, in more than one way, 
the difficulty of the subject matter.  He is speaking about matters that he tells us it is 
difficult if not impossible to be precise about, namely the beautiful or noble and the 
just (the good is not mentioned).  That Aristotle’s manner of writing is perplexing 
should be clear, and it is precisely this perplexing manner or writing that allows for, 
or perhaps even encourages, diametrically opposed interpretations of his work.  The 
reason for such blatantly contradictory interpretations is quite obvious as soon as one 
notices that Aristotle contradicts himself many times in this work.  As was stated, this 
thesis will have to confront the direct disagreement in Aristotle’s account of moral 
responsibility in Books III and VII.   A simple reading of these two sections reveals, 
as I briefly showed, stark contradictions in Aristotle’s teaching regarding moral 




teachings have to be reconciled in some way, or they are dependent upon the context, 
or the contradiction is the result of carelessness, or the teaching of one book is 
somehow superior to the other—that is, Aristotle intentionally presents multiple 
teachings regarding moral responsibility in his Ethics.   In order to make such 
determinations, we have to try to articulate the method of interpreting contradictions, 
omissions, and seeming repetitions.  I hope to have shown convincingly that 
Aristotle’s manner of writing is not straightforward.  It remains, however, to be 
shown that this manner of writing is the result of deliberate care rather than of 
confusion or carelessness.  I hope next to show why Aristotle might write in this 
manner. 
Why is Aristotle’s Manner of Writing So Complex ? 
There are four reasons that explain why Aristotle wrote in a deliberately 
perplexing manner: first, to avoid persecution; next, to protect salutary opinions; 
thirdly, for the sake of education; and, lastly, as a result of the necessary 
incompleteness of human knowledge.  
In the first place, the guiding question under consideration in the Ethics—
namely, what is the best life?—is a politically sensitive one.  That is, any conclusions 
reached or answers given necessarily degrade, or relegate to secondary status, other 
ways of living.  Moreover, if the best human life is not identical with the life of the 
good citizen, then Aristotle’s discussion runs the risk of offending any and all existing 
political associations, including, of course, the one in which he lives.  In other words, 
to ask what the best life is for a human being is necessarily to call into question the 




Aristotle’s assertion late in the Ethics that the contemplative life is the best life for a 
human being, for example, necessarily depreciates the life of the morally serious man, 
the man upon whom the political association depends.  Aristotle’s discussion of 
human happiness and the best life properly falls within a political discussion.  
Aristotle’s manner of proceeding tries to pay the proper respect to the moral and 
political world, even as he points beyond it. 
Aristotle’s attempt to call the city’s opinions into question only with extreme 
caution and reticence—or even, the attempt to preserve some of the city’s opinions—
is not the result merely of self-interest.  We should not misinterpret Aristotle’s 
indirect speech as duplicitous for the sake simply of self-preservation.  Quite to the 
contrary, Aristotle’s manner of teaching can be viewed as quite philanthropic, insofar 
as it attempts to better any human being who might read his work.  Aristotle’s work is 
not an unbridled attempt to uproot the prevailing political opinions, even if those 
opinions are somehow inadequate.  Living together well requires traditional opinions.  
Aristotle’s task is in this respect twofold: encourage respect for traditional opinion or 
authority and point to the limits of that respect.  To state it somewhat differently, 
Aristotle wants to laud both moral and intellectual virtue, and this is no small task.  
For moral and intellectual virtue may ultimately prove not only to be distinct, but 
even in direct tension with one another.  Some moral opinions are decent or salutary, 
even if the basis on which these opinions rest is not necessarily rational.  That is, 
there is something beneficial about the attachment that most decent human beings 
have to moral virtue, even if they do not fully understand that attachment.  It would 




false opinions without having the ability either to provide new reasons to be attached 
to moral virtue or to point to something higher.  Because Aristotle’s educational 
project recognizes its own rational limits, it has, in a way, humbler aims.  Aristotle 
does not seek to turn every human being into a philosopher, nor does he think that is 
even desirable or possible.  He seeks, rather, to reassure some morally serious persons 
of the decency of that attachment. 
 But there is, clearly, an educational purpose to the text.  In this work that is so 
political, we are reminded that education must be the object, above all else, of the one 
who is engaged in politics, the legislator.42  The educational aspect of the Ethics is 
another reason why Aristotle’s manner of writing is incomplete.  The book is not 
written for those who already have insight into these things by themselves 
(I.4.1095b10).  Such persons have no need of this book.  Rather it is for those who are 
able to be educated.  Aristotle leaves certain arguments or conclusions for the reader 
to figure out for himself or herself.  Rather than simply supplying the reader with 
ready made answers, in other words, Aristotle tries to teach us to think.  If the 
conclusions were simply dictated as a matter of fact, without the intellectual training 
that it takes to get there, it wouldn’t be worthy of the name education.  The Ethics is 
an exercise in rational thought, in syllogistic reasoning.  The work, to put it another 
way that I will explain shortly, is dialectical in nature, and dialectics, Aristotle tells 
us, is useful for three purposes: training or exercise (gymnasia), casual encounters, 
and the philosophical sciences (Topics I.2.101a25-30).  The usefulness of dialectics in 
exercise, Aristotle says, should be evident on its own terms.  It is teaching or training 
in how to think. 
                                                 




 All of this is not to say that the end result will provide clear answers.  It may 
not.  But it may still yield significant insight, most generally into the limits of human 
knowledge.  This, too, explains the partial character of Aristotle’s writings.  One of 
the reasons that Aristotle does not straightforwardly give us answers because human 
knowledge is necessarily incomplete in at least two regards.  First, knowledge of the 
whole eludes human beings.43  And secondly, the future is always unclear 
(I.10.1101a17-19).  But progress in knowledge is possible.  We can improve our 
knowledge, recognizing that some of our strongest held opinions are false or that 
deepest longings are nonsensical or imaginary.  Learning from Aristotle truly means 
learning with Aristotle.   
Granting, then, that Aristotle intentionally writes in this manner, how ought 
we to read Aristotle?  Or, what are some things to keep in mind as we attempt to 
make sense of his work?  First, as was previously noted, the inquiry in Aristotle’s 
Ethics is political.  Indeed, ethics is a part of politics for Aristotle, and this must be 
kept in mind.  Aristide Tessitore argues that many otherwise excellent studies of the 
Ethics “typically lack a deep appreciation for the political dimension within which 
that teaching is presented.”44  Accordingly, every attempt will be made to remain 
sensitive to the political nature of the Ethics.  Following Tessitore, as well as Bodéüs 
and others, I hope to take Aristotle’s own assessment of the nature of the Ethics 
seriously.  Very early on, in I.2, Aristotle tells us that the Ethics is a sort of political 
inquiry (mēthodos, 1094b10-11).  The end of the inquiry in the Ethics, namely the 
human good, is stated outright at the beginning, and falls under some knowledge or 
                                                 
43 Consider Topics I.11.104b15-17.  Also, Posterior Analytics II.19.100a3-b17. 




capacity.  It would seem, Aristotle says, that the science or art of politics aims to 
understand the good for a human being.  Aristotle’s inquiry into the question of 
human happiness leads him almost immediately to declare that the question of the 
human good—or happiness—belongs to the knowledge, science, or capacity of 
politics (politikē).  Politics thus understood may mean the political art or even 
political science, but it should be clear above all that it most emphatically is related to 
politics.  So the investigation that takes place in the Nicomachean Ethics is a political 
investigation (I.1.1094b10-11).  We ought to be alert to the possibility that Aristotle 
defers to political authority and therefore sparingly offers criticism.   
Being political in nature, the discussion is accordingly practical.  It is widely 
recognized that the Ethics, as well as the Politics for that matter, both fall under the 
category of Aristotle’s practical works, that is, those works that deal with action.45  
Aristotle treats the question of human happiness from a practical point of view.  The 
end of the present matter is not contemplation or theory (theōria), Aristotle says, but 
that we might become good (II.2.1103b26-27).  Although he later amends, rejects, or 
qualifies the assertion, Aristotle states here that the end of the inquiry is action 
(praxis) and not knowledge though he does acknowledge that we would be more apt 
to find the good if we possessed some knowledge or recognition (gnōsis) of the good 
(I.2.1094a22-24).  Since this discussion deals with actions, which are variable, 
differing levels of accuracy are to be expected.  In matters concerning the beautiful or 
noble and just, about which politics deliberates, too much precision cannot be 
expected.  On the other hand, in matters of geometry, one ought to expect the highest 
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level of precision.  So the focus of the work is practical, as opposed to theoretical.  
And as a practical work, we should expect a lesser degree of precision.  As a result, 
every speech or argument (logos) about actions “is obliged to speak in outline and not 
precisely” (II.2.1104a1-2).  As Aristotle alerts his reader: 
“And it is necessary also to take each of the things that are said in the 
same way, for it belongs to an educated person to look for just so 
much precision in each kind of discourse as the nature of the thing one 
is concerned with admits; for to demand demonstrations from a 
rhetorician seems about like accepting probable conclusions from a 
mathematician” (I.3.1094b22-27). 
 
One would proceed correctly “if one were to attain the clarity that goes along with the 
underlying material, for precision ought not to be sought in the same way in all kinds 
of discourse, any more that in things made by the various kinds of craftsmen” 
(I.3.1094b12-13).  For the present inquiry is about the noble and the just, it is a 
political investigation, and there is great variation and disagreement about them. 46  
Again in Chapter Seven, Aristotle encourages the reader to let an outline of 
the preceding suffice (I.7.1098a20-22).  In matters of the utmost urgency or 
importance for a human being, the philosopher Aristotle encourages accepting 
arguments that fail to rise to the highest accuracy.  He defends this lack of rigor as 
appropriate for his course of inquiry.  The current inquiry, Aristotle reminds us, is not 
for the sake of knowing, but rather it is for the sake of acting.  Aristotle distinguishes 
the geometrician from the carpenter along these lines, saying that both look to right 
angles in their work, but one does so for the sake of utility and the other because he is 
a beholder or theorizer (theatēs) of the truth.   
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Perhaps the best way to summarize the difficulty of interpretation, or to bring 
all of the preceding together, is to call Aristotle’s work what it is, namely dialectical.  
Aristotle necessarily adapts his style of writing depending on the nature of the 
inquiry, and is prone to use a dialectical style in his practical works.  Aristotle 
distinguishes between dialectal syllogisms and demonstrations in the Topics.  
Demonstration comes from premises that are known to be true and primary or first 
(prōton: Topics I.1.100a25-30).  But this is not Aristotle’s typical manner of 
proceeding, and in fact, it is questionable whether Aristotle ever produced a single 
demonstration, strictly speaking.47  Rather than writing demonstrations, then, 
Aristotle most often writes dialectically.  This is true of his writings on nature and 
metaphysics and is especially true of his political writings.  This means that Aristotle 
does not set down premises as simply true in his political writings; rather, the starting 
points are always provisional and may lead to contradiction or conclusions that are 
not in accord with reason.  When this happens, Aristotle says, it is necessary to 
destroy the argument where the falsehood began (Topics VIII.10.160b23-25).  
Aristotle is not above, then, following an argument to its logical conclusion to test 
that argument.  Aristotle often begins from opinions, opinions that are respectable or 
highly esteemed in some way.  These conventional opinions (endoxai) often contain a 
kernel of truth, or will perhaps aid in the endeavor to arrive at a better understanding 
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of matters.  Aristotle’s investigations proceed, taking certain beginning points that he 
later ends up modifying or even rejecting.  These dialectical inquiries can yield 
significant insights even as they reveal the argument to be flawed, as it shows, in the 
first place, wherein lies the flaw, and, in the second place, can help to provide a fuller 
account of the matter under investigation, or even point to another road to investigate 
the matter.  In some instances, these beginning points may hold up under scrutiny, 
and in other instance they do not.  Yet in any case, the investigation, if properly 
begun, can yield insight. 
Aristotle begins his dialectical reasoning from very common opinions, the 
things that are rather familiar to us (Physics I.1. 184a).  He begins from things that are 
clearer to us, even if it is not clear according to nature.  The goal or hope is that we 
will arrive at what is clearer by nature.  An Aristotelian dialectical syllogism 
(dialektikos syllogismos) reasons (syllogizomesthai) from these reputable opinions 
(endoxai), but it does not necessarily evaluate all commonly held opinions.  To 
review all opinions (doxai), especially in ethical matters, would be rather pointless, to 
repeat (Nicomachean Ethics I.4.1095b), and Aristotle thinks it would be sufficient to 
review those opinions that have the greatest prominence.  Aristotle evaluates opinions 
that are reputable or held in high esteem (endoxai, Topics I.100a25-27) or those that 
are widely held.  “A dialectical inquiry,” Joe Sachs offers, “might assume some 
opinion that equates knowledge with perception (which is just what happens in the 
first half of Plato’s Theaetetus), but it would do so in order to try it out and test it.”48  
When arguing dialectically, then, Aristotle reasons from “things that seem true to 
everyone, or to most people, or else to the wise, and of the latter either to all of them 
                                                 




or most of them or to those who are best known and most respected” (Topics 
I.1.100a30-100b23).  But these beginning points are all questionable, even if we 
begin with the opinions of the wise.  The dialectical nature of Aristotle’s inquiry adds 
to the difficulty of interpretation, and it must be taken into account, especially if one 
attempts to understand a part of his work.  Aristotle’s dialectics is a double edged 
sword, simultaneously helping and hindering our inquiry.  One has to try to follow 
Aristotle as he proceeds through investigation; one can understand his arguments only 
if one understands the motion of the work.  Simply recounting a part of a work of 
Aristotle’s without a larger context is problematic insofar as it is removed from the 
larger argument.  One has to determine where Aristotle is in the inquiry.  Just as one 
could not hope to understand adequately a conversation by only hearing snippets, so 
too would one’s understanding of Aristotle be limited without an appreciation of the 
entire conversation.  The Ethics is a conversation, and the books and chapters are 
parts of that conversation.  We have to get away from the notion that Aristotle reaches 
conclusions that are absolute, reached from premises that have been firmly settled and 
established.  Rather, the conclusions he reaches are provisional, and must be judged 
in light of the movement of the entire argument.   
In general, Aristotle finds it acceptable to proceed from commonly held 
reputable opinions, especially the opinions of the wise.  In many ways, then, 
Aristotle’s dialectical arguments mirror dialogues with the wise.  Indeed, in many of 
his writings on nature, for example, Aristotle will begin with an opinion of Zeno, 
Anaxagoras, or Empedocles.  And in the Politics, he frequently takes up the opinion 




Aristotle takes these opinions put forward by his real or constructed interlocutor and 
proceeds to examine them in the manner of a conversation, i.e., dialectically.  
Therefore, as Carnes Lord says, “the possibility must at least be considered that 
Aristotle’s political writings are in their own way as radically ironic as those of 
Plato—that they deliberately withhold Aristotle’s final or most fundamental 
reflections on man.”49 
Are we not back where we began then?  If Aristotle’s writings are dialectical, 
why not turn back to the dialogues of Plato to understand the Socratic Paradox.  My 
answer is that Aristotle does precisely what Plato does not do with respect to the 
paradox: Aristotle submits the Socratic Paradox to dialectical inquiry.  There is no 
direct dialectical treatment of the Socratic Paradox in Plato, even though it features 
prominently in several dialogues.  Plato never allows his reader to see a conversation 
between his Socrates and a sound interlocutor.  In this sense, perhaps Aristotle 
surpasses Plato.  In the Ethics, particularly Book VII, Chapters 2 through 3, Aristotle 
creates a dialogue between Socrates and himself on the question of knowledge and 
virtue.  We have before us, then, a first rate thinker, Aristotle, submitting Socrates to 
the same dialectical inquiry that the latter generally inflicts on others.  We see 
firsthand a conversation between two philosophers. 
 
Audiences 
Given the political nature of the Nicomachean Ethics, we cannot help but 
notice that the intended audience is composed of those human beings who are most 
likely to be engaged in politics in some capacity.  Bodéüs  argues, rather persuasively, 
                                                 




that the lawgiver is Aristotle’s most direct audience.  As Carnes Lord points out, 
“Aristotle’s practical science is directed not to philosophers or students of philosophy, 
or not principally to them, but to political men.”50  While Lord may be correct in 
arguing that the Ethics is dedicated principally to political men, it is not a foregone 
conclusion that it is dedicated solely to them.  It is entirely possible that Aristotle 
recognized that a diverse audience would be attracted to the work, or even that he 
intended to appeal to a diverse audience.  If I.2 points to the political nature of the 
inquiry in the Ethics, I.3 tells us something about the intended audience.  Aristotle 
writes this work for an educated audience, for people who are good at making 
distinctions, and possess good judgment.  Above all, the student cannot be too young, 
because such persons follow their impulses and are too inexperienced in the actions 
of life.  They are unfamiliar with politics.  Carnes Lord is correct to point out that, at 
least in part, the audience is composed of human beings familiar with politics.  
Aristotle will return to the question of his audience in a digression in the next chapter, 
I.4, and indicate that his students will have to have been brought up beautifully or 
nobly by means of proper habituation (1095b4-6).  He then goes on to quote Hesiod, 
granting further insight as to whom he intends to reach: 
Altogether best is he who himself has intelligence (noēsis) in all 
things, 
But good (esthlos) in his turn is he who trusts one who speaks well. 
But whoever neither himself intellects, nor, harkening to another,  
Lays to heart what he says, that one for his part is a useless man 
(1095b10-13). 
 
Aristotle clearly has in mind as students neither those who already know nor those 
who are unwilling to listen to another.  He intends to speak to someone who is able 
                                                 




and willing to learn.  “The listener to whom the NE prologue refers,” as Bodéüs says, 
“may be understood as a learner (manthōn), Aristotle’s undertaking as a kind of 
teaching (didaxis), and the discourses (logoi) mentioned there as discourses for 
teaching (didaskalikoi logoi).”51 
We immediately see that the Ethics is not addressed to the best human beings, 
for this type of human has no need of Aristotle’s treatise, although it may be 
addressed to those who are potentially the best type of human being.  If the theoretical 
life, or the life of the philosopher, is best, we can concede Lord’s assertion that 
Aristotle’s intended audience in the Ethics is not philosophers.  We are further 
justified in this assertion when we remember that the work is practical and not 
theoretical, especially since philosophy is concerned, above all, with theoretical 
investigation.  We cannot, however, rule out potential philosophers, as the potentially 
best are not identical to the best actually.  Best, to repeat the Hesiod quote, would be 
to possess intelligence regarding all things without the help of another.   
While the Ethics is not addressed to the highest type of human beings, we also 
see that it is not addressed to the lowest type, those who disregard the advice of others 
who speak well.  The Ethics, then, is addressed to the in-between types (metaxu) or 
even to the good (esthloi).  It may well be that this middling type—those who trust 
the ones who speak well—is in fact composed of those who are at the top of the 
social structure both from the perspective of economic and political clout, but from 
the perspective of intelligence they are of the middling sort that Aristotle describes.  
These types of human beings can be guided by, and even have a propensity to follow 
the advice of, those who might know.  Such persons are already predisposed at the 
                                                 




very least, surely to moral virtue.  To the extent that such persons are open to trust the 
one who speaks well, Aristotle intimates that in fact his intended audience may well 
have such a predisposition.  The type to which Aristotle appeals has a predisposition 
in favor of goodness (esthlos, distinguished in the Hesiod quote from agathos).   
The Ethics, in contrast to the Politics, is dedicated above all to improving the 
gentlemen. While the Politics certainly intends to teach the gentlemen, it is with a 
view to the improvement of all.52  The Ethics is dedicated to those who are willing 
and able to learn from another, those who have some genuine concern with morality.  
These are serious human beings who take it as a given that one ought to try to be 
good.  Those who do not begin from such premises must be ruled, and the discussion 
of how that ought to be done is to be found in the Politics.   Both works together form 
the whole of Aristotle’s political teaching, or at least indicate what the whole might 
look like.  Education is for those willing, interested, and capable of learning, and laws 
for those who either are unwilling or incapable of listening.   
The audience of the Ethics, to repeat, is composed of human beings who are 
between the best and worst types, and to persons who take moral virtue seriously.  
They believe in the just and the noble as a result of having been raised properly or 
even beautifully.  But even this group, the morally serious, is not homogeneous.  In 
fact, Aristotle may be speaking to multiple audiences in his text.  Aristide Tessitore 
persuasively argues that there are two audiences in the Ethics.  He recognizes that the 
work is addressed to morally serious persons but goes on to state that it is addressed 
                                                 




to “two distinct types of morally serious persons: those who are not and never will be 
philosophers and those who are potential philosophers.”53 
In fact, if the intended audience of the Ethics is composed of two distinct 
groups, the morally serious and the would-be-philosophers, this allows for the 
possibility that the Ethics may have two distinct teachings. That is, it may speak 
differently to the morally serious person than it does to the would-be-philosophers.  
The compatibility of the two teachings, if in fact that proves to be the case, is by no 
means guaranteed, and, in fact, they may ultimately result in profound conflict.  That 
is, the life of the morally serious person and the life of the philosopher may ultimately 
be in direct conflict.  If this were to be the case, there is no reason for Aristotle to 
announce openly such a conflict, and indeed good reason to understate or even 
mitigate this difference.  As we turn to Aristotle’s account of moral responsibility in 
the following chapters, I would urge, following Tessitore and others, openness to the 
possibility that conflicting accounts of moral responsibility could be intended for 
distinct audiences.   As we turn in the following chapters to evaluate Aristotle’s 
discussion of moral responsibility in Books III and VII, it is absolutely essential to 
bear in mind the conclusions articulated here regarding Aristotle’s cautious style of 
writing.    
 
Summary 
Aristotle’s writings, especially the practical writings, are meant to speak to 
multiple audiences.  He frequently retreats to common opinion, or even tries to 
                                                 




provide common opinion with a more solid grounding even if that opinion may be, in 
the end, groundless.  Aristotle is perfectly willing to leave our common opinions 
intact and only challenge those readers who are sensitive to inconsistencies and 
dissatisfied with a defense of a particular opinion that is salutary but unconvincing.  
Aristotle knows that many readers turn to the Ethics hoping and longing to have their 
deepest held opinions concerning morality confirmed, and, if this is one’s strongest 
desire, Aristotle will not disappoint.  But he does prod those few who are not satisfied 
unless their opinions can be shown to withstand the strongest rational scrutiny, those 
few who are willing to abandon their deepest held opinions if rational support for 
those opinions fails to be demonstrated.  Accordingly, there will be silences, pregnant 
omissions, hesitations, and even outright contradictions.  This does not mean that any 
interpretation of the Ethics is possible.  Whenever we struggle to interpret Aristotle, 
we must take his cues as our guide and let him point us toward his answers.  We have 
to work to find Aristotle’s final or most fundamental reflections on man. 
As we move forward then to interpret the Ethics, we need to take note of the 
movement of the argument that occurs in the text, although not necessarily attempting 
to offer a comprehensive interpretation of the entire text.  Thus far, drawing primarily 
on Book I of the Ethics, I have provided many examples of the intentionally 
ambiguous manner of Aristotle’s writing.  And Book I really serves as an introduction 
to all that follows.  It introduces us to Aristotle’s manner of writing: it sets up the 
question under consideration and delineates the manner in which it will treat the 
question.  It is also intended to attract the attention of the intended audience.  The 




human being.  Aristotle  seeks in this quest to identify the highest human good.  
Aristotle chooses to focus on the question of happiness for precisely this reason, 
because all human beings presumably want to become happy. Accordingly, this quest 
for or inquiry into the highest human good would seemingly be attractive to any 
serious human being.  It is certainly of great interest to both the would-be philosopher 
and the morally serious human being, Aristotle’s intended audience.  And Aristotle 
offers, at least officially, an answer to this most important question.  A mere seven 
chapters into the work, Aristotle delivers: happiness, or the human good, is an activity 
(energeia) of the soul in accordance with virtue, and if there is more than one virtue, 
with the best and most complete one (I.7.1098a16-18).   
By arguing that our prospects for happiness are wedded to the acquisition of 
virtue, Aristotle has further managed to harness the audiences’ interests and steer it 
toward virtue.  The decent human beings in the audience will follow Aristotle into the 
discussion of virtue, as he has appealed both to their self-interest and to their sense of 
decency.  Aristotle tries to appeal both to the morally serious person and to the 
potential philosopher, or even to the two characteristics of the same person.  But he 
does occasionally draw our attention to the distinction between moral and intellectual 
virtue, although the examples are quite muted by his overriding concern to show them 
to be compatible.  For example in Chapter Five, Aristotle posits three possibilities for 
the best life: the life devoted to pleasure, the political life, and the contemplative life.  
After dismissing the life of pleasure by comparing it to the life of fatted cows, and 
arguing that the life of politics is incomplete, Aristotle refrains from speaking about 




inquiry, the contemplative life is replaced by the life of money-making, which is 
dismissed as obviously not being the highest life as money is instrumental.  Aristotle 
fails to take up the question of whether the best life for a human being is the 
contemplative life here in Book I.  It is postponed until much later; the audience must 
be made to find such praise a little more palatable.  In the interim, he admonishes the 
life of money-making, a censure sure to please the supporter of moral virtue and the 
reasoning that leads to the rejection is meant to impress the theoretically inclined, 
even if it is ultimately unconvincing.   Furthermore, Aristotle’s raising and then 
immediately dropping the distinction between intellectual and moral virtue at the 
beginning of Book II allows Aristotle to capture virtue simply, something that appeals 
to both the would-be philosopher and the gentleman.  Aristotle thus exploits the 
desire of all human beings, especially the serious ones, to be happy, and he thus, for 
the moment, collapses the distinction of those who want to pursue moral virtue and 
those may turn out to be more interested in intellectual virtue: the intellectually and 
the morally virtuous human being are united in the quest for happiness as well as their 
attachment to virtue.   He unites them by appealing to what is of great interest to both.  
Aristotle manages to unite the interests of both the intellectually and morally virtuous 
and this serves two purposes.  First, it keeps both audiences interested in the inquiry, 
and secondly, it makes each favorably disposed toward the other, as Aristotle has 
given the reader no reason to doubt the harmony between moral and intellectual 
virtue.    
Book I, then, serves as an introduction, and Book II goes on to set the terms of 




II that virtue is of two sorts, moral (or character, ēthos) and intellectual, and he 
focuses the inquiry on moral virtue and will continue to treat moral virtue for the next 
several books (II-V).  Moral virtue, or virtue of character, comes about for a human 
being as the consequence of habit (ethos).  One’s character is thus what one has 
acquired as a result of habituation.  Although Aristotle will occasionally draw the 
reader’s attention to intellectual virtue, the focus for the time being is on the moral 
virtues.  That means that the majority of the substantive books deal above all with 
virtues acquired as a result of habit, although the virtues are not the habits themselves. 
The bulk of the Nicomachean Ethics is dedicated, above all, to a treatment of moral 
virtue.  Book III begins to take up and treat the individual virtues such as courage and 
justice independently, but not before taking up the question of moral responsibility.  
This much makes sense.  If Aristotle is going to focus on moral virtue, he must first 
show in what way human beings are morally responsible.  Without moral 
responsibility, any talk of moral virtue is either non-sensical.  Aristotle’s first 
discussion of responsibility takes place, then, within his broader discussion of moral 
virtue.  In the next chapter, I will turn to investigate the account of responsibility 
found in Book III. 
 








Aristotle presents his official teaching regarding moral responsibility in Book 
III.1-5 of the Nicomachean Ethics.  There, Aristotle offers a clearly articulated 
teaching regarding moral responsibility, which I will call Aristotle’s official teaching.  
Most work on Aristotle’s account of moral responsibility focuses, understandably, on 
this account.  This is only half of the story, however, because Aristotle takes up the 
issue again in Book VII.  By beginning with Aristotle’s official teaching in Book III 
in the present chapter, I am laying the groundwork for a comparison of his two 
presentations of the question.   
In the present chapter, I will briefly point out a few observations from Book II 
that will further the argument before turning to Book III.  Then I will subject chapters 
one through five of Book III to rigorous scrutiny in order both to arrive at Aristotle’s 
official teaching regarding moral responsibility in Book III and to bring to light the 
problems associated with that official teaching.  I will then provide compelling 
reasons for us to doubt that Aristotle’s official teaching regarding moral responsibility 
is his final statement or genuine teaching on the matter, and I will also show why 
Aristotle would have given an official account that is not ultimately his own.  I also 
argue that although Socrates is not explicitly named as Aristotle’s protagonist in Book 
III, Aristotle clearly has him in mind.  In fact, Aristotle alerts the careful reader to the 




responsibility.  In Book III, Aristotle addresses Socrates’ paradoxical teaching on 
moral responsibility, without naming it explicitly, and officially dismisses it.  I will 
show that Aristotle’s official teaching regarding moral responsibility, which includes 
a rejection of Socrates’ paradox, in large part serves a political purpose.  No one, as 
best I can tell, has sufficiently taken note of the political dimension of the Ethics 
when attempting to interpret Aristotle’s teaching on moral responsibility as it is found 
treated in the entire work.54  The present chapter will pave the way for a 
reinvestigation of Aristotle’s teaching regarding moral responsibility that we find in 
the first three chapters of Book VII, which takes the form of a dialogue with Socrates 
and his paradox that all wrongdoing is involuntary.  Despite having been officially 
dispensed with in Book III, Socrates’ paradox emerges in Book VII as a powerful 
objection to Aristotle’s earlier account of moral responsibility.  Essential to my thesis 
is my argument that Aristotle’s treatment of moral responsibility begins from and 
remains concerned above all with Socrates’ strong paradoxical objection that no one 
voluntarily does wrong, even if it has to be suppressed or rejected for political 
purposes.  Before turning straight to Book VII, we must first examine the account of 
moral responsibility in Book III. 
  
 As we have seen, the conclusion of Book I leads to a discussion of virtue 
(aretē), which Aristotle cleaves immediately in half at the beginning of Book II.  
Virtue, Aristotle tells us, is of two kinds, intellectual and ethical or moral (ēthikos).  
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After briefly telling us how someone comes to possess these virtues, Aristotle states 
that he will focus on moral virtue for the foreseeable future.  Aristotle explicitly 
postpones an inquiry into intellectual virtue and how reason is related to moral virtue, 
telling the reader there will be a discussion of it later (II.2.1103b31-34).  A discussion 
of moral virtue that abstracts from the very relevant question of reason’s relationship 
to virtue follows.  As with any abstraction, fundamental issues are therefore missing 
or suppressed.  Indeed, Aristotle does not directly address reason and the rational 
virtues again until Book VI, although he will make occasional reference to them.  It is 
of the utmost importance to keep in mind that Books II through V are dedicated to a 
direct investigation of moral virtue to the explicit exclusion of intellectual virtue.  
Moreover, Aristotle will go on in the next few books to speak about moral virtue as 
though the virtues are things desired for their own sake.  That is, he will speak about 
moral virtue from the point of view of someone for whom moral virtue is the highest.  
It is important to keep in mind that Book I had raised the possibility of another virtue 
for its own sake, intellectual virtue, to which Aristotle will not return until after the 
conclusion of the discussion of the moral virtues. 
Despite postponing a discussion of moral virtue’s relation to reason in Book 
II, Aristotle does make several comments that are noteworthy for the current 
investigation.   
First, Aristotle mentions that one difference between moral and intellectual 
virtue is how they come to be.  Intellectual virtue comes about, for the most part, 




habituated or trained to become morally virtuous: one becomes just by performing 
just actions.    
But immediately we get the impression that proper habituation, however 
necessary, cannot suffice.  In order for action truly to be virtuous, it has to be the 
product of our own free choice.  As choice involves deliberation, reason creeps back 
into consideration.  Three things, Aristotle tells us in Book II, lead us to make a 
choice, the beautiful, the pleasant, and the advantageous (II.31104b30-34).  These 
three things can be brought together into a single common heading, namely things 
that are deemed to be good.  The good comprises the beautiful, the advantageous, and 
the pleasant.  In other words, humans make choices based on a consideration of what 
they believe to be good.   
In II.4, Aristotle states that there are three qualifications that are necessary in 
order for an action to be considered virtuous: they have to be done first and foremost 
with knowledge, they have to be the result of choice, and one has to be in the 
corresponding stable condition (II.4.1105a28-33).  In the first place (prōton), 
Aristotle tells us, a virtuous act must be done knowingly.  Secondly, one has to 
choose the virtue and cannot do it accidentally or merely as a result of habituation if it 
is genuinely to be virtuous.  Habituation is a good and necessary beginning point, but 
in and of itself it is insufficient.   Knowledge is an integral part of virtuous action, as 
is choice.  And if choice is solely the result of habituation, to what extent can it truly 
be called choice?  To what extent does one voluntarily do something or refrain from 
doing something if one has been habituated thereto, and the action chosen is not the 




mentioned the central qualification, choice, in the previous chapter, and choice will 
prove to be inextricably linked with knowledge.  Aristotle mentions choice in the list 
of qualifications as if to highlight its importance.  With respect to knowledge, 
Aristotle already told us that it comes about by teaching, not by habituation.  No 
matter how much Aristotle tries to focus on moral virtue, he cannot abandon or 
escape completely reason, or knowledge.  We will also see how intimately choice is 
bound up with knowledge in Book III. 
Turning to Book III 
The importance of choice and knowingly doing virtuous actions leads directly 
into Book III.  Here we dive into the heart of the matter.  Aristotle lays before us the 
major problem for his account of moral virtue, and the seriousness of this part of the 
investigation cannot be overstated.  Aristotle’s account of moral virtue stands or falls 
by his ability to provide a convincing account of moral responsibility.  Aristotle needs 
to have a coherent account of moral responsibility if his exhortation to moral virtue 
that follows is to make any sense.  Exhortations to virtue would fall on deaf ears if the 
audience were incapable of taking responsibility for their actions and choosing to live 
virtuously.  Since virtue is concerned only with voluntary actions, Aristotle says, “it is 
no doubt a necessary thing for those who inquire about virtue to distinguish what is a 
voluntary act and what is an involuntary act” (III.1.1109b32-34).  To repeat, it is no 
doubt necessary to articulate an account of moral responsibility.  Unless there is such 
a thing as a voluntary act, there is not virtuous action.  Virtue depends on freedom 




Aristotle immediately adds a further consideration, however: a conception of 
volition is not only necessary for one inquiring, but also useful for those legislating 
about honors and punishments.  The correctness or truth of his account of moral 
responsibility is but one consideration.  That is, another guiding concern of the 
investigation of moral responsibility is political.  It is useful to have a clear distinction 
between voluntary and involuntary acts in the political world, for the sake of honoring 
and punishing, even if no such clear line can be drawn with precision theoretically. 
Aristotle leaves it unclear which consideration is more pressing.  At any rate, 
Aristotle alerts the reader as to how important an account of moral responsibility is 
for a political community.55  A political community cannot stand without clear 
standards for voluntary behavior.  Without a clear account of moral responsibility, 
reward and punishment, praise and blame, all lack clarity.  In Book III, Aristotle takes 
the side of the political community and seeks to provide for the community a 
plausible account of moral responsibility that it can use in determining matters of 
praise and blame.  And Aristotle does provide a straightforward definition of moral 
responsibility in Book III.  Aristotle’s official position is that one is responsible for 
one’s actions if that person is not forced to do an act and knows or sees (oida) the 
particular circumstances regarding that act.  While this seems straightforward, 
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Aristotle consistently alerts the careful reader to the problems with this official 
account, and also tells us why he puts forward the account he offers. 
 
Voluntary Versus Involuntary 
Aristotle provides the reader of the Ethics with a clear definition of voluntary 
action in III.1, action that could appropriately be blamed or praised.  A voluntary act 
is one done with knowledge and free of external force.  Aristotle’s official 
pronouncement regarding moral responsibility is that one cannot be held responsible 
if one involuntarily commits an act, and lack of volition comes about as a result of 
either force of ignorance (III.1.1111a22).  Aristotle’s procedure is a negative one: he 
first defines the involuntary and leaves us to the opinion that the voluntary is what 
remains.  This manner of proceeding is open to the following objection: it is not 
necessarily the case that if Aristotle can define the involuntary that what is left over is 
the voluntary.  In the first place, Aristotle could have failed to exhaust the class of the 
involuntary.  Secondly, there may exist a class of actions that is between voluntary 
and involuntary or is mixed (miktai), a possibility Aristotle at least entertains 
(III.1.1110a11-14).  It is also possible that no act is free from ignorance and force.  
Understood in a certain light, all human action contains elements of ignorance and 
force, as I will argue shortly. 
But Aristotle sets the bar for ignorance and force very high, or, differently 
stated, he sets the bar for knowledge somewhat low.  Aristotle limits the knowledge 
that is necessary to make an act voluntary to knowledge of particulars.  No 




know and therefore to act voluntarily.  One only needs to know the particular details 
surrounding an act.   
But even this low standard of knowing the particulars is problematic.  To use 
Aristotle’s own example in Chapter One, let us examine the case of the person who 
throws things overboard from a ship during a storm.  This action, according to 
Aristotle, is mixed, being neither fully voluntary nor fully involuntary.  It is voluntary 
insofar as the act was preferred at the time it was committed, and it is involuntary 
insofar as the person had to adjust to the unfortunate necessity of the storm—he had 
to choose between two evils.  And, as Aristotle says, “it is not easy to give an account 
of what sort of things one ought to choose in return for what sort of ends, since there 
are many differences among the particular circumstances” (III.1.1110b7-9).  So the 
person who throws things overboard in a storm is between voluntary and involuntary 
action.  There is, presumably, no way the person could have known about the storm 
before setting out on the trip.  Chance played an enormous role in his or her decision.  
But while the ship in a storm is, in one sense, exceptional, in another important regard 
it is really quite typical.  Given the fact of human uncertainty regarding the future 
(consider I.9-11), are not all human actions to some degree reminiscent of the boat 
example?  Are there not always metaphorical storms that can descend in a moment’s 
notice?  Human beings are never entirely free from external constraint imposed by the 
outside world; necessity limits choice.   Even the most voluntary of acts still in a very 
fundamental way mixed (miktos) at best, partaking somehow of both the voluntary 
and the involuntary.  Despite Aristotle’s neat distinction between voluntary and 




There is no neat division between voluntary and involuntary even though human 
beings hope to be able to draw one.   
The official teaching, to be clear, is that force has to be something external in 
order to render an action involuntary—being carried off by either the wind or even 
another person.  Someone, Aristotle says, may raise the objection that the pleasant 
and the beautiful are external sources of compulsion, and would thus render service 
done in their pursuit involuntary.  From the very beginning of his account of moral 
responsibility in Chapter One, Aristotle faces an unnamed interlocutor who raises 
very Socratic reservation.  Yet Aristotle rejects this objection on the grounds that if 
the objector were correct, all actions would be forced and none would be involuntary 
since, as Aristotle observes, “everyone does everything for the sake of these ends” 
(III.1.1110b11, emphasis mine).56  This response does not do away with the problem, 
however.  The pleasant and the beautiful were two of the three parts of the good listed 
in II.3.  Aristotle here omits the advantageous, a quite telling omission, for if we 
concede that all are compelled to pursue their own advantage and cannot be blamed 
for it, no act remains for which one can be blamed.57  The unnamed objector, to bring 
the beautiful and the pleasant together under one category, simply claims that people 
are compelled to pursue the good.  His objection, then, carries considerably more 
weight, as it now begins to look a lot more like something Aristotle would agree with.  
What if, instead of asserting that the pleasant and beautiful are sources of compulsion, 
one were to assert that the good is a source of compulsion, insofar as human beings 
are such by nature as to pursue what appears to be good to them?  Consider, in this 
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context, the very famous opening lines of the Ethics.  “Every art and every inquiry, 
and likewise every action and choice, seems to aim at some good, and hence it has 
been beautifully said that the good is that at which all things aim” (I.1.1094a1-4, 
emphasis added).  Aristotle suppresses the most radical version of this objection: can 
anyone voluntarily pursue what he believes to be bad, or are all compelled to pursue 
the good as they see it?  Aristotle has told us that every choice seems to aim at some 
good.  Indeed, part of Aristotle’s reasoning for rejecting this as an excuse for vicious 
acts is that if it is true one could not take credit for virtuous acts done in pursuit of the 
beautiful.  In other words, vice has to be voluntary because virtue is voluntary.  But 
that is not a sound refutation of the objection and it depends upon the acceptance of 
the voluntary nature of virtue, something the interlocutor may not concede.  Thus 
Aristotle begs the question: is virtue voluntary?  This failed refutation merely 
highlights the greater problem.  Is virtue voluntary?  Aristotle’s unnamed objector 
could simply respond by contending that all actions—virtuous, vicious, or other—are 
involuntary.  Aristotle limits his objector to a tame version of the argument that all 
human beings cannot help but pursue the good as they see it.  Or, stated differently, 
no one voluntarily does wrong.  Aristotle concludes his discussion of force by saying 
that it appears that what is forced is that whose source is external. 
To repeat: Aristotle buttresses his account of the voluntariness of doing wrong 
by an appeal to voluntarily doing right.    In other words, Aristotle here builds a case 
for intentional wrongdoing by reference to intentionally doing right.  But this avoids 
the fundamental question.  Can one voluntarily do right, or voluntarily do anything 




acts could possibly be involuntary.  But his proof in many ways presupposes what it 
is trying to prove, or at least presupposes agreement.  This is good dialectical 
reasoning, insofar as it proceeds from agreements, but the judicious reader is justified 
in asking whether that agreement is warranted.  The only way out of this impasse 
would be if each human being is somehow responsible for the way that the good 
appears to him or her, and Aristotle does not discuss that here.  
 
Ignorance 
Instead, Aristotle turns next in this chapter to discuss, rather briefly, ignorance with 
respect to volition.  Obviously, ignorance is an excuse for wrong or vicious behavior.  
Therefore Aristotle has to distinguish culpable from non-culpable ignorance.  He 
must articulate what makes some ignorance blameworthy and some ignorance 
excusable.  However, Aristotle’s discussion of ignorance raises more questions than it 
answers with respect to one’s responsibility for one’s conception of the good.  In 
every instance, Aristotle tells us, what is done on account of ignorance is not a 
voluntary act (III.1.1110b18-19).  Aristotle is quite clear in this section that ignorance 
of particulars is what excuses actions, not a more general type of ignorance.  Thus 
Aristotle moves to a fairly moderate account of culpability that is in line with 
conventional thinking on the matter.  But Aristotle has failed to argue how it might be 
the case that one is responsible for his own ignorance.  To repeat, Aristotle says that 
there are two types of involuntary acts, those that happen through either force (bios) 




external.  The question that immediately comes to mind, then, is whether the cause of 
ignorance is internal or external.   
 At any rate, Aristotle very clearly articulates his official teaching regarding 
ignorance.  As was just stated, one’s actions are involuntary when one’s ignorance is 
of particulars, and in this case there is pity and forgiveness.  Aristotle distinguishes 
the six particular circumstances about which one could be ignorant.  They are: who is 
acting, what the act is, what the act is concerned with, sometimes also the means, 
what the action is for the sake of, and how the act is done.  Whoever acts ignorantly 
of any of these six particulars has acted involuntarily, Aristotle says, and especially 
the one who is ignorant of the most governing particulars, namely the things in which 
the action consists and for the sake of which the action is done (III.1.1111a15-21).  
Aristotle adds the caveat, without any argument, that it is necessary for the one who 
acts involuntarily also to experience pain and regret (epimeleia).  This qualification is 
not unproblematic.  It seems to presume, at the very least, a later awareness or 
recognition of the particulars of which one was previously unaware, and this may in 
fact never occur.  A second problem is why one would experience pain and regret 
over something one has, by Aristotle’s account, done involuntarily.  If the act were 
involuntary in the strictest sense, one has no basis for feeling responsible for it  If the 
wind, to use Aristotle’s example, forced one person into another causing the latter to 
fall to his death, there is no cause for regret.  The person is, strictly speaking, not 
responsible for his actions.  This is not, of course, to deny that human beings 
genuinely feel regret over matters for which they are not responsible.  Of course they 




 Having set down conceptions of force and ignorance, Aristotle can now 
conclude with a definition of a voluntary act.  A voluntary act “would seem to be one 
whose source is in oneself, when one knows (oida) the particular circumstances in 
which the action takes place” (III.1.1111a22-24).  We should be clear that Aristotle 
hedges even more than usual in this circumstance.  Instead of telling the reader what a 
voluntary act seems to be, which is already a far cry from telling us that a voluntary 
act is, Aristotle tells us what it would or might seem to be.  That is, Aristotle uses the 
optative mood of “to seem” (doxeien) a mood indicating hope or wish, or at the very 
least a lack of certainty.  Aristotle ends the chapter with a few objections to his 
conclusion, and dismisses these objections on the grounds that they are strange 
(atopos).  While Aristotle may be correct to label these objections strange, 
strangeness, in and of itself, is no refutation.  The truth, after all, may be strange. 
 
Choice 
In the next chapter, Aristotle distinguishes choice (prohairesis) from voluntary acts, 
because, although they are similar, they are not the same thing.  Aristotle has told us 
that a voluntary act would seem to be one whose source is in oneself when one knows 
(or sees: oida) the circumstances of the act.  Choice, Aristotle tells us, seems to 
determine what belongs most properly to virtue more than to individual actions.  
Because children and animals act voluntarily, but not as a result of choice, choice and 
volition need to be distinguished from one another.  Choice doesn’t immediately get 
us very far, then, although we quickly see that we cannot choose things that are 




winning an athletic competition.  We can choose things that lead to that end, such as 
preparing adequately, but we cannot choose the end itself, since, in the athletic 
example, we cannot control the decision of the judge or the training routine of 
competitors.  The same line of argument holds for health and happiness.  We cannot 
simply choose to be happy.  To press the athletic metaphor, there are factors beyond 
our control in life just as in an athletic contest.  We can only choose to train properly 
toward the end of health and happiness.  Choice is of things related to the end.  This 
still avoids the fundamental question, namely how does the end appear for one? 
We are what sorts of people we are as a result of the choices we make, and 
not, Aristotle tells us, by opining.  But there is a problem associated with this, and 
Aristotle points it out.  Don’t human beings make choices based on opinions about 
the good and the bad, and if so, where do those opinions come from?  Aristotle does 
concede this:  
And we choose what we most of all know (or see: oida) to be good, 
but we have opinions about things we do not know (oida) very well…  
And if an opinion comes before a choice or comes along with it, that 
makes no difference, for we are not considering this, but whether it is 
the same as any sort of opinion (III.2.1112a7-13). 
 
All Aristotle is trying to do in this context is show that choice is different from 
opinion; for his current purposes he isn’t trying to articulate the relationship between 
these two concepts.  So we still are unclear about where our opinions come from or 
what way we might be thought to be responsible for them, especially our opinions 
about the highest end or goal (telos) of human life.  It is clear that we do not simply 






Chapter Two reaches an impasse, as choice is considered among voluntary 
things, but it does not exhaust the list.  Some voluntary acts are not the result of 
choice.  Aristotle raises the possibility, explored in the next chapter, that choice is a 
voluntary act that has been deliberated about.  Aristotle tells us that deliberation 
concerns things that are up to us and have to do with action.   
The Aristotle switches gears slightly and tells us that the causes (aitia) are 
nature, necessity, and chance—but also intelligence (nous).  He moves on rather 
quickly to point out that deliberation is not about ends.  “We do not deliberate about 
ends, but about the things that are related to the ends… But the end being posited,58 
they consider in what way and by what means it would be the case” (III.3.1112b15-
16).  Deliberation, then, is about means, not ends.   The ends are given.  But where do 
the ends come from?  Aristotle’s digression would indicate that the ends come from 
nature, necessity, chance, or intelligence.  Aristotle determines that deliberation is 
about the things one is to do by oneself, while the actions are for the sake of 
something else.  The thing chosen, or the choice, is the result of the desired thing that 
has been deliberated about.  Choice, then, would be the deliberate desire of things that 
are up to us.  Aristotle decides to let this outline of deliberation and choice suffice. 
Wishing 
Aristotle does take up the question of ends in Chapter Four, though he does not 
resolve this question.  Here he tells us that it has been said that wishing (boulēsis) is 
                                                 





for the end, and that the end is thought by some to be the good and by others to be the 
thing appearing to be good (or the apparent good: phainomenos agathos).  We seem, 
in Chapter Four and following into the next chapter, to have hit the heart of the 
problem with respect to Aristotle’s official teaching on moral responsibility.  In the 
choice between whether persons wish for the good or the apparent good, Aristotle 
seems to try to have it both ways.  He asks rhetorically whether one must say that 
“what is wished for simply and truly is the good, but for each person the apparent 
good?” (III.4.1113a22-24).  He seems to be saying that all human beings truly and 
simply pursue the good, but that some human beings go wrong and chase apparent 
goods, that is, things that are not truly good.  The decisive step remains missing.  
Aristotle does not show how what is wished for is up to us.  If anything, Aristotle has 
here indicated that the end, namely the good, is the thing that is truly and simply 
wished for, even if some human beings simply go wrong, misguided by pleasure.  
 
Objections to Aristotle’s Account of Moral Responsibility Thus Far 
The movement of chapters one through four takes us closer to the problem; they do 
not solve it.  The question, beginning in Chapter One, was what makes something 
voluntary.  A discussion of volition didn’t suffice; rather it led us into a discussion of 
choice, which led in turn to a discussion of deliberation, which culminated in a 
discussion of wishing.  The question of responsibility keeps being put off.  The 
conclusion is a let down, because Aristotle leaves unclear how the choice or wishing 
for the end is within our power or up to us.  To be sure, the official conclusion that 




both up to us (III.5.1114b13 and ff.).  That is, they are things we voluntarily do as a 
result of choice.  Activities, or ways of being at work (energeia), are made up of acts 
that we choose in accordance with the end (telos) that is wished for.  Our actions and 
choices are up to us insofar as we choose them in accordance with our end.  Given the 
end, we voluntarily engage in means toward that end.  But what of the end itself, or to 
complicate matters further, what of how we see that end?  Is the end something given 
to human beings, given by god, nature, chance, or good-fortune?  Would one 
voluntarily wish for a bad view of the end, especially if that means being unhappy?  
Can a human being voluntarily choose to be unhappy?  To say that no one is 
voluntarily wretched or unhappy is partly true and partly untrue, according to 
Aristotle.  No one, he says, is unhappy voluntarily, but he tells us that one can be base 
voluntarily.   
Then Aristotle does something quite strange and, as far as I can tell, unique in 
the Ethics.  He issues a challenge to the reader and essentially invites a refutation.  If 
baseness is not voluntary, the thing ought to be disputed.  In effect, Aristotle says, 
“Show me where I’m wrong.”  If there are no objections, Aristotle will proceed as if 
vice and virtue were voluntary.  But there were objections and another will indeed 
follow in Chapter Five.  Aristotle is content, though, so long as his account of 
voluntary virtue and vice appears so (III.4.1113b20).  He then adds as further proof 
of his official position the fact that lawmakers bear witness to it by punishing those 
who do vicious things.  Aristotle defers to the actions of the political community, 
reminding us again of the political nature of the overall inquiry and once again 




transgressors of the laws, and therefore must rely in deed on affirming moral 
responsibility.  Moreover, Aristotle adds that lawmakers praise and blame in order to 
encourage virtuous behavior and to deter vicious behavior, highlighting the practical 
necessity of responsibility for governing.  This appeal to common practice merely 
serves to show that common opinion agrees that there is such a thing as voluntary 
virtuous and vicious action, but appealing to popular opinion does not rise to the level 
of a proof.  Moreover, Aristotle alludes to the fact that this action may be practical, 
even if not grounded on a true account of human action.  In other words, Aristotle 
recalls to the reader’s mind a standard other than truth, political utility.  We would do 
well to remember that the purpose of this investigation is to be good, not simply to 
know it (II.2.1103b25 and ff.).  The city must punish wrongdoers for the politically 
salutary reason that it encourages virtuous behavior among the citizens and 
discourages vicious behavior.  Aristotle’s account of moral responsibility in Book III 
serves his explicit aim very well.  This is an account of moral responsibility that is 
perfectly in harmony with doing well.  Whether or not it accords as well with 
knowing is another question.   
Aristotle next moves to give a specific example of punishment, with the 
supposed intention of showing the compatibility of his theory of moral responsibility 
with the city’s.  In the example he uses, the perpetrator of the vicious act is ignorant 
but somehow responsible for his ignorance and therefore deservedly punished.  “In 
fact,” Aristotle says, “people apply punishment for ignorance itself if the one who is 
ignorant seems to be responsible for it, as when the penalties are doubled for people 




revealing.  People punish the drunk for purposefully becoming intoxicated, reflecting 
their belief that the drunk person is responsible for his or her condition.  Does 
Aristotle’s example serve to shed any light on one’s responsibility for ignorance 
generally, or does it rather reveal the problematic nature of determining responsibility 
for ignorance.  According to common sense, the drunk person is more responsible (if 
responsibility admits of degrees) than someone who is ignorant.59  This is because a 
human being must become drunk; one doesn’t start out that way.  A human being’s 
natural state is sobriety; one has to do something actively in order to become drunk.  
What about other forms of ignorance?  Does one not begin from ignorance and have 
to be active to learn or come to know something?  Does one become ignorant?  The 
law of Athens that punishes intentionally becoming ignorant as a result of 
intoxication highlights, rather than solves, this problem.  By likening drunkenness to 
ignorance, Aristotle invites us to reflect on both the similarities and the differences 
between the two and on what would have to be necessary in order truly to hold 
someone responsible for being ignorant.  
 The drunk is punished because it was presumably within his or her power not 
to become drunk in the beginning.  By similar logic, Aristotle states that it was in the 
power of the unjust or dissipated person not to become unjust or dissipated in the first 
place, but this is asserted and not argued for.  Is becoming unjust like becoming 
drunk?  Is justice the natural state of a human being as sobriety is?  Does Aristotle 
make use of or exploit the reader’s tendency to believe that most human beings are 
                                                 
59 Alcoholism, of course, only complicates these matters.  Is one responsible for the genetic make-up 
that has inclined him or her to alcoholism?  In other words, is one an alcoholic from birth or does one 
become an alcoholic?  Aristotle’s example only serves to highlight the problem of responsibility, as 




decent to begin with?  With respect to the fundamental question in this case, Aristotle 
is surprisingly reticent.  Did the person who has become unjust know justice to begin 
with, or was he originally ignorant of it?  With respect to ignorance, especially 
ignorance concerning the end (telos), can ignorance of the end ever be in one’s own 
power?  To what extent is one responsible for one’s character?  As Susan Sauvé 
Meyer says, “Aristotle no more requires the agent to be responsible for her character 
in order to be responsible for the action of feeling produced by character than he 
requires the statuary to be responsible for his statuary skill in order to be responsible 
for the statue he produces using that skill.”60 Aristotle does say, though, that we are 
responsible, in a way, for our active conditions, because “we are in control of their 
beginnings” (III.5.1114b32-1115a1).  But Aristotle doesn’t make clear the way we 
are in control in the beginning, and in fact earlier in the Ethics he gives good reason 
to doubt that the beginning is within our control.  The beginning, at the very latest, 
would be when we are very young children, to whom Aristotle unequivocally does 
not grant choice (III.2.1111b8 and ff.).  The beginning of our character or active 
condition would be formed in large part, if not entirely determined, by our nature and 
the way we are raised and not, therefore, be up to us in any serious respect.  It would 
be senseless, then, to hold one accountable for his birth and the conditions of his 
childhood.  It would be strange to hold someone thus responsible, even if some such 
conception of responsibility is necessary if society is to function. 
Here we would do well to hearken to Aristotle’s words when speaking about 
one’s ability to be just and moderate: “It makes no small difference, then, to be 
habituated in this way or in that straight from childhood, but an enormous difference, 
                                                 




or rather all the difference” (II.1.1103b23-25, emphasis mine).  We thus find Aristotle 
in flat contradiction of himself.  On the one hand he says we are responsible for the 
beginning of our active condition, and on the other he tells us very clearly that the 
beginning of our active condition is quite out of our own hands.  Rather our active 
condition appears to be formed in large part by our parents and the political 
community, as well as by the influence of nature and chance.  We could blame the 
parents, and hold them accountable, but this is quite obviously inadequate because 
they, too, are what they are as consequence of the habituation and nature they 
received from their parents.  The process goes on and on so that no one is ever 
responsible for his or her actions.  This problematic aspect of when responsibility 
begins, then, has to be suppressed because it threatens to undo any attempt to 
construct an account of moral responsibility.  Political associations have to take a 
somewhat arbitrary but firm stand on the point at which someone becomes 
responsible for his or her actions.61   
At the end of Chapter Five, Aristotle again raises an objection from an 
unnamed interlocutor, who presses Aristotle on the question of how one is 
responsible for his or her conception of the end.  This is a powerful objection that 
threatens to undo Aristotle’s clear account of moral responsibility: 
But suppose someone were to say that all people aim at the apparent 
good, and they do not govern its appearance, but rather whatever sort 
of person each one is, of that sort too does the end appear to him.  So if 
each one were somehow the cause of his own active condition, then he 
would also somehow be the cause of its [the end’s] appearance.  But if 
not, no one is the cause of wrongdoing for himself, but does these 
things on account of ignorance of the end, believing that by these 
                                                 
61 In the United States, the decision that we hold adults to be responsible for his actions the day he 
turns eighteen reflects both the need for a clearly defined answer to this otherwise difficult problem 




means one will secure the highest good for oneself.  But the targeting 
of the end is not self-chosen (authairetos); instead, one needs to be 
born having vision, by which to discern beautifully and choose what is 
truly good, and one is of a fortunate nature in whom this comes about 
beautifully.  For with respect to what is greatest and most beautiful, 
and which is impossible to get or to learn from anyone else, but which 
one will have in such a condition as one was born with—to be well 
and beautifully born in this respect would be the complete and true 
blessing of nature (III.5.1114a31-b12). 
 
Aristotle has quite beautifully and elegantly stated the serious objection to his official 
account of moral responsibility.  If Aristotle’s sole goal in the present case is to 
buttress moral responsibility, one cannot help but wonder why he gives such a 
powerful objection.  This objection echoes Aristotle’s earlier language, where he says 
that a recognition (gnōsis) of the end (telos) or highest good (to ariston) would have 
great weight in one’s life and, “like archers who have a target, we would be more apt 
to hit on what is needed” (I.2.1094a18-24).  Thus far, Aristotle has only been able to 
show that people voluntarily choose means based on a given end, but he has not 
shown how they are responsible for the end itself.  To be clear, Aristotle has not 
shown that the end is self-chosen, and this is absolutely necessary if we are to be truly 
responsible for our actions. 
Aristotle’s official account of moral responsibility stands or falls by his ability 
to refute this objection related to our ability to choose ends.  Aristotle does not do 
that.  To this most serious, and logically compelling objection, an objection one might 
say that is perfectly in line with Socrates’ radical paradox, Aristotle offers the 
following:  If the objector is correct in asserting that no one voluntarily does wrong 
because no one is responsible for the way in which the good appears to him, then all 




“then the vices must be voluntary things too, since they come about in a similar way” 
(III.5.1114b21-25).  Terrence Irwin rightly points out that Aristotle explains “that if 
we deny responsibility for our states of character, we must treat both virtue and vice 
as entirely non-voluntary.”62  But that is precisely the objector’s claim: both virtue 
and vice depend upon the fortune or chance of one’s birth; neither is voluntary.  So 
Aristotle’s response to the objector rests on the conditional claim, never proven, that 
virtue is voluntary.  Aristotle relies on the refusal of the reader to doubt the voluntary 
nature of virtue to defend the voluntary nature of vice.  But the nameless objector did 
not call into question only the voluntary nature of moral vice; he likewise called into 
question the voluntary nature of virtue.  The one who sees the end is of a fortunate 
nature, blessed, he even says, by nature.  There is very no volition in being born 
possessing keen vision of the human end.  It is, in the decisive respect, luck.  The 
capacity to see beautifully what is truly good is not, strictly speaking, up to us.  We 
are not responsible for this natural ability.  Whether one comes to see the human end 
rightly or not depends on nature and birth.  The nameless, Socratic objector calls into 
question Aristotle’s entire project with respect to moral virtue, and Aristotle only 
focuses on half of the difficulty—vice—in his response.  The objector could respond 
by calling into question the voluntariness of virtue, something Aristotle certainly 
asserted but did not demonstrate (again, see III.5.1114b21-25).  Moreover, Aristotle 
must recognize the line of argument of this objection, as his own response to the 
objection is couched in a conditional sentence.  If virtue is voluntary, he says, then 
vice must be too.  But that remains an open question.  This conditional response ends 
Aristotle’s account of moral responsibility in Book III.  He has officially rejected or 
                                                 




dispensed with the objection.  Aristotle lets the matter stand thus, and simply 
reasserts—above the objection—the voluntary nature of both virtue and vice in order 
to move in the next chapter to his first discussion of a particular virtue, courage.  For 
the intellectually serious person who expects Aristotle to put down soundly and 
resoundingly the objection of this unnamed interlocutor, Aristotle’s actual defense 
must be unsatisfying.  Perhaps, however, he has satisfied the morally serious person 
with his rescue of moral responsibility.  Whatever the case, Aristotle certainly has not 
done full justice to the far-reaching objection from his Socratic interlocutor.  We will 
return to this powerful Socratic objection again in Book VII. 
 
Concluding Thoughts on Book III 
Despite the problems I mentioned, Aristotle’s official teaching regarding 
moral responsibility serves a definite purpose.  On the surface, the official teaching is 
unequivocal, free of nuance, and falls perfectly in line with a conventional account of 
morality.  Indeed it offers a reasonable basis for a traditional account of 
responsibility.  One is responsible for one’s actions except when one is forced or 
ignorant, ignorance being clearly and narrowly define here.  Only external actions 
count as force, and ignorance is limited to ignorance of particular circumstances 
surrounding the act.  Moral responsibility, an otherwise extremely problematic topic 
in moral and political philosophy, is neatly solved.  Aristotle puts to rest any 
ambiguity in the question and asserts that human beings are in fact responsible for 
their behavior, virtuous or otherwise in order to move on, beginning in Chapter Six, 




responsibility in Book III is free from controversy.  Thus, Aristotle offers clear 
guidelines for legislators and citizens regarding moral responsibility.  Moreover, he 
offers his readers guidelines for reasonably praising and blaming human action, 
guidelines that do not assign excessive blame or excuse too many actions.  True to the 
spirit of his teaching regarding moral virtue generally, Aristotle’s account of moral 
responsibility is very moderate.  It provides clear and moderate standards for praise 
and blame, honoring and punishing.   
This account of moral responsibility would have great appeal to a certain part 
of Aristotle’s audience.  In the last chapter, I argued that Aristotle intends to speak to 
a diverse audience in the Ethics and I identified the two major factions that he has in 
mind as the morally serious person and the would-be-philosopher.  The account of 
moral responsibility that Aristotle offers in Book III would appeal, above all, to such 
a morally serious person.  Moral virtue depends upon such an account.  By contrast, I 
hope to have shown how the account in this chapter would not have satisfied the 
would-be-philosopher, because there are simply too many questions unanswered and 
objections that went unrefuted.  The account that Aristotle here offers is therefore not 
addressed to him, except perhaps as a test to see whether he finds this account 
satisfactory.  Rather, Aristotle offers a refined, moderate, reasonable defense of moral 
responsibility to men whose primary concern is with morality.  Aristotle gives a 
politically salutary account of moral responsibility in Book III, and it is intended to 
address the concerns of those men for whom political health is of the utmost concern.   
Aristotle has shown to the morally serious person that philosophy, which is what 




even contribute to the well-being of the polis by attempting both to clarify the basis of 
moral virtue and to provide it with a reasonably solid foundation.  Philosophy and 
politics, at least this far, are perfectly compatible. 
With his account of moral responsibility in Book III, Aristotle has made 
things clear and easy for us, and, as Terrence Irwin says, “we can either praise 
Aristotle for avoiding mystifying and misguided efforts to tackle the free-will 
problem or blame him for evading the central problem he should have faced.”63  I 
have already noted the political reason why one would evade or suppress the central 
problem: a clearly defined account of moral responsibility is politically salutary and 
highlighting the problem is not.  The problem with Irwin’s account of Book III is 
twofold.  First, Irwin fails to make note of the political nature of the inquiry at hand 
and thereby doesn’t consider the possibility that Aristotle’s refusal to tackle the 
problem of moral responsibility could be intentional and serve a purpose.  As 
Aristotle has indicated, and as I have shown, a clear account of moral responsibility 
free of theoretical problems is well-suited for a large constituency of his audience and 
also politically useful or even politically necessary.  Secondly, Book III is not 
Aristotle’s last word on the matter in the Nicomachean Ethics.  One of the great 
difficulties in the scholarly research on Aristotle’s account of moral responsibility is 
that works tend to focus exclusively on Aristotle’s account of moral responsibility in 
Book III.  Occasionally his account in Book VII is addressed, but generally not in 
reference to Book III.  That is, the scholarly works tend to treat these books in 
isolation from one another, and I think that this has led to many misinterpretations of 
Aristotle’s correct teaching regarding moral responsibility. 
                                                 




To that end, I will turn in the next chapter to investigate Book VIII, having 
made clear the many objections along the way that one could raise to Aristotle’s 
account of moral virtue in Book III.  By far the most far-reaching challenge to 
Aristotle’s account is made at the end of this account in Chapter Five of Book Three 
in the name of the unnamed objector.  My suggestion is that this objection is Socratic 
in nature, falling perfectly in line with the Socratic thesis that knowledge is virtue and 
even stating explicitly that no one is responsible for wrongdoing.  That is, here in 
Book III, as Aristotle tries to turn the focus to an investigation and praise of moral 
virtue, he disposes of this calling into question of moral virtue made in the name of 
intellectual virtue.  Aristotle wants to advocate moral virtue, even if its grounding 
cannot stand up to rational scrutiny.  Socrates’ name is suppressed in this objection, 
although he will later be named explicitly as Aristotle turns from moral virtue to 
investigate intellectual virtue.  As I have shown, Aristotle’s apparently clear account 
of moral responsibility in Book III is, when pressed under the weight of investigation, 
revealed to be riddled with problems.  One cannot, therefore, take it as Aristotle’s last 
word on the matter.  In order more fully to understand his teaching, we are compelled 
to turn to his later investigation of the matter in Book VII where Aristotle names 
Socrates as his interlocutor.  In other words, the main challenge to Aristotle’s official 
account of morality in Book III is indeed issued by Socrates.  In the next chapter we 
will turn to examine these sections in order to see if Aristotle’s official account can 






Chapter 4: Aristotle and the Socratic Impasse That No One 
Voluntarily Does Wrong 
 
Transition from Moral to Intellectual Virtue 
Having made clear the inadequate character of Aristotle’s earlier articulation 
of moral responsibility in Book III in the previous chapter, I will turn in the present 
chapter to Book VII in order to explore Aristotle’s fuller or more precise account of 
the relationship between knowledge and virtue, and hence, of moral responsibility.  
To restate the findings of the last chapter, in Book III Aristotle had limited voluntary 
and therefore culpable actions to those acts that are free from force and ignorance, 
where force and ignorance are very narrowly, and also inadequately, defined.  For a 
fuller account of moral responsibility, especially as it relates to force, but above all as 
it relates to ignorance, Aristotle must meet head on the best or at least most powerful 
argument opposed to his earlier account.  The issues Socrates raised must be 
addressed if Aristotle’s account of virtue is to be persuasive.  He must face Socrates 
as the representative of the position that all wrongdoing is the result of ignorance and 
therefore excused.  Socrates’ argument threatens to explode Aristotle’s neatly 
defined, yet inadequately defended, boundary between culpable and non-culpable 
ignorance.  After a lengthy but necessary preparatory investigation into Aristotle’s 
earlier account of moral responsibility, we are now in a position to understand 




disagreement, or dialogue, concerning moral responsibility, will bring to light the 
relationship between ethical and intellectual virtue.  This clash of intellectual titans 
will force Socrates and Aristotle’s respective arguments into the open, enabling one 
to gain greater clarity about these arguments.   
Turning from an analysis of Aristotle’s account of moral responsibility in 
Book III to an examination of the same topic in Book VII, we must note that Aristotle 
makes a new beginning in Book VII (1145a15) that was prepared for in Book VI.  
Book VI marks beginning of Aristotle’s treatment of intellectual virtue (VI.1. 1139a 
and ff.).  Early in Book VI, Aristotle reminds us that, “We were claiming that the 
virtues of soul are divided into those that belong to ethics (ēthos) and those that 
belong to thought (dianoia)” (VI.1.1138b35-1139a1).  Aristotle reminds the reader of 
the distinction he made in Book II, between ethical (ēthikē) and intellectual virtue 
(dianoētikē).  Up to this point, Aristotle’s investigation of virtue has focused almost 
solely on ethical virtue, taking this division for granted, and Aristotle now intends to 
take up the question of intellectual virtue.  But in the interim, he briefly considers the 
role that the intellect plays even in in ethical questions.  But admitting intellectual 
virtue into the discussion threatens to undo everything Aristotle has done, insofar as 
his earlier treatment spoke of ethical virtue independently of intellectual virtue.  The 
discussion at the end of Book VI points to the need for a new beginning, thanks in 
large part to Aristotle’s brief encounter with Socrates at the end of Book VI, for 
Aristotle’s division between intellectual and ethical virtue has depended upon either a 
refutation or a suppression of Socrates’ radical thesis that virtue is knowledge.  




compelled to return to his earlier remarks concerning choice and moral responsibility, 
and this ultimately leads to a direct investigation of the so-called Socratic Paradox.  In 
order to rescue moral virtue, Aristotle must now deal, in some way, with Socrates.  
Either Socrates must be rejected, moral virtue must be rejected, or they must be 
reconciled in some way. 
Aristotle begins his discussion of intellectual virtue by first speaking about the 
soul (VI.1.1139a2-3).  The soul, Aristotle reminds us, is composed of two parts, the 
irrational and the rational parts (VI.1.1139a3-4; cf. I.110226-28).  This division of the 
soul into two reminds the reader of the tenuous division of virtue into two that 
Aristotle is now calling into question.  The account of intellectual virtue—as 
distinguished from moral virtue—that follows in Book VI reflects the division of the 
soul into a rational and irrational part.  Indeed, the division of virtue into two parts 
may depend upon Aristotle’s ability to maintain the division of the soul into the 
rational and irrational.   
In Book I, however, Aristotle had said that the sort of speech that divides the 
soul into two is used abundantly in exoteric or popular arguments (exōterikoi logoi) 
and one ought to make use of them (1102a26-27); Aristotle says that it makes no 
difference for the discussion in Book I if this is an accurate understanding of the soul 
or simply a way of understanding the soul metaphorically.  The analysis of 
intellectual virtue that follows is therefore problematic, insofar as it relies on this 
questionable division of the soul.  It suffices to say that Aristotle has not here defined 




Aristotle’s reinvestigation of virtue leads to a reinvestigation of choice, which 
was important in his earlier account of moral responsibility.  Aristotle quickly asserts 
that there is no choice without intellect (nous) and thinking (dianoia; VI.2.1139a33-
34).  This being the case, Aristotle must turn to a search for intellectual virtue, and 
this investigation treats virtue from a higher plane (anōthen, VI.3.1139b14).  Judged 
by this higher standard, what, he asks, is the relationship between intellectual and 
moral virtue?  If thought and intellect play a role in choice, Aristotle must clarify the 
distinction he made between moral and intellectual virtue in Book II, as the two now 
prove to be more intimately linked than was previously asserted.   
Indeed, Aristotle gives the reader good reason to doubt that the distinction 
between the rational and irrational part of the soul holds up under investigation.  
Instead, the two parts of the soul may well collapse into one another and be ultimately 
indistinguishable: “For good action (eupraxia) is an end (telos), and desire (orexis) is 
for this.  On account of this, choice is either desiring intellect (nous), or intellecting 
(dianēotikos, adj.) desire, and this sort of beginning (archē) is a human being” 
(1139b3-5).  These remarks, coupled with Aristotle’s earlier indication that dividing 
the soul into two is how the soul is spoken of in exoteric writings, should lead the 
reader to stop and reevaluate Aristotle’s earlier distinction between the rational and 
irrational parts of the soul, for it now appears that the two are inextricably linked. 
Indeed, they may always have been inseparable by nature (I.13.1102a30).64 It is 
therefore possible that the soul exists and acts as a single unit for Aristotle.  Joe Sachs 
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Platonic division of the soul which is always accepted in the Aristotelian ethical works.” Ibid, p. 143.  
While Irwin is correct to say that Aristotle makes uses of the division of the soul into a rational and 
irrational part in the Ethics, he does not note the ways in which Aristotle himself points to the 




points us to De Anima for Aristotle’s more careful and complex consideration of the 
soul.  Aristotle, he says, “suggests that all activities of the soul belong to it as a 
whole, at 429b11-22… and, at 432a22-b8, that desire is present in all thinking.”65  In 
other words, the account of intellectual virtue that follows in Book VI rests upon an 
inadequate understanding of the soul, that, in the last analysis, may not be Aristotle’s 
true understanding.66  Perhaps Aristotle will give us an indication as to how we could 
begin to think about intellectual virtue based on a more careful consideration of the 
soul. 
At any rate, Aristotle spends the bulk of Book VI, as he states at the 
beginning, attempting to solve the problem of the target.67  For in all the active 
conditions of the soul, he says, “there is some target to which the one who has a 
rational understanding looks off as he tightens or loosens his grip” (VI.1.1138b21-
23).  In trying to solve this problem, Aristotle enters a region where, it would seem, 
thinking enters into considerations of moral virtue. 
 Prudence or practical wisdom (phronēsis) emerges as the most likely power 
of the soul that provides the necessary link between moral and intellectual virtue, 
since it is the intellectual faculty that deals with determining the right action in a 
particular circumstance.  Moral virtue deals with actions, and prudence is that power 
                                                 
65 See Sachs’ Translation of the Nicomachean Ethics, page 102, note 141. 
66 Consider also Republic, where Socrates calls into question his earlier tripartite division of the soul, 
saying there is a longer road that leads to a better understanding of the soul (504b).  He provides a hint 
almost immediately by saying that “Now this [the good] is what the whole soul pursues and for the 
sake of which it does everything” (505d-e).  If we can speak of the soul as being unified in its pursuit 
of the good, the earlier tripartite division would no longer hold.  I would also consider Socrates’ speech 
in the Symposium in this context, which treats philosophy, a seemingly rational activity, as the 
manifestation of an intense erotic desire (201d-212c, ).  
67 The problem of the targeting of the end has been with us all along.  See I.1.1094a22-24; 
II.6.1106b31-33; III.12.1119b16-19.  Also VI.12.1144a7-9, where Aristotle says “For virtue makes the 
target correct, and prudence the means to it [the target].”  I discussed at length in the last chapter the 
problem of targeting the end.  See especially III.5.1114b and ff. where Aristotle discusses the difficulty 




of the soul that is a “truth-disclosing active condition involving reason about human 
goods that governs actions” (VI.5.1140b20-21).  But Aristotle finally concludes that it 
is impossible to be prudent without being good (VI.12.1144a36-1144b1), further 
blurring the distinction between ethical and intellectual virtue.  Prudence (phronēsis), 
a sort of intellectual virtue, emerges as necessary for moral virtue.  But once an 
intellectual virtue has been admitted to be in some way concomitant with moral 
virtue, the boundaries between them are murkier than before.  Indeed, Aristotle tells 
us, some people even say that all the virtues are forms of prudence (VI.13.1144b17-
18).  “Some people,” as it turns out, is Socrates, and Aristotle concedes that Socrates 
was partially correct in speaking of virtue and prudence in the same breath, although 
he was also partially mistaken.  He was correct insofar as he said there is no virtue 
without prudence, but mistaken insofar as he said that all virtues are forms of 
prudence (VI.13.1144b18-21).  This is Aristotle’s first explicit reference to any 
version of the so-called Socratic Paradox, and this encounter makes evident the dire 
need for a fuller treatment of Socrates and his understanding of the relationship 
between moral and intellectual virtue. 68  In order to maintain the dual division of 
virtue, Aristotle must distinguish his position regarding prudence from Socrates’ 
position.69  Aristotle certainly tries to distance himself from Socrates’ identification of 
moral and intellectual virtues, but manages only a slight separation from the Socratic 
position.  Whereas Socrates believed that all the virtues are reasoned accounts 
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Socratic Paradox.   
69 J.J. Mulhern tries to argue in “Aristotle and the Socratic Paradoxes,” p. 295, that despite that fact that 
it is true that Aristotle nowhere provides a solution to the Socratic Paradox in the Nicomachean Ethics, 
an Aristotelian solution can be constructed based on the distinctions Aristotle has made concerning 
virtue from Book I forward, his prime example being the distinction between intellectual and moral 




(logoi), we, Aristotle says, believe they are with or accompanied by (meta) reason 
(logos) (VI.13.1144b28-30).  It is unclear who “we” are in Aristotle’s statement.  
Aristotle says most emphatically that Socrates equates virtue with prudence, but he 
also indicates that Socrates thought virtue was reasoned accounts (logoi), and only 
parenthetically alludes to the most radical formulation of that thesis, that virtue is 
knowledge(s) (epistēmai, VI.13.1144b29-30).  If virtue does in fact equal knowledge, 
then no one who possessed knowledge could fail to act virtuously.   
Socrates’ radical identification of virtue and practical wisdom at the end of 
Book VI, which is alluded to in its less radical form, calls Aristotle’s entire ethical 
project into question, so a more thorough investigation of intellectual virtue and 
Socrates’ thoughts on the matter is called for.  Aristotle has raised a problem by 
raising the question of what role wisdom and knowledge play with respect to virtue, 
and the insufficiency of his account of intellectual virtue at the end of Book VI 
demands a more thorough investigation of this topic.  Having introduced Socrates’ 
understanding of the relationship between wisdom and virtue, Aristotle is compelled 
to make a new beginning in Book VII and tackle this problem directly.  For 
Aristotle’s account of moral virtue to stand, Socrates’ theses must be either refuted or 
at least rejected. 
 
A New Beginning 
Aristotle calls the reader’s attention to the importance of Book VII with the 
pronouncement of a new beginning.  Aristotle’s encounter with Socrates at the end of 




addressed directly instead of in passing.70  The difference in Book VI between 
Aristotle and Socrates concerning moral and intellectual virtue culminates in a direct 
confrontation between Aristotle and Socrates in Book VII.  Aristotle finally addresses 
the Socratic objections that he managed to postpone or reject in Book III, since he can 
no longer hold Socrates at arm’s length.71  Indeed, the fact that Aristotle engages the 
foremost political philosopher, Socrates, in direct dialogue in Book VII further alerts 
the reader that Book VII promises to be a most philosophically rich book, and 
certainly marks an ascent over his quick dismissal of a nameless Socratic objector in 
Book III.  The encounter between Socrates and Aristotle in Book VII will allow us to 
see whether moral virtue in its best articulated form can withstand Socratic 
investigation.  The main objector to the Ethics as it has been presented thus far is not 
the unethical or immoral man, but the philosopher.72  Socrates’ objections to 
Aristotle’s account of moral virtue can be said to reach their climax in Book VII, and 
here, as opposed to the earlier encounters, Aristotle turns his sight to meeting 
Socrates directly and in name.  It is reasonable, then, to suppose that Aristotle’s direct 
treatment of Socrates’ impasses in Book VII—and indeed of Socrates’ final 
appearance in the work—marks a clear ascent over Aristotle’s discussion of moral 
                                                 
70 J.J. Mulhern, “Aristotle and the Socratic Paradoxes.”  He rightly points out that there generally have 
not been too many commentaries that treat both the end of Book VI and the beginning of Book VII, but 
he argues that the two references to Socrates are arbitrarily divided by their assignment to different 
books.  I, on the other hand, argue that the encounter at the end of book VI with Socrates offers such a 
profound challenge to Aristotle’s account of moral virtue that it requires a break and a new beginning, 
so that the division between books VI and VII is not arbitrary. 
71 I addressed the inadequacy of Aristotle’s response in Book III to a Socratic objector (especially 
III.5.1114a31-1114b25) in the last chapter of this dissertation. 




responsibility in Book III, as it is now a much more philosophic investigation.  Book 
VII stands apart from the rest of the book.73   
 Upon making his new beginning, Aristotle immediately expands the moral 
universe beyond the limits of the investigation in the previous six books, and it turns 
out that virtue and vice do not exhaust the human possibilities.  In addition to vice, 
there are two other character flaws that are to be avoided: incontinence,74 which has 
hitherto only been alluded to, and brutishness.  As virtue is opposed to vice, so 
continence is opposed to incontinence.  The opposite of the beast-like state is 
something heroic and godlike, Aristotle tells us, as Homer made Priam say about 
Hector (VII.1.1145a18-21).  Both of these states are exceedingly rare among human 
beings, Aristotle tells us, and although he will provide many examples of the bestial 
state in Chapter Five, he avoids giving an example of this rare, god-like man.75  It is 
certainly possible that bringing us into dialogue with Socrates, as Aristotle is about to 
do, leads us to an example of that rare god-like human being, the philosopher.76 
                                                 
73 Thus Ronna Burger, in Aristotle’s Dialogue with Socrates, p. 132says, “It [Book VII] seems to have 
left behind the gentleman as a member of its audience, along with the attempt to capture ethical virtue 
as the virtuous person understands it.”  Moreover, Aristide Tessitore says, “More than any other book 
in the Ethics, Book VII departs from the standard of orthos logos that provides the dominant horizon 
for the treatise as a whole.  The more extensive use of arguments drawn from dialectic and natural 
philosophy and, in general, the greater emphasis on puzzle and discovery, reveals that the dominant 
horizon is not the only or even fundamental one.  The radical dissimilarity between the life of the 
philosopher and that of the kalos k’agathos [the gentleman] emerges most clearly for those willing to 
undertake a thoughtful reading of Book VII…” (Reading Aristotle’s Ethics, p. 72) 
74 I will render akrasia as incontinence and engkrateia as continence.  I would prefer “lack of self-
control” and “self-control” were the former not so cumbersome.   
75 For the problematic nature of Aristotle’s use of Priam’s “pitifully ironic” words about Hector, see 
Burger Aristotle’s Dialogue with Socrates, pp. 132-133. 
76 Both the godlike and beast-like man live outside of the political community.  Consider Aristotle’s 
remarks in Politics: “One who is incapable of participating or who is in need of nothing through being 
self-sufficient is no part of a city, and so is either a beast or a god” (I.1253a26-29).  Consider in this 
context also Nietzsche’s Twilight of the Idols, Maxim and Barb number 3: “To live alone you must be 




 Instead of a discussion or example of this rare, god-like human being, 
Aristotle instead introduces three new terms: softness (malakia), luxuriousness 
(truphē), and endurance (karteria).  He then turns briefly to a consideration of the 
method he will undertake at this point in the book.  Aristotle’s new beginning in Book 
VII requires a new method of investigation as well.  It is necessary, Aristotle says, 
after having posited things as they appear to be (ta phainomena), to go through the 
impasses or confusions, in order bring to light all the respectable opinions (endoxa)  
regarding these experiences.  And here Aristotle clearly refers to these phenomena as 
experiences (pathē).  If the difficulties are resolved, and the respectable opinions 
remain, then the matter will have been brought to light sufficiently (VII.1.1145b2-7).   
The goal appears to be to leave respectable opinions intact to the degree that this is 
possible.77  The problem is clear:  If Aristotle’s explicit aim is to keep received 
opinions intact, his aim is not to bring the truth regarding the matter under 
investigation fully to light.  He will only push matters as far as they can go while still 
leaving received opinions intact. 
 Once he has established his new method of inquiry, Aristotle turns first to an 
examination of continence and incontinence.  Now it seems, Aristotle tells us, that 
continence and endurance are morally serious and therefore praiseworthy, while 
incontinence and softness are low and blameworthy.  These then are the phenomena 
as they present themselves and as they are generally understood.  According to 
common opinion, continent people are morally serious, and should accordingly be 
praised because they stand by their reasoning and do not fall into doing things that are 
base on account of passion.  The incontinent person, by contrast, succumbs to his 
                                                 




passions all the while knowing that his actions are base.  Some people say that a 
continent person is like a moderate and a person of endurance, while others deny it.  
But earlier, Aristotle calls moderation a moral virtue (III.10.1117b23 and ff.), and he 
will soon deny that the moderate person is continent, on the grounds that a moderate 
person does not have strong or base desires that are characteristic of the continent 
person (VII.2.1146a9-15).     
 Although continence, according to common opinion, is praiseworthy, 
Aristotle withholds his agreement with that judgment and therefore only delicately or 
with great hesitation points to the problem with continence, namely that the continent 
person possesses base desires.  But he does point us toward the confusion that is 
revealed in respectable opinion according to which continence is praiseworthy, and 
this may help us to understand why Aristotle withholds his praise of continence.  The 
continent and the incontinent person are similar in a fundamental way that Aristotle 
fails to make clear, though he does leave the conclusion to be drawn.  Both the 
continent and the incontinent person share base passions, and it would be absurd to 
praise as virtuous someone who possesses base desires.  Moreover, greater continence 
is called for only in the case of extremely intense base passions.  Continence is 
praised despite, or precisely because of, the presence of base desires, and, in the case 
of tremendous continence, despite the presence of tremendous, base desires.  The 
praise recognizes that the person is base, but that he has somehow overcome his 
baseness.  Moreover, precisely this self-overcoming is what is praiseworthy, and this 




continent person is both controller and controlled.78  A human being cannot control 
himself unless he is composed of more than one psychic element, for example a 
rational and an irrational part.  Aristotle has prepared us for this understanding of the 
soul, and encouraged us to make use of it, but it is an understanding that is used 
abundantly in popular or exoteric writings.  Since the soul is only spoken of as two-
fold in such writings, there is good reason to think that continence and incontinence 
are also popular or exoteric understandings of the phenomena.  The phenomena of 
continence and incontinence are so confused that one wonders whether they even 
exist or if they are not just a useful way of describing human psychology that would 
ultimately have to be rejected in favor of a more precise understanding of the soul. 
All of this is meant to reveal the impasses regarding moral virtue and 
incontinence that Aristotle has not brought clearly to light.  And it makes sense, given 
his proposed method of inquiry in Book VII, that he does not mark these confusions 
as clearly as possible, since he hopes to keep respectable opinion intact.  After all, one 
ought not to disparage continence, especially if disparaging it leads people not to 
moderation, but to licentiousness.  Before moving on, it must be pointed out that 
Aristotle indeed distinguishes incontinence from licentiousness (akolaston), and he 
also brings it to light that some people speak of incontinence with respect to 
spiritedness, honor, and gain.  He will treat these later.  
 
The Socratic Impasse 
In Chapter Two, however, the impasses regarding incontinence come to a head, but 
Aristotle refuses to raise any of the confusions regarding incontinence in his own 
                                                 




name.  Instead he puts these in the mouths of others.  The impasses come from two 
sources, namely philosophy and sophistry, and these are two activities that must be 
distinguished.  Putting the impasses in the mouths of others allows Aristotle to play 
the role of guardian of respectable opinion, or as an arbiter between the gentlemen 
and the philosopher, a role perfectly suited to allow him to follow his proposed 
method of inquiry.  Someone, Aristotle says, might raise an impasse: “Some” (tines) 
say that it is not possible for one possessing knowledge to behave without continence.  
Here, however, as opposed to his use of earlier unnamed interlocutors in Book III, 
Aristotle identifies the objector who raises the impasse (aporein) as Socrates. Indeed, 
“it would be terrible,” according to Socrates, “if, when knowledge is present, 
something else were to master it and drag it around like a slave” (VII.2.1145b23-24).   
 This is the second reference in just a few short pages to Socrates.  At the end 
of Book VI, and here again in Book VII, Aristotle points to two Platonic dialogues 
where Socrates takes up a question concerning virtue.  Earlier, Aristotle made 
mention of Socrates’ position in the Meno, and here in VII.2, he takes up Socrates’ 
position in the Protagoras.  The Meno can be said to have as its theme the question, 
“What is virtue?” and the Protagoras has as its theme the question, “Is virtue 
teachable?” In the Protagoras, Socrates chastises the opinion of the many, who think 
that knowledge does not rule when it is present in a human being, but that something 
else rules him, be it anger, pleasure, pain, erotic love, or fear.  Thus the many liken 
knowledge to a slave being dragged around by all the others.79   
                                                 
79 In the Protagoras and here in the Ethics, Plato and Aristotle both use andrapodon as the word for 





Indeed, Socrates used to do battle against the argument that knowledge could 
be overpowered altogether, saying there is no such thing as incontinence 
(VII.2.1145b25-26).  This is no small impasse that must be reconciled, as Socrates 
does not simply say our understanding of incontinence is in need of clarification.  He 
rejects outright the existence of the phenomenon we are trying to understand.  
The articulation of Socrates’ argument consists of three parts.  First, as was 
just mentioned, Socrates claims that there is no such thing as incontinence.  Secondly, 
Socrates denied the existence of akrasia because he thought that no one acts contrary 
to what takes to be best.  Lastly, one only acts contrary to what is best as a result of 
ignorance.  Aristotle refrains from mentioning the radical conclusion that Socrates 
draws in the Protagoras from these arguments, perhaps because this would prove to 
be an irresolvable conflict between the Socrates and respectable opinion.  In the 
Protagoras, Socrates states the conclusion to Protagoras in the only part of that 
passage where he speaks in the first person: “For I pretty much think that none of the 
wise men holds that any human being voluntarily errs or voluntarily carries out any 
shameful and bad deeds.  Rather, they well know that all those who do shameful and 
bad things do them involuntarily” (345d-e).  In other words, if Socrates’ 
understanding of incontinence is correct, it would destroy Aristotle’s earlier account 
of voluntary wrongdoing and, with it, respectable opinion.  If Aristotle’s account of 
moral virtue and moral responsibility is the most plausible articulation of moral virtue 
and responsibility, then Socrates’ thesis undermines moral responsibility as such. 
The problem with Socrates’ position concerning the relationship between 




contention with the phenomena (phainomenois) that come plainly to sight (enargōs; 
VII.2.1145b27-28).80  Respectable opinion (endoxa) relies a great deal on the way 
that things appear or seem to be, and Socrates denies that appearances accurately 
capture reality.81 By denying the phenomenon of incontinence, Socrates stands in 
stark contradiction to respectable opinion.  Socrates’ position is paradoxical in the 
literal sense that it runs contrary to respectable opinion.82  Aristotle aims to reconcile 
respectable opinion with the impasses that occur, to the extent that such a 
reconciliation is possible.  In other words, Aristotle tries to reconcile philosophy and 
the city as the impasses raised here are those raised by philosophy.  But the extent to 
which Socrates’ thesis regarding akrasia genuinely runs contrary to the opinions of 
the city, going so far as to deny the existence of a moral phenomenon, dims the 
prospects for any reconciliation.  The difference, after all, is not simply about the 
correct way to understand something but whether that something exists. 
Moreover, if Aristotle’s intention is to preserve respectable opinion, he should 
simply drop Socrates’ radical denial of the existence of incontinence.  Socrates’ 
rejection of incontinence can be rejected on the grounds that it contradicts plain 
appearances; it can be rejected precisely because respectable opinion fails to take 
seriously the impasse posed by Socrates’ thought.  In fact, Aristotle indicates that 
Socrates is alone in his rejection of the existence of continence, therefore posing very 
little threat to respectable opinion.  The benign nature of Socrates’ denial of this 
                                                 
80 W.D. Ross translates perhaps too strongly in his translation of the Nicomachean Ethics: “Now this 
view [i.e., Socrates’] plainly contradicts the observed facts.” 
81 Endoxa is related to the Greek verb dokein, to seem.   
82 Weiss, The Socratic Paradox and Its Enemies, p.5.  Aristotle seems to be the originator of referring 
to Socrates’ arguments as the Socratic Paradox, insofar as Aristotle states that Socrates’ arguments 




phenomenon does not result from a lack of radicalism, but rather because it is so 
radical that it garners little to no attention from the morally serious.  Socrates’ 
impasse is likely to be laughed off or identified with mere sophistry (VII.2).  Instead 
of letting sleeping dogs lie, instead, that is, of suppressing  or reconciling this tension 
between Socratic thought and respectable opinion—Aristotle instead chooses to 
highlight the tension, contrary to his explicit aim.   
Indeed, Aristotle takes the paradoxical nature of Socrates’ argument to be 
justification for an investigation into the matter, instead of a justification for letting it 
drop, as he immediately says that it is necessary to examine whether the experience 
(pathos) of incontinence is really ignorance, as Socrates says it is, and if so, what 
manner of ignornace (VII.2.1145b28-29).  Moreover, Socrates is now the judge 
before whose bar respectable opinion must come, not the other way around, as 
Aristotle earlier indicated.  Aristotle’s procedure thus shifts the burden of proof from 
Socrates to those who would reject his thesis.  That is, Aristotle’s procedure is to 
examine attempts to refute Socrates, with every failed attempt strengthening Socrates’ 
thesis, as opposed to attempting to use Socrates’ thesis to refute respectable opinion.   
Aristotle begins his inquiry into Socrates’ claim by stating a rather 
straightforward opinion regarding the incontinent.  He tells us, “That such a person 
[the akratic] believes beforehand is apparent (phaneron)” (VII.2.1145b30-31).  
Aristotle leaves unclear precisely what it is that the unrestrained person believes 
beforehand, and we are left to fill in the gaps for ourselves.  Aristotle suggests—he 
does not explicitly state—that the unrestrained person, at the moment he behaves 




rate, is apparent.  Of course, this formulation is problematic, since it is precisely 
appearances with which Socrates’ arguments contend.  An appeal to appearances, 
when these are precisely what are at stake, is not a refutation of Socrates.  If such an 
appeal to appearances were sufficient, there would have been no need to inquire in 
the first place.   
Aristotle next points out that some attempt to save respectable opinion by 
conceding considerable ground to Socrates, but rejecting other parts of his argument.  
This attempt too is unsuccessful.  Aristotle says that these are willing to concede to 
Socrates that nothing is more powerful than knowledge, but they try to save the 
phenomenon of incontinence by distinguishing between knowledge and opinion.  
While it is impossible to act against knowledge, these people think that one can act 
against his opinion concerning what is best.  This objection serves a valuable role as it 
reveals the more problematic aspect of Socrates’ thesis by what it refuses to accept.  
These people are unwilling to agree to the thesis that no one acts contrary to what 
seems best to them.  But this is precisely the grounds upon which Socrates denies the 
existence of incontinence.  In other words, this is the heart of the matter.  The denial 
of the existence of incontinence depends upon the thesis that no one acts contrary to 
what he takes to be best: because no one acts contrary to what he takes 
(hupolambanō) to be best, but only as a result of ignorance, there is no such thing as 
incontinence (1145b25-27).   
While these people deny the central aspect of Socrates’ argument, they do not 
turn to a direct examination of it.  Instead they focus their sights elsewhere, 




Socrates’ contention that no one acts contrary to what he takes to be best.  And while 
the distinction between knowledge and opinion could certainly carry the argument 
forward, it could also be equivocation in the service of avoiding the fundamental 
problem.  At any rate, Aristotle gives every indication that the distinction that such 
people make between knowledge and opinion is not sufficient for refuting Socrates’ 
thesis.  Presumably, this argument turns to opinion because opinion is weaker than 
knowledge.  But since there tends to be forgiveness for people who behave 
incontinently as a result of either the weakness of their opinions or even self-doubt, 
Aristotle says, this cannot be what we are after, for incontinence is something 
blameworthy, not forgivable.  Moreover, there is fundamental agreement here 
between them and Socrates, as they concede to Socrates that unrestraint is impossible 
for one who knows.  At any rate, Aristotle will return to opinion (VII.3, and again in 
VII.8-9).  After two attempts to disprove Socrates’ thesis, it still stands. 
Next Aristotle raises the question of whether incontinence occurs when 
prudence (phronēsis) resists.  Aristotle raises the possibility because he rejected 
opinion on the grounds that it was too weak, so he decides to see if incontinence 
occurs when something stronger, namely prudence, resists. Aristotle, however, 
immediately rejects this possibility as absurd, since this would require the co-
presence of prudence and incontinence, and no one would claim that a prudent person 
would voluntarily do base things (VII.2.1146a4-7).  Here Aristotle concedes 




base things.83  Prudence, at any rate, is too strong, and opinion is too weak to be what 
resists when incontinence occurs.   
The discussion of the relative strength or weakness of the faculty that attempts 
to resist when incontinence occurs leads Aristotle to examine the strength or 
weakness of that which it opposes.  What causes the tension?  It turns out that the 
continent person possesses strong, base desires and is thus distinguished from the 
moderate person (VII.2.1146a9 and ff.).  In fact, the continent person must have 
strong base desires, for if he possessed only weak desires, continence would be 
nothing great.   
Aristotle quickly points out that this line of argument can begin to devolve 
into a sophistic impasse (VII.2.1146a21-1146b5).  The sophistic argument states that 
an senseless person would be better off incontinent than continent, because, as a 
result of incontinence, one does the opposite of what one believes is best.  One’s 
senselessness in such a situation thus mistakes bad things for good ones, and as a 
result of incontinence with respect to what one believes to be good (which is actually 
bad), he will choose what he believes to be bad (which is actually good).  So 
incontinence, according to sophistic argument, is not always bad.  But these types of 
arguments are not made with a view toward understanding the phenomenon of 
incontinence, but are made instead with a view to being impressively clever.  Such an 
argument is irrefutable, but provides no clear direction out of the argument, and seeks 
to remain at the level of paradox.  Here Aristotle distinguishes the kind of impasse 
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(aporia) raised by Socratic inquiry from the impasses raised by sophistic inquiry.  
Indeed, Aristotle separates Socrates’ impasse from the sophistic impasse by a number 
of steps.  Moreover, we would do well to remember that Socrates’ impasse suggested 
to Aristotle the need for further inquiry, and Aristotle sees no such necessity with 
respect to the sophistic impasse.  Merely sophistic argumentation seems to be for the 
sake of refuting someone (elenchein), or forcing them into a paradox (paradoxos).  
Thus, Aristotle distinguishes Socratic inquiry from the use of paradox, reserving the 
use of the term paradox as a term of disparagement.84  It is clear, then, that the so-
called Socratic Paradoxes are not paradoxes at all, at least not as the term is used or 
understood by Aristotle.85  To refer to Socrates’ theses as paradoxes is to reduce them 
to sophistic games, and to incline one to reject them as such.  From the treatment that 
Aristotle gives to Socrates’ views on knowledge, virtue, and unrestraint, it is clear 
that he viewed them as genuine impasses, rather than sophistic paradoxes.  Perhaps it 
would be useful, and more accurate, to refer to the Socratic Paradox as the Socratic 
Impasses. 
 
                                                 
84 See, for example, Metaphysics Book Γ, Ch. 7: “Now this opinion has come about for some people in 
the same way that other paradoxes have; for whenever one is not able to refute (luein) eristic 
arguments, by giving in to the argument, he concedes the thing on which the reasoning was based to be 
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85 Weiss, in The Socratic Paradox and Its Enemies, argues that Socrates employs his so-called 
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the manner in which Aristotle here disparagingly says the sophists employ paradoxes.  Socrates’ 
overarching goal in practicing philosophy is not the pursuit of wisdom or knowledge of truth according 
to Weiss; rather, Socrates’ overarching concern is “to eradicate the false beliefs and puncture the 




Can One Who Knows Be Incontinent? 
Aristotle continues to press Socrates’ impasse in the next chapter, laying out two 
tasks that remain in his investigation of incontinence.  First he must take up the 
question of whether the incontinent acts knowingly (oida) or not, and if so, in what 
respect; then he will expand the inquiry to a host of topics including what sort of a 
thing continence and its privation are concerned with, what the relationship is 
between them, as well as their relationship to endurance and softness, and “similarly 
for all other points belonging to this theoretical inquiry (theōria)” (VII.3.1146b6-14).  
It is especially noteworthy that here in Book VII, the study has risen to the level of a 
theoretical inquiry (theōria), especially considering that earlier in the Ethics Aristotle 
told us that the inquiry was not for the sake of contemplation or theory but rather in 
order that we might become good (II.2.1103b26-28). 86  This confirms our earlier 
suspicion that Book VII marks a clear ascent over the previous books, and begins to 
embark on philosophic investigation.  Specific to our purposes, the inquiry here in 
Book VII marks an ascent over Aristotle’s earlier treatment of the same material in 
Book III.  Moreover, the present inquiry can no longer be said to be strictly for the 
sake of actions—if we are concerned merely with actions, perhaps the earlier account 
suffices.  If, however, we are interested in intellectual clarity, the inquiry must 
become theoretical and requires contemplation. 
 A proper beginning point for the inquiry is to determine whether continence 
and incontinence are distinguished by what they are involved with or by the manner 
in which they are involved with whatever that thing might be.  It is certainly possible, 
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Aristotle states, that continence and incontinence are distinguished in both of these 
regards.  In other words, with respect to what and in what manner do we say a person 
lacks continence?  Is it possible to be incontinent with respect to all things, or is 
simple, unqualified incontinence concerned only with one thing?  Raising these 
questions reveals that we do not yet know what incontinence is, so we are not yet in a 
position to judge Socrates’ position with respect to it.  Aristotle’s first insight is that 
the incontinent person is concerned with the same things that a licentious person is 
concerned with, namely pleasure, but the incontinent and the licentious differ in the 
manner in which they are involved with these same things.  The licentious person 
differs from the incontinent insofar as he chooses the pleasant things, because he 
believes the pleasant thing should always be pursued, whereas the incontinent person 
pursues the pleasure at hand despite believing that he ought not to pursue it.  The 
licentious person is not marked by any internal struggle. 
 By distinguishing between the licentious and the incontinent with respect to 
belief, Aristotle must revisit the question of what it is that the incontinent person 
believes.  And so Aristotle will make six attempts in this chapter to refute Socrates’ 
thesis and save the phenomenon of incontinence.  First, Aristotle will consider 
whether the incontinent person possess opinion but not knowledge; second, he will 
distinguish two senses of knowing; third, he will distinguish the different ways one 
knows premises with heavy reliance on an example; fourth, he will compare the 
incontinent person to someone who is drunk, asleep, or insane; fifth, he will treat the 
topic from the standpoint of nature, again making heavy reliance on an example; and 




time leaving out insane).  The parallels between the third and fourth attempts, on the 
one hand, and the fifth and sixth attempts, on the other, should be noted.  I will treat 
in turn each attempt to save the phenomenon. 
As in the last chapter, Aristotle turns first to opinion—this time qualifying it 
as true opinion—and again rejects this possibility quickly.  It is not against true 
opinion that the incontinent person acts against, Aristotle avers, because people 
believe in their opinions just as strongly as people who know, as Heraclitus indicates 
(1146b24-31).  From a subjective standpoint, there is no difference between 
knowledge and opinion. 
 Aristotle’s second attempt to save the phenomenon of incontinence relies on 
the equivocal way in which the word “knowledge” is employed.  It is possible, 
Aristotle says, for someone to have knowledge but not to use that knowledge, and it is 
also possible for someone to have knowledge and to put it to use.  It makes a 
difference whether the one who has knowledge is contemplating (theōreō) or not 
contemplating what it is necessary to do (1146b31-34).  Here in the chapter that has 
risen to the level of a theoretical inquiry, Aristotle indicates that it in order to do what 
it is necessary to do, one must contemplate knowledge.  The Ethics, which, as stated 
above, Aristotle says is for the sake of action and not for the sake of theory or 
contemplation, now reveals that contemplation is necessary for doing what it is 
necessary to do.  In other words, in the context of a theoretical inquiry into the 
question of the relationship between virtue and knowledge, Aristotle now emphasizes 
the primacy of contemplation for living well.  In order to do what one ought or needs 




terrible (deinos), Aristotle says, for one to act contrary to knowledge while 
contemplating it, but it would not be terrible if one were to act contrary to knowledge 
while not contemplating it.  This distinction between the two ways of knowing could 
save the phenomenon of incontinence, but if it does, Aristotle fails to draw that 
conclusion.  Indeed, this distinction, as David Schaefer says, “is plausible enough, yet 
incomplete, inasmuch as it does not explain why it is that the akratic fails to exercise 
his knowledge.”87  Moreover, it is not clear that this distinction captures the 
phenomenon as it presents itself.  The phenomenon of incontinence, by outward 
appearances, is marked by the tension between knowledge and desire—that is, both 
are present and active and the phenomenon is the tension between the two and the 
ultimate failure of knowledge.  If knowledge is inactive, there is nothing against 
which desire struggles.  If the knowledge is not being exercised or contemplated, 
Aristotle’s distinction fails to account for that apparent tension.   
 Recognizing that the treatment is incomplete, having sided yet with neither 
common opinion nor Socrates, Aristotle continues his attempt to examine whether 
people are unrestrained knowingly by distinguishing between two different manners 
of having premises.   Nothing, he says, prevents someone from acting contrary to 
knowledge who has knowledge of both the universal premise and the particular 
premise but who uses only the universal premise.   And the universal premise itself 
differs, as it consists of two parts.  The example of a universal premise that Aristotle 
gives is that dry food is beneficial to every human being.  The two parts of this 
universal premise, then, are dry food and human being, and there are two particular 
                                                 




premises that would have to follow in order to arrive at the conclusion that one ought 
to eat this particular food.  The entire syllogism would run as follows: 
 
Universal Premise:  (Every) Dry food is beneficial to every human being 
Particular Premise 1: This particular food is dry food 
Particular Premise 2: I am a human being                    
Conclusion: This particular food is good for this particular human 
being 
 
One would have to hold all three premises to arrive at the conclusion that one ought 
to eat this particular food.  It would not be absurd at all, Aristotle tells us, if one 
possessed the universal knowledge in this case but acted against it because he lacked 
particular knowledge.  In other words, it would not be strange if one possessed the 
premise that dry food is beneficial for a human being but failed to eat it because one 
does not have the premise that the particular food in front of one is dry food or if one 
does not activate (energeō) that premise.  Under these circumstances, presumably, 
one could knowingly act without continence.   But it would be amazing, Aristotle 
says, if one knew the universal premise and the particular premise that this food is dry 
food and failed to eat it. 
 There are, however, two very important and related problems with this 
attempt to explain incontinence.  The first has to do with the veracity of the first 
universal premise, the second with the seemingly uncontroversial recognition of 
oneself as a human being. 
 In this seemingly morally irrelevant example of eating dry food, Aristotle 
offers us the possibility of a universally valid premise with respect to all human 




suspicious of the notion that there are any universally valid rules for a human being to 
follow.  Aristotle’s discussions of both justice and of the mean ought to compel the 
reader to question the notion that there can be a universally valid principle of action.   
Aristotle does mention in II.6, however, three actions for which there is no mean 
condition—adultery, theft, and murder.  These actions carry the connotation of 
baseness as soon as one names them, Aristotle says (1107a9-12).   Aristotle provides 
very little argument as to why these actions are base, but his assertion that the name 
of these actions already carries with it the particular judgment of baseness is 
revealing.  Murder, for example, already carries in its name the connotation of a base 
killing, thus leaving open the possibility that there can be a taking of human life that 
is not murder.  The action itself is killing, and one can inquire whether a particular act 
of killing is justified or if it is unjustified, i.e., if it is murder.  To call a killing murder 
is already to have pronounced on the question of its baseness.88  Perhaps there are 
justifications, such as self-defense, for killing under certain circumstances.  The city, 
at any rate, must insist that killing under some cases is justifiable, or else it could 
never defend itself in war and would, of necessity, perish.  Is euthanasia, to mention 
another example, ever justified by the demands of mercy?  And is suicide ever 
justifiable?89  And can we not imagine a situation which would at least compel us to 
reflect on whether adultery could ever prove justifiable?  What, for example, if an act 
of adultery were the only way to save the life of one’s spouse?90  Or what if it were 
the only way to procure an heir to the throne and thus maintain civil order and prevent 
                                                 
88 The Greek is androphonia, which is slaughter of men.  An androphonos was a legal term, and 
referred to someone convicted of homicide (See entry in Liddell and Scott’s Greek-English Lexicon).  
89 Consider Xenophon’s Apology of Socrates to the Jury, especially §6. 




the city from falling into civil war?91  Less imagination is necessary, I suppose, to 
consider an example where taking someone’s property without his or her consent is 
justifiable.  I am not attempting here to prove that these actions are in fact excusable; 
it is enough to have muddied the waters sufficiently and to suggest that actions, 
because they deal with particulars, cannot be treated simply in universals.  Indeed, 
Aristotle gives the reason every reason to doubt that such a set of rules exists.  
Aristotle insists on the variability of particular actions, and this is why his account of 
moral virtue focuses on the more ambiguous mean conditions of the soul as opposed 
to trying to discern a universal set of moral rules.  
 Even justice, according to Aristotle, is varied or changeable.   Many, in fact, 
take the variability of justice as evidence that all justice is strictly conventional, but 
Aristotle insists that there is something just by nature, even if it is changeable 
(V.7.1134b18-33).92  Justice, then, is much like health.  There is a natural conception 
of what it means for a human being to be healthy, even if each particular instantiation 
of health varies relative to the particular human being. 
Indeed, to return to the text, perhaps this is why Aristotle chooses the 
seemingly innocuous example of eating dry food.  For even this example is 
                                                 
91 Consider, for example, the circumstances that led to the Norman conquest of England when the 
childless King Edward the Confessor died without a clear heir apparent. 
92 Consider what L. Strauss has to say about the variability of the demands of justice, according to 
Aristotle: “There is a universally valid hierarchy of ends, but there are no universally valid rules of 
action.  Not to repeat what has been indicated before, when deciding what ought to be done by this 
individual (or this individual group) here and now, one has to consider not only which of the various 
competing objectives is higher in rank but also which is most urgent in the circumstances.  What is 
most urgent is legitimately preferred to what is less urgent, and the most urgent is in many cases lower 
in rank than the less urgent.  But one cannot make a universal rule that urgency is a higher 
consideration than rank.  For it is our duty to make the highest activity, as much as we can, the most 
urgent or the most needful thing.  And the maximum effort which can be expected necessarily varies 
from individual to individual.  The only universally valid standard is the hierarchy of ends.  This 
standard is sufficient for passing judgment on the level of nobility of individuals and groups and of 





problematic when judged in the light Aristotle’s discussion of the appropriate amount 
to eat in II.6.  There, when determining how much one ought to eat, Aristotle insists 
that the proper amount of food one ought to eat must be judged in relation to the 
particular human being who is doing the eating: six pounds of food is not enough for 
Milo the wrestler, but it is probably too much for most human beings (1106b1-4).  
There is no universal rule telling one whether (or, more precisely, how much) one 
ought to eat.  This means, to return to the syllogism, that one cannot know the 
universal premise that Aristotle stated the person possesses (he does not say the 
person knows that premise).   There is no food that is universally good for a human 
being, as food can admit of excess.  The incontinent person mistakenly tries to 
discover universal rules that apply when in fact none can be found.  As such the 
universal premise is likely to contradict other universal premises.  I will return to this 
problem when Aristotle takes it up again in his next example. 
The second problem with this syllogism is that one would have to ask whether 
this particular dry food is beneficial for this particular human being.  As in the Milo 
example, one would have to know not only that one is a human being in order to eat 
correctly, but also what type of human being.   Now, of course, knowing one’s dietary 
needs is not philosophically interesting, but this pedestrian example points to the 
higher philosophic imperative to “know thyself.”  Aristotle insists that one might 
possess the particular premise that one is a human being, but two questions should 
follow.  First, “what is a human being?”  And to ask what a human being is, for 
Aristotle, is to ask its end is, and it is unclear that the common sense recognition that 




means to be a human being.  Moreover, one would have to be able to distinguish what 
type of human being one is, or where, within the full range of human possibilities, 
one falls.  In other words, if the philosophic imperative to know oneself is no easy 
task, it calls into question the ability of most people to determine what is truly good 
for them.  While Aristotle reveals the uncontroversial problem with the first particular 
premise (he admits that one can fail to recognize that this particular food is dry), he 
leaves it to the reader to find fault with the universal premise and the second 
particular premise.  To repeat, there are two problems with the example Aristotle 
gives when trying to save the phenomenon of incontinence by distinguishing between 
the two ways of possessing premises.  The first was the dubious possibility of a 
human being knowing a universal premise with respect to human conduct, and the 
second was the highly questionable notion that most people know what it means to be 
a human being in both the universal and particular case.  Looking back to the high 
standard Aristotle set for scientific knowledge (epistēmē) in Book VI—knowledge 
must be the result of a demonstration deduced from first principles (archai)—we see 
that it is doubtful if there can ever be knowledge concerning human action, 
considering its necessary variability.  Indeed, one wonders whether knowledge thus 
understood is possible at all.93 
                                                 
93 In order to demonstrate a matter, the demonstration would have to proceed from truth (alētheia) or a 
first principle or, more simply, first thing (prōton).  Consider the difficulty Aristotle has in explaining 
how the mind or soul (psuchē) grasps the first thing (prōton) in Posterior Analytics II.19.100a3-b17.  
The soul cannot know (epistamein) the first principle, but it can grasp it by intellection (nous).  At the 
very least, this intuitive intellection of the first principle seems out of harmony with Aristotle’s heavy 
emphasis on empiricism earlier in the Posterior Analystics.  If the truth, strictly speaking, of the first 
principles cannot be known simply, then the prospects for demonstration are questionable.  Consider 
also Maimonides The Guide of the Perplexed II.3,15, 24 where Maimonides says that Aristotle never 




 After the food example, Aristotle mentions another way that one can have 
knowledge but fail to use it, and this person both has and does not have knowledge.  
Aristotle likens this person to someone who is asleep, insane, or drunk.  Aristotle has 
used this language several times before in Book III when discussing ignorance 
(III.1.1110b20 and ff.; III.5.1113b30-33).  I have argued that Books III and VII need 
to be read in conjunction with one another, as they treat of the same topic, and, in 
Book III, Aristotle likens the insane and drunk to the ignorant.  If the analogy holds 
both forward and backward, Aristotle quietly intimates that the incontinent person is 
indeed ignorant, which means that he cannot therefore act knowingly.  The 
phenomenon of incontinence has not yet been saved, and Socrates’ equation of virtue 
and knowledge still stands. 
 Aristotle next turns to investigate the phenomenon of incontinence from the 
point of view of nature.  Stated in somewhat different terms, he looks for a physical 
cause of the phenomenon.94  Perhaps this step follows from the physical description 
that Aristotle has just given of the akratic as akin to someone who is asleep, drunk, or 
mad.  Turning to a natural or physical investigation suggests that the previous 
argument of the chapter is a different type of investigation, and Aristotle generally 
distinguishes between natural and logical inquiries.  The parallelism that I noted 
between Aristotle’s third and fourth inquiry, and fifth and sixth, is clearer with this 
distinction in mind.  Aristotle examines the same considerations, first from the 
standpoint of logic, and then from the standpoint of nature.   
 Just as in the logical inquiry, Aristotle makes heavy use of an example in his 
physical inquiry.  Aristotle first gives the example of someone who holds the 
                                                 




following two premises: first, all sweet things ought to be tasted, and second, this 
particular thing is sweet.  The conclusion would lead the one who holds these to 
premises to taste the sweet thing, assuming the person is able and in no way 
prevented from doing so.  Just as in the previous example, the conclusion follows 
from a universal premise and a particular one.  Of course, this example does not 
speak of the incontinent person but rather the licentious person, and so we would 
have to adjust the premises for the incontinent person.  For him, the universal premise 
is that no sweet thing should be tasted, a highly dubious premise.  Indeed, both the 
licentious person and the incontinent person hold extreme, unreasonable universal 
premises.  As is often the case with Aristotle, the reasonable premise would be the 
more moderate premise that some sweet things should be tasted.  I have already gone 
over the difficulty with trying to find universal premises with respect to human 
action, so there is no need to dwell on the difficulty, but it is remarkable that Aristotle 
fails to call either universal premise into question.  At any rate, the incontinent person 
holds the universal premise that no sweet thing should be tasted, and he also holds an 
additional universal premise: every sweet thing is pleasant.  Finally, he holds the 
particular premise that this particular thing is sweet.  One more thing is necessary, 
Aristotle says, for incontinence to occur.  Desire must also be present.  Since Aristotle 
had earlier cast doubt on separating desire from intellect, there must be an intellectual 
component to desire (VI.2.1139b3-5).  The desire must somehow contain the notion 
(opinion, belief) that the particular object is worthy of desire, i.e., that it is good.  
Aristotle does not make it clear, but the incontinent person holds two contradictory 




person holds, that no sweet thing should be tasted, can be slightly modified so as to 
say that it is good not to taste sweet things.  The second universal premise is that 
every sweet thing is pleasant, hence the desire for the sweet thing.  The missing, but 
implicit premise is that pleasure is good.  In other words, the incontinent person holds 
the contradictory premises that eating sweets is both good and not good.  If the 
premise that some good things ought to be tasted is the reasonable one to hold, the 
incontinent person has not sufficiently thought about when and under what conditions 
it would be good to taste something sweet and instead prefers the seeming simplicity 
of ready-made universal prohibitions and commands in an attempt to reduce the 
complexities of the world into all-or-nothing categories.  Indeed, animals are 
incapable of incontinence for precisely this reason, Aristotle tells us, because they are 
incapable of forming universal conceptions (VII.3.1147b3-5).  At any rate, Aristotle 
makes clear what is going on in the mind of the incontinent person.  On the one hand, 
he holds the universal premise that sweet things ought not be tasted, and, on the other, 
he holds that sweet things are pleasant.  The incontinent person ultimately acts as a 
result of the latter premise.  The opinion that the sweet thing is pleasant wins out in 
the case of the phenomenon of incontinence.  This is the opinion that governs 
action—the final premise.  Its finality results from the fact that it is the final premise 
at work that governs the action.95  Aristotle says that someone can lose his continence 
because of a reasoned account, in a way, and by an opinion that incidentally 
contradicts correct reason (1147a35-b3).  The incontinent person’s actions contradict 
his universally held premise that one ought not to taste sweet things.  But he does not 
                                                 
95 Ronna Burger’s comments here were extremely helpful for understanding this section (Aristotle’s 
Dialogue with Socrates: On the Nicomachean Ethics, pp. 143-144).  She points out that the premise 




know such a thing, and the fact that he possesses contradictory opinions regarding the 
matter reveals his lack of knowledge. 
 Since this final premise is not universal and does not seem to pertain to 
knowledge in the same way as something that is universal, it seems as well that what 
Socrates was seeking turns out to be the case, Aristotle says: “For it is not when 
knowledge in the authoritative sense seems to be present when the experience of 
incontinence occurs, nor is it this that is dragged around by passion; rather it is when 
the perceptive is present” (1147b13-17).96  VII.3 is a highly condensed, 
philosophically rich chapter in which Aristotle conducts a theoretical investigation 
which includes both a logical inquiry and an inquiry based on nature. And here, 
despite setting out to dispel Socrates’ contention and preserve common opinion, 
Aristotle concedes one aspect of the so-called Socratic Paradox: no one knowingly 
does wrong; knowledge cannot be dragged around like a slave.97  Moreover, Aristotle 
has saved, in a way, the phenomenon of incontinence, although he has radically 
altered the understanding of this experience.  The incontinent person is not overcome 
by passion; rather, he is guided in his actions by the final premise that the sweet thing 
before him is pleasant.  At this point, the discussion with Socrates appears to have 
concluded, but the conversation concerning incontinence continues for another seven 
                                                 
96 What is here translated as “the perceptive” is tēs aisthētikēs.  While most translators agree that the 
adjective refers back to knowledge (tēs epistēmēs) in the previous line, which would render it 
“perceptive knowledge” or “knowledge bound up with perception,” Aristotle is at least somewhat 
ambiguous. 
97 Indeed, John Cook Wilson (Aristotelian Studies: I. On the Structure of the Seventh Book of the 
Nicomachean Ethics, chapter I-X.) finds Aristotle’s agreement with Socrates in VII.3. so contrary to 
what Aristotle says elsewhere in the Nicomachean Ethics but also and especially in the Eudemian 
Ethics, that he rejects that VII.3 could have even been written by Aristotle.  The agreement with 
Socrates, he says, “appears quite unworthy of Aristotle” (p. 48), and his answer in VII.3 is “worse than 
no answer”; moreover,  “there is no trace of this doctrine in the other books of the Nic. Ethics” (p. 49).  
Cook Wilson in fact points to the first half of Book III as evidence that the conclusion in VII.3 is not 
Aristotle’s, which I treated in the last chapter.  I readily acknowledge the apparent inconsistency 




chapters.  We can immediately identify two reasons why the discussion continues.  In 
the first place, Aristotle has failed to make clear why the incontinent person acts on 
the basis of the premise “this sweet thing is pleasant” instead of on the basis of the 
premise “one ought not to eat sweet things.”  Second, Socrates’ denial of 
incontinence was only one aspect of the fundamental perplexity that he raises.  
Socrates denies the phenomenon of incontinence because he holds that no one acts 
contrary to what he thinks is best, but only as a result of ignorance, and Aristotle has 
not directly addressed this contention.  Can one knowingly do wrong, acting contrary 
to what he thinks is best?   
 
Continuing Investigation of Incontinence 
Having not yet answered these questions, Aristotle continues to press the issue, trying 
to discern what incontinence is simply or without qualification. It is clear, he tells us, 
that continence and incontinence have to do with pleasure, just as softness and 
endurance have to do with pains.  But pleasures themselves must be divided, Aristotle 
here tells us, first into the necessary and unnecessary.  The necessary pleasures are 
those that have to do with the body, especially those that deal with touch and taste.  
Among unnecessary pleasures, Aristotle first speaks of those that are choiceworthy in 
themselves; the examples he gives are victory, honor, and wealth.  One can be 
incontinent with respect to money, or gain, or honor, or even spiritedness, but these 
particular instantiations are only incontinence in a qualified sense or are only called 
incontinence by a certain likeness (VII.4.1147b31-35).  As further proof that these 




attached to incontinence simply.  So, under this bifurcation, Aristotle concludes that 
incontinence deals with the necessary pleasures of the body, the same things with 
which licentiousness is concerned, namely food, drink, and sex.   While Aristotle’s 
original division of pleasure was into necessary and unnecessary, he now divides 
pleasure according to its naturalness.  Some pleasures are beautiful (or noble, kalon) 
and serious, and thus choiceworthy by nature, and there is a class of pleasures 
contrary to this.  If the class is truly contrary, it would consist of unnatural pleasures 
for the base or shameful and non-serious.  The pleasures that Aristotle had just 
spoken of as unnecessary but choiceworthy in themselves—money, gain, victory, and 
honor—are now said to be in the middle between natural and unnatural.    
 Having argued that there is no incontinence in an unqualified sense with 
respect to these in-between pleasures, Aristotle now turns to investigate the 
relationship between incontinence and unnatural pleasures, pleasures that one feels as 
a result of a defect, habituation, or possessing a depraved nature (VII.5.1148b15-19).  
Aristotle will determine that there cannot be incontinence, strictly speaking, with 
respect to these unnatural pleasures either.  Aristotle has quietly opened the account 
of those who knowingly do wrong to include others besides the incontinent person.  
In addition to the incontinent, the licentious person as well as the brutish person may 
potentially do wrong knowingly.  But in none of these cases would it seem that the 
actor acts against what he believes to be best.  The licentious person, we can infer 
from what Aristotle has said before, proceeds on the premise that all sweet things 
should be tasted, for example.  There is very little to dispute in the case of the 




Aristotle has defined him, the licentious person pursues pleasures related to the 
body.98   Aristotle will return to a discussion of the licentious person momentarily.  At 
present, he wishes to discuss a new moral low, the brutish, animal-like condition.  
Twice in this context, Aristotle mentions the tyrant Phalaris by name. 99  The tyrant, 
over and above the akratic, would seem most of all to be in a position to be able to do 
knowingly whatever he wishes without fear of retribution and without regret.100  In 
this case, Aristotle speaks of the nefarious activities of Phalaris, who took pleasure in 
such unnatural activities as roasting his victims alive and cannibalism 
(VII.5.1149a13-14).   Aristotle limits his examples of animal-like behavior to 
barbarians and tyrants, as both stand outside of society in their way.  People arrive at 
this condition, to repeat, from either a defect, improper habituation—for example, 
those who have been abused since childhood—or from having a corrupt nature.  
Aristotle compares these beast-like human beings to the insane or the diseased.  The 
reason that Aristotle argued that one cannot be incontinent with respect to the in-
between pleasures was that no blame attaches to them in the way that blame attaches 
to incontinence with respect to natural, i.e., bodily pleasures.  Here, too, Aristotle 
argues that there is no such thing as incontinence, and he cases this conclusion a lack 
of blame.  These diseased, depraved, beast-like humans are frightening.  Indeed, these 
beast-like men are so repulsive that “they escape our judgment of blame.  We cannot 
recognize in them a human being to condemn.”101  Nature, or an abused childhood, or 
                                                 
98 Indeed, in the Protagoras, which is the dialogue most relevant to Aristotle’s treatment of the 
Socratic thesis, Socrates implies that Protagoras is a teacher of injustice.  Protagoras does not praise 
incontinence, but licentiousness (akolasia, consider 341e, 349d, 359b). 
99 Politics V.10.1310b26-31. 
100 Consider Plato, Gorgias 466b and ff., Republic 344a, 573b-580c; and Xenophon, Hiero. 




disease has rendered them inhuman.  If these people do wrong, the cause seems to lie 
in the way they became what they are. 
 Next Aristotle turns to incontinence with respect to spiritedness, and theorizes 
that this is less shameful than incontinence with respect to desires insofar as 
spiritedness seems to follow reason in a way (VII.6.1149a24-26).  Moreover, 
spiritedness seems to be more natural, insofar as it is more common for human beings 
to become spirited than to follow desire excessively.   
In VII.7, Aristotle distinguishes continence and incontinence from endurance 
and softness.  Continence and incontinence have to do with pleasure, while endurance 
and softness have to do with pain.  With respect to pleasure and pain, most people are 
in-between the extremes.  Most people, that is, fall somewhere between being 
continent and incontinent, just as most people fall between endurance and softness.  
This is important because it throws light on the discussion that came before.  Most 
people are neither virtuous nor vicious, but somewhere between continence, 
endurance and their respective privations.  Aristotle makes one further division in 
incontinence, between impetuousness and weakness, before moving on to discuss 
licentiousness.   The weak person acts incontinently after having deliberated, while 
the impetuous one acts without control on account of hastiness.   
But if these two are distinguished, they are united by the shared feelings of 
regret, which also distinguishes them from the licentious.  The incontinent person is 
thus curable, while the licentious person is not.  The incontinent person is better off 




opinion concerning the first principle (archē).102  Despite occasionally departing from 
correct opinion concerning the first principle as a result of passion, the incontinent 
person still preserves it (VII.8.1151a24-26).  Indeed, it is the presence of correct 
opinion that defines both the continent person and the incontinent person, although 
the former stands firm in his correct opinion while the incontinent person stands apart 
from correct opinion on account of passion.   
 
Aristotle’s Agreement with Socrates 
At this point, Aristotle turns to conclude his discussion of incontinence.  Once 
he has clarified what incontinence, continence, softness, and endurance are, both 
Socrates’ position and respectable opinion remain intact.  Aristotle has accomplished 
his self-imposed goal of reconciling respectable opinion to the impasses.  Moreover, 
Aristotle ends this discussion by agreeing with the Socratic thesis that no one 
knowingly does wrong, having unpacked this enigma, and provided insight into what 
it means.103  One such insight is the distinction between knowledge and correct 
opinion.  Correct opinion, which both the continent person and the incontinent person 
                                                 
102 Eariler, Aristotle said that the licentious person was better off, since there was nothing to tell the 
one who already knew what to do but simply lacked the self-control to do it (VII.2.1146a31-1146b2).   
103 This is by no means universally concluded.  J.J. Mulhern, in “Aristotle and the Socratic Paradoxes,” 
declares that for Aristotle the doctrine that virtue equals knowledge is too simple to be true.  Yet he 
admits that he struggles to find textual evidence to the contrary: “It is true, of course, that Aristotle’s 
entire solution to the paradox is not to be found in this or any other compact passage of the Ethica…” 
(p. 295).  It is also not clear to my mind why simplicity is grounds for determining the falsity of a 
doctrine.  He also rejects the paradox as Aristotle’s opinion because he argues that that would mean no 
one does wrong willingly.  Because, as he says, “if this conceptual paradox were left standing… no 
one does wrong knowingly” (p. 295).  Mulhern correctly draws the conclusion, but is dissatisfied with 
the result.  Mullhern finds that those scholars who think Aristotle and Socrates agree focus solely on 
VII.3.  I hope that I have avoided this accusation by my careful treatment of III.1-5 and VII.1-10.  My 
investigation of Aristotle’s treatment of the Socratic Paradox has gone to great effort to place that 
investigation within Aristotle’s broader discussion of morality and moral responsibility—it is not an 




possess, is capable of being overcome by the desire for pleasure, but knowledge is 
not.  No one, Aristotle says, echoing Socrates, can knowingly do wrong, and the one 
who possesses practical wisdom cannot be incontinent.   The weakness of opinion, 
even correct or true opinion, points to the strength of knowledge.  But there can be no 
scientific knowledge regarding moral virtue, of right and wrong, since this is the 
realm of action (praxis), which is necessarily variable, and thus does not admit of 
universally valid rational principles.  The most that one can hope for is to possess 
prudence, and the prudent person both sees what one ought to do and is able to act on 
it (VII.10.1152a8-9).104  It seems, Aristotle says, that the one who possesses prudence 
is able to deliberate beautifully about the things that are good and advantageous for 
living life well as a whole (VI.5.1140a25-28).  Despite leaving it unclear how 
precisely one comes to possess prudence or lacks it, Aristotle gives every indication 
that nature and habituation determine one’s standing.   
Indeed, nature and habituation are decisive in forming all of these active 
conditions.  To repeat, both the one who possesses continence and the one who lacks 
it possess correct opinion concerning first principles.  One arrives at correct opinion 
of the first principles in the first place as a result of either nature or habituation, and 
one stands by that correct opinion or fails to as a result of nature or habituation.  With 
respect to the incontinent person, Aristotle points to the fragility of correct or true 
opinion that rests solely on habituation.  Correct opinion is not sufficient for correct 
choice.  Although Aristotle states that the incontinent person is so voluntarily, 
because he somehow sees what he is doing, he gives every indication that nature or 
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habituation is responsible for making the incontinent person possess such an active 
condition that leads to incontinence in the first place.  Aristotle now answers the 
question he left unanswered in VII.3.  There, as I pointed out, Aristotle left unclear 
why the continent person acts on the basis of the final premise that one ought not to 
taste sweet things, while the incontinent person acts on the basis of the final premise 
this sweet thing is pleasant.  Here the answer is revealed: it is either the result of the 
person’s nature or how that person was habituated.  Very little, it would seem, in the 
determination of what sort of a human being we are to be, is up to us.  Both the 
continent person and the incontinent person possess correct opinion, and whether they 
stand by that opinion or apart from it depends on their nature and upbringing. 
It turns out, then, that Aristotle’s stance toward respectable opinion has 
undergone a quiet but radical change.  Aristotle does not deny outright the existence 
of the phenomenon of incontinence, but he has parted ways with the usual 
interpretation of the it.  In parting with the conventional interpretation of 
incontinence, Aristotle reveals his fundamental agreement with Socrates, as both 
assert an analysis of the phenomenon that leaves intact the primacy of the good in 
action.  Aristotle has kept the phenomenon of incontinence intact as well as the plain 
facts of the matter, thus preserving respectable opinion to a degree.  But he has so 
radically altered the understanding of the phenomenon that incontinence is left 
standing only in name.  It no longer looks like incontinence as previously understood.  
Before, this phenomenon was understood to occur when the part of the soul that 
possesses knowledge is overcome by the desiring part of the soul.  Aristotle here 




knowledge.  Desiring and thinking, we should recall, are inseparable.  Instead, the 
incontinent person possesses conflicting opinions about what is good.  The 
incontinent person, indeed all human beings, desires to be happy with his whole soul.  
But the incontinent person, and similarly the one who possesses continence, possesses 
conflicting views of what will bring him happiness.  Indeed, incontinence is now 
understood to be the inability to stand by one’s conception of what is good for oneself 
in the face of a competing good while continence is the ability to stand by one’s 
conception of the good.  Nature, habit, or some combination of the two determines 
which opinion one stands by.   
Although habit is very hard to change, it is easier to change, Aristotle says, 
than one’s nature.  The problem is that long habituation comes to resemble nature.  
Here Aristotle quotes Evenus, who says, “I tell you, friend, it [habit] is exercise 
continued for a long time, and so this, for human beings, ends up being their nature” 
(VII.10.1152a32-33).  Aristotle presents Evenus as a sort of moral determinist, and 
even seems to endorse this view.105  Whether we are virtuous or vicious, continent or 
incontinent, prudent or foolish is all determined by nature and habituation.  The 
example of Evenus is quite interesting, since Socrates mentions, somewhat tongue in 
cheek, that he was a sophist who taught virtue for profit.106  Aristotle of course points 
out the hypocrisy of one who claims both to be able to teach virtue and that virtue is 
not teachable, but, less obviously, Aristotle quietly indicates that he shares Socrates’ 
doubts concerning the teachability of virtue, and, in this case, its necessary 
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concomitant, prudence.107 With such heavy emphasis on nature and habituation, 
Aristotle suggests that it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to teach virtue.   
Where then, does virtue come from?  By speaking of the prudent person and 
the clever person, Aristotle reminds us of the distinction between the two that he 
made earlier: cleverness allows one to discern the means to the object one has set 
down, but prudence appears to be that “eye of the soul” that allows one to see clearly 
what is good and advantageous for oneself—to see the human good (VI.12.1144a22-
31).  What then, allows one to see this clearly?  Every indication is that it is the result 
of either nature, proper habituation, or some combination of the two, for surely no 
one would choose to remain ignorant of what is truly good for oneself.  But placing 
the emphasis so squarely on matters out of control when it comes to determining our 
character, Aristotle further calls into question one’s responsibility for that character.  
Indeed, the only reason one would live viciously, or incontinently, would be because 
one fails to see the human good.  For if one truly saw the human good, one would be 
compelled to pursue it.  In order to determine the human end correctly, one must be 
born, it would seem, possessing something like good vision, by which to discern 
correctly and choose what is truly good.  And to be born in such a condition, “would 
be the complete and true blessing of nature” (III.5.1114b5-12).   
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Chapter 5:  Conclusion 
 
In this dissertation, I followed a somewhat unconventional path. In doing so, I 
have been guided by the belief that Aristotle makes clear what Plato leaves 
obscure.108  And indeed, Aristotle has illuminated an otherwise impenetrable 
labyrinth within the Platonic corpus.  In attempting to escape this labyrinth and still 
conquer the Minotaur that is the Socratic Paradox, we turned to Aristotle as our 
Ariadne, for a guide is always welcome in such matters.  With Aristotle’s help, we 
have made sense of the Socratic Paradox, and he has enabled us to see past the 
paradoxical nature of the statement to the understanding of human action and desire 
that it entails.   
Aristotle helps us to make sense of Socrates’ thesis, he helps us to understand 
what it might truly mean if it is not simply meant as a paradox.  In other words, 
Aristotle treats the paradox seriously, providing depth and breadth to an otherwise 
enigmatic statement.  The Socratic Paradox is open to the charge of intellectualism, 
but we now see, with Aristotle’s help, that the Socratic Paradox takes passion and 
desire into account.  We see, moreover, that desire and reason are not as neatly 
cleaved as one would initially believe, as desiring is present in thinking and vice 
versa.109  Aristotle makes clear how precisely the quest for wisdom, philosophy, 
arises out of the recognition that virtue is knowledge.   
Turning to the Ethics, we found that Aristotle treats in Books III and VII the 
topics on which the Socratic thesis touches, although Socrates is  mentioned by name 
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only in VII.  We discovered that Aristotle offers competing or even contradictory 
teachings regarding the relationship between virtue and knowledge in these books, 
but that this contradiction can be explained.  In order to arrive at that explanation, and 
thus to understand Aristotle’s final teaching concerning knowledge and virtue, it is 
necessary to understand the aim of the work as a whole as well as to recognize that 
these two parts of the work serve different purposes.  Following the movement of the 
Ethics as a whole; situating each discussion of moral responsibility within the larger 
movement of the conversation; noticing Aristotle’s several hesitations and omissions; 
remaining sensitive to the dialectical nature of the work; and paying attention to the 
work’s political nature provided great insight into the discrepancy between Books III 
and VII.  The seeming contradiction between Aristotle’s two accounts of moral 
responsibility in Books III and VII can be explained, above all, by the shift of focus 
from moral to intellectual virtue.  Aristotle’s teaching regarding moral responsibility 
in Book III serves a primarily  political purpose and provides the foundation for his 
account of the moral virtues that follows.  Book VII, by contrast, aspires to greater 
theoretical clarity while trying to preserve the politically salutary teaching of Book 
III.  Aristotle self-consciously presents an account of moral responsibility in Book III 
that is riddled with difficulties, forcing one to look to Book VII for his fuller 
theoretical account.  Book III relies on too narrow a conception of both force and 
ignorance, and, above all, leaves unclear how human beings form their conception of 
the human end (telos).  If the targeting of the end is not self-chosen, but is received 
from nature or habituation, then no one is responsible for wrongdoing.  Discerning 




speaking, within one’s control (III.5.1114a31-1114b8).  Aristotle rejects in Book III 
the notion that our prospects for correctly seeing the human end are determined by 
chance, but the grounds of that rejection, resting on hypothetical arguments, are quite 
insufficient (III.5. 1114b13 and ff.).  When Aristotle discusses praise and blame, he 
outlines a conception of moral responsibility that leaves room for the notion that we 
are responsible for wrongdoing.   
But, of course, that is not the end of the story, and Aristotle returns to the 
question of intentional wrongdoing in Book VII, providing his fuller theoretical 
account of the relationship between knowledge and virtue in the guise of an 
investigation of Socrates’ denial of the phenomenon of incontinence.  Turning to 
Socrates allows Aristotle to reveal to the philosophically inclined reader an 
understanding of moral responsibility that moves beyond his own inadequate account 
of moral responsibility in Book III.  Aristotle declines, however, to broadcast his 
agreement with the most radical aspects of Socrates’ thesis in order to preserve the 
politically salutary effects of his earlier account of moral responsibility, an account of 
moral responsibility that is useful, if not necessary, for the lawmaker, especially with 
a view to honoring and punishing citizens (Consider III.1.1109b30 and ff.).  Aristotle 
gives every indication that Book VII is of the utmost importance and thus contains his 
considered judgments.  In trying to arbitrate between moral and intellectual virtue, 
Aristotle often mutes the differences between Socrates and virtue as it is ordinarily 
understood.  Indeed, he only obliquely refers to the potential rift: Socrates is only 
explicitly mentioned with respect to one character virtue, namely truthfulness, and in 




but rather is prone to the related vice of irony.  The only time Aristotle mentions 
Socrates in conjunction with a moral virtue, he is said to be the example of someone 
who possesses the vice, albeit a graceful vice (IV.7. 1127b25 and context).  Socrates 
is not mentioned with respect to any other moral virtue, but he really comes to the 
fore once Aristotle turns to an investigation of the intellectual virtues.   
Aristotle gives every indication, however, that Book VII is of the utmost 
importance and thus contains his considered judgments, indicating his turn, following 
Socrates, away from the moral virtues and on a quest for intellectual virtue. 
Aristotle has begun anew in Book VII, and he marks the ascent over his previous 
discussion by bringing intellectual virtue to the forefront of his account of human 
excellence.  Moreover, Aristotle broadens the variety of moral characters in Book VII 
beyond simply virtue and vice to include continence and incontinence, and beastlike 
and godlike conditions, thus revealing how limited his earlier account of virtue and 
vice was.   Indeed, expanding the variety of character types brings Aristotle into 
direct confrontation with Socrates, as Socrates denies the very existence of one of the 
new states of character, namely incontinence.  Although he does so somewhat 
obliquely and under the pretense of acting as arbiter between Socrates and common 
sense, Aristotle ultimately agrees with Socrates in Book VII: the common sense 
understanding of incontinence is fundamentally flawed, and this conclusion reveals 
Aristotle’s silent nod to Socrates’ assertion that no one voluntarily does wrong.   
Aristotle takes up Socrates’ denial of the phenomenon of incontinence, declaring, 
in fact, that such an investigation is necessary even though Socrates’ denial 




Socrates’ denial of incontinence depends upon the more radical claim that no one 
knowingly does wrong.  By focusing on incontinence, Aristotle implies that 
incontinence is the test case for Socrates’ equation of knowledge with virtue.  
Aristotle’s investigation of Socrates’ claim regarding incontinence takes place over 
the first ten chapters of Book VII, although his last mention of Socrates by name in 
the Ethics occurs in VII.3.  When Aristotle mentions Socrates for the final time, he 
concedes that what Socrates is correct in saying that it is impossible for knowledge, at 
least in the governing or authoritative sense (kuriōs), to be present when incontinence 
occurs.   
By focusing on Socrates’ denial of the phenomenon of incontinence, Aristotle 
implies that this is the test case for Socrates’ thesis that virtue is knowledge.  But if 
this inference is correct, then Aristotle concedes other aspects of the thesis without 
raising any hackles.  If incontinence is the least persuasive part of the identification of 
knowledge and virtue, and Aristotle ultimately comes around to Socrates’ point of 
view on incontinence, then Aristotle has left no reason to doubt the Socratic Paradox.  
As Ronna Burger says, “[O]nly a confrontation with the issue of akrasia can really 
put the Socratic position to the test.  In the course of this confrontation, it looks as if 
Aristotle moves closer and closer to the Socratic position, which appears at first so 
counterintuitive, until by the end he is led to a recognition of its fundamental 
principle.”110  The reader benefits from this dialogical argument between Aristotle 
and Socrates, as Aristotle makes clear the fundamental principle in question, the 
principle guiding Socrates’ denial of incontinence. 
                                                 




Aristotle arrives at Socrates’ opinion by a somewhat circuitous route, but he 
arrives there nonetheless.  It becomes clear that ignorance must play a role if one is to 
fall victim to incontinence, for such a one necessarily lacks a genuine understanding 
of his own good.111  When Socrates asserts that all wrongdoing is the result of 
ignorance, this is what he has in mind.  It is not the case that someone is ignorant of 
the particular action he or she is engaged in; rather, the person is ignorant of the place 
of that action would have in a good life.  The incontinent, to use the example that 
Aristotle uses, fails to have a clear grasp of what a truly good human life is.  As 
Aristotle goes on to elaborate, incontinence in particular is marked by a failure to 
reflect seriously on the proper place of physical—that is, bodily—pleasures within a 
good human existence.  What is at stake is not so much the particular action, whether 
such and such an action is or is not pleasant, but a failure to situate the particular 
action within a larger understanding of the human good.  What is necessary is a true 
understanding of the human good, or an investigation of what is the best life for a 
human being.  As Socrates tells us over and over, there is no inquiry more important.  
Aristotle helps us clearly to see the Socratic impetus for the Socratic way of life.  The 
only way to avoid vice would be to possess an accurate understanding of what is good 
for a human being.   
Aristotle spends the next several chapters explaining his agreement with Socrates, 
elucidating what is at work when the phenomenon that is called incontinence occurs, 
and thus providing great insight into what Socrates meant.  As it is commonly 
understood, incontinence occurs when knowledge is overcome by passion or desire.  
Without being completely dismissive of common opinion, indeed preserving it 
                                                 




insofar as possible, Aristotle shows the flaws in such an account.  Aristotle does not 
go so far as to deny the phenomenon of incontinence, but he ends by changing its 
meaning  so radically that it barely resembles the phenomenon whose existence 
Socrates denies.  The understanding of incontinence that Aristotle arrives at is 
perfectly compatible with Socrates’ denial of the phenomenon; Aristotle has truly 
preserved common opinion as much as possible. 
 Given Aristotle’s heavy emphasis on preserving opinion, it is easy to overlook 
that he concedes to Socrates that knowledge is not present when incontinence occurs 
and that it is impossible for the incontinent person to possess prudence.  Despite 
dismissing opinion twice in successive chapters (VII.2 and 3), Aristotle finally states 
that opinion indeed  marks the incontinent person.  While knowledge cannot be 
overcome by passion, opinion can.  Correct opinion can be overcome by the 
passionate desire for pleasure.  But even this is not quite accurate, as Aristotle 
declares that incontinence comes about somehow (pōs) from a reasoned account or an 
opinion (VII.3.1147a35-b1).  In other words, the struggle that we see in the 
incontinent person is not between knowledge and desire, nor is it between opinion 
and desire.  Since desiring and thought cannot be separated, the struggle felt by the 
incontinent person occurs between competing “desiring thoughts” (VI.2.1139a33-b5).  
Stated somewhat differently, the incontinent person possesses competing opinions 
regarding what is truly good for him.   
And to possess conflicting opinions regarding what is good for oneself is 
ultimately ignorance concerning what is truly good for oneself.  To use the example 




and that eating sweets is good.  This person strives to follow general rules that he 
supposes are universally valid, such as that sweets should not be tasted.  The 
incontinent person possesses opinions regarding general rules of conduct, believing it 
is good to follow these rules, but he recites them in the same way that one might cite 
demonstrations or the verses of Empedocles without understanding them (1147b9-
12).  He also possesses the opinion that pleasure is good (1147a24 and ff.), and the 
nature of the struggle now comes to light.  Not having reflected sufficiently on the 
question of the good for a human being, the incontinent person is torn between 
contradictory desiring thoughts.  By trying to follow universal rules, the incontinent 
person shows himself to be blind to the complexities of human life.  For Aristotle, all 
particular questions must be viewed in light of the hierarchy of human ends, which 
would entail knowledge of what the end for a human being is, and the incontinent 
person lacks this knowledge.  The cause of all of the incontinent person’s wrongdoing 
is, in a word, ignorance.  His ignorance points to the need for knowledge of the end of 
human life, to knowledge of what the good life is for a human being.  The incontinent 
person is weak in the face of pleasure precisely because he possesses inadequate 
knowledge concerning what is truly good.   To repeat, Aristotle says that incontinence 
occurs, in a way, from an opinion that is not opposed to right reason.  Aristotle never 
says what this opinion is, but it is possible that the missing opinion is that pleasure is 
good (1147b).  Let us return to Aristotle’s example: one thinks it is good to refrain 
from eating sweets, but one also thinks that eating sweets is pleasant.  This missing 
opinion or argument, that pleasure is good, is also at work.  The person 




good), and he acts upon the latter opinion, lacking the strength to stand by the first 
opinion.  (Strength would only be necessary in the case of people who have an 
opinion regarding what is good; it does not take strength to refrain from eating rat 
poison)  And Aristotle implies in VII.9-10 that possessing that strength (continence) 
or lacking it (incontinence) is a result of one’s nature, habituation, or some 
combination of the two.   
Here I have made clear what Aristotle leaves unclear.  Aristotle’s agreement with 
Socrates is far deeper than his explicit concession to his view in VII.3.  The 
incontinent person does not act contrary to what he believes to be best, because he 
does not hold a consistent view of what is best.  He holds contradictory opinions 
about what is truly good for himself, and therefore lacks knowledge concerning his 
own good.   
The incontinent person, therefore, lacks self-knowledge.  In the first place, he fails 
to understand his own motivation for action.  He claims to be overcome by passion, 
but the real source of his struggle is a competing conception of what is truly good for 
himself, and pleasure is central to this competing conception of the good. The root, 
then, of the incontinent person’s failure to understand his own motivation for actions 
is his failure to recognize that he possesses competing visions of what is good for a 
human being.  The incontinent person has not sufficiently reflected on what is truly 
good for himself, exposing his most fundamental lack of self-knowledge.  The 




beings to know themselves.112  In the absence of such self-knowledge, greater 
continence is needed, and this comes about, somehow, from greater habituation. 
The incontinent person is indeed ignorant of the human good, following general 
rules of action as a result of habituation.  Aristotle points simultaneously, then, to the 
weakness and strength of habituation: habituation is weak, insofar as we see that 
people pursue pleasure instead of following the rules they have been habituated to 
follow.  By contrast, however, habituation makes a great deal of difference in 
determining whether one will be continent or incontinent, and this is extremely 
difficult, if not impossible, to change once that character has been formed.  In both 
cases, Aristotle points to the insufficiency of habituation while stressing how difficult 
it is to overcome one’s rearing.  Habituation is an insufficient guide for discovering 
how to live well truly, even if it is the best that can be hoped for in some cases. 
If, however, ignorance is the root of human ills, and habituation is ultimately 
insufficient for overcoming ignorance, this points to the utmost urgency of the need 
for a knowledge or science of human affairs, for human beings can never live well 
either individually or collectively without such knowledge.  In the last chapter, 
however, I raised the possibility that knowledge, at least as Aristotle defines it in 
VI.3, may be impossible for human beings to attain.  Aristotle holds a very high 
standard for knowledge in VI.3, requiring knowledge to proceed by demonstration 
from first principles (archai).  To my knowledge, Aristotle fails to provide an 
example of a first principle that is grasped by the intellect.113  This is even more 
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problematic if we were to try to discover knowledge of the first principles for action.  
If our only prospects for knowledge or science depend upon grasping the first 
principles, our prospects are bleak.114  
Fortunately, Aristotle’s manner of inquiry in the Ethics provides an example of 
another route to knowledge, especially knowledge of human affairs.  The knowledge 
the incontinent person lacks, according to Aristotle, is prudence, and we should not 
forget that Socrates emerged in Book VI as the proponent of the view that prudence is 
the basis of all virtue (1144b17-32).  Aristotle will echo that conclusion in the last 
analysis (VII.10.1152a6-9).  Indeed, Aristotle’s conclusion is quite telling, as it 
reveals precisely what knowledge the incontinent person lacks; he lacks knowledge of 
what it means for a human being to live well.  And this knowledge is prudence, for 
prudence is the “truth-disclosing active condition involving reason that governs 
action, concerned with what is good and bad for a human being” (VI.5.1140b4-7). 
Moreover, by referring to Socrates as the proponent of the view that prudence is 
virtue, Aristotle alerts the reader to the possibility that Socrates’ way of life embodies 
prudence.  Socrates is the prudent man, possessing the active condition that discloses 
what is good and bad for a human being.   
Indeed, by imitating Socrates’ method of inquiry and holding him up as the 
standard of the prudent man, Aristotle points to an alternative path to acquiring 
knowledge concerning human affairs. One must begin as Aristotle and Socrates do, 
not from first principles, but from what is first for us (I.4.1095b2).  We should begin 
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from respectable opinions (endoxai) about human affairs, and the method of inquiry 
is not demonstration (apodeixis), but dialectics, for progress in understanding can 
come about as a result of dialectical inquiry.  That is to say, we should philosophize.  
To say, as Socrates does and Aristotle now agrees, that no one knowingly does wrong 
leads to the conclusion that philosophy is the one thing necessary.   Insofar as the 
philosopher aims to know himself, he embodies this quest for knowledge.  Philosophy 
aims to discover what is truly good for a human being, striving to replace opinion 
concerning virtue with knowledge about it.  Moreover, philosophy calls into question 
the opinions that one has received as a result of habituation, which Aristotle argues is 
difficult to change (VII.10.1152a30-31).  Philosophy at least offers one the hope of 
rising above the accidental circumstances surrounding the way that one was raised.  If 
one is to transcend opinion, which provides a weak attachment to virtue, one must 
turn to philosophy.  The conclusion of Socrates’ twin theses—no one knowingly does 
wrong and virtue is knowledge—is that one ought to pursue knowledge as the one 
thing needful, even if its attainment is unlikely.  We now see why the thesis that no 
one knowingly does wrong is so central to Socratic philosophy, insofar as it provides 
the very impetus for that pursuit.     
 Last, I would like to mention some prospects for further inquiry based on the 
work that has been done here.   Two ways to continue to pursue this investigation 
come immediately to mind .  The first is to continue to follow Aristotle’s argument in 
the Nicomachean Ethics.  Aristotle’s investigation of Socrates leads him, in the end of 
Book VII, to  inquire into pleasure.  After all, the one who lacks self-control falls prey 




matter Socrates’—understanding of self-control, the phenomenon would have to be 
situated within a comprehensive account of pleasure.  This, of course, would lead 
inevitably into an inquiry of what the good life for a human being is, as well as 
determining the role that pleasure plays in such a life.  I have tried above to show how 
the equation of knowledge and virtue, coupled with the highly dubious nature of any 
claim to knowledge, point to the urgency of philosophy as a way of life.  If 
knowledge is the answer to the problem of virtue, then the life devoted to pursuing 
knowledge emerges as the chief claimant for the title of the best life.  
The second way to further this investigation is to turn to the very place where 
Socrates is initially said to have made the radical claim that knowledge equals virtue, 
and thus return to the starting point for this dissertation: the Platonic dialogues.  This 
study began by wondering about Socrates’ highly paradoxical equation of knowledge 
and virtue in such dialogues as the Protagoras and the Gorgias.  Confident that 
Aristotle has helped us to understand Socrates’ claims, we are now in a position to 
view the dialogues anew, from a higher plane.  Having followed Aristotle’s treatment 
of Socrates’ claims both from the point of view of logic and of nature, we can return 
to the source himself, Socrates.  Clearly, although both lines of inquiry are sketches 
of future research agendas, they  rest on or presuppose the validity of the conclusions 










This glossary is meant to serve as an explanation of some of the important Greek 
terms that Aristotle uses in the Nicomachean Ethics that are of particular importance 
for this dissertation. 
 
Appearance (phainomenon) 
The way that something appears to be, as distinguished from the way that it is.  
According to Aristotle, Socrates’ thesis that no one acts contrary to what he holds to 
be best contradicts the appearance of things. 
 
Beautiful or Noble (kalon) 
The Greek kalon  has a wide variety of meanings, comprising the beautiful, noble,  
and fine.  Because beautiful tends to capture this same range of meanings in English, 
I ordinarily translate kalos as beautiful, but also occasionally as noble when this 
seems to better capture the sense of the Greek.  
 
Choice (prohairesis) 
A choice is something done voluntarily and with reason and thought (III.2.1112a15-
17).  Aristotle moves from voluntary (III.1), to choice (III.2), to deliberation (III.3), to 




The activity of beholding with the intellect.  By the end of the Ethics, Aristotle says 
that the contemplative life is the best life a human being can lead: “But the person 
who is at work with his intellect and takes care of this and is disposed in the best way 
toward it seems also to be most dear to the gods… and it is likely that the same 
person is the happiest.  So in this way too, a wise person would be the most happy” 
(X.9.1179a23-32). 
 
Continence and Incontinence (akrasia and engkrateia) 
Engkrateia is literally “self-control,” and akrasia is “lack of self-control.”  It is the 
ability or inability to withstand the temptation of pleasures, especially of the bodily 
type.  Aristotle says that Socrates denied that there is such a thing as incontinence on 
the grounds that no one acts contrary to what he believes to be best (VII.2. 1145b25-
27).  See Protagoras 352a and ff. 
 
End or Goal (telos) 
The purpose of a being, or that for the sake of which a thing is done.  The Ethics 
looks for the human end, the final or most complete good for a human being.  
Aristotle points to how central the discovery of the human end is in trying to attain 




(gnōsis) of the end in order to aim at it (1094a23), and that humans ought to get a 
grasp, at least in outline, as to what the end is and to which of the sciences (epistēmai) 
or powers (dunamai) it belongs (1094a25-26). Such a recognition (gnōsis) of the end 
(telos) or highest good (to ariston) would have great weight in one’s life and, “like 




The state of character that comes about as the result of habit.  Aristotle divides human 
virtue into two, ethical and intellectual.   
 
Good (agathon)  
As Aristotle reports in the famous opening lines to the Nicomachean Ethics, it has 
beautifully been said that the good is that at which all things aim.  The question, then, 
is what is the good for a human being.  According to Socrates, everyone pursues what 
he believes to be good or best. 
 
Impasse (aporia) 
The word could also be translated as a state of perplexity or confusion, or being at a 
loss. In the Platonic corpus, Socrates is known for being at an impasse and bringing 
his interlocutors to an impasse.  Scholars thus call “aporetic” those dialogues of Plato 
that end without Socrates and his interlocutors reaching a definitive answer to the 
question they are exploring.  According to Aristotle, impasses are necessary steps for 
investigation. 
 
Involuntary (Akōn)  Page 18 
An action is involuntary, according to Aristotle, if it is the product of ignorance or 
external force (III.1.1110a1-4).  The heart of the controversy surrounding the Socratic 
Paradox is whether one can voluntarily do wrong, or whether all wrongdoing is the 
product of ignorance.   
 
Intellect (nous) 
By process of elimination, Aristotle says that nous is the intellectual capacity with 
which first principles are grasped (VI.6.1141a7-8).   
 
Know (gignōskein, epistamasthai and eidenai )  
Aristotle and Plato employ several verbs related to knowing, although gignōskein 
differs from epistamasthai in the way that the French connaître differs from savoir or 
the German kennen  from wissen. Additionally, eidenai, the perfect form of the verb 
to see, is also used to mean “know.” The English “knowledge” translates the Greek 
noun epistēmē which is related to epistamasthai, and “awareness” or “recognition” 
translates gnōsis.  Aristotle holds a very high standard for knowledge (epistēmē) in 
VI.3, requiring knowledge to proceed by demonstration from first principles (archai).  
In order to demonstrate a matter, the demonstration would have to proceed from truth 
(alētheia) or a first principle or, more simply, first thing (prōton).  In Posterior 




first principle, but it can grasp it with the intellect (nous).  At the very least, this 
intuitive intellection of the first principle seems out of harmony with Aristotle’s 
heavy emphasis on empiricism earlier in the Posterior Analystics.  If the truth, strictly 
speaking, of the first principles cannot be known simply, then the prospects for 
knowledge that proceeds from demonstration are questionable.  One potential first 
principle is the principle of non-contradiction, which Aristotle discusses in 
Metaphysics Γ, Ch. 3 (1105b18 and ff.).  But Aristotle will only go so far as to say 
that this is the “most certain” (bebaiotatos) of all principles   
 
Licentiousness (akolaston) 
The character trait of indulging in the bodily pleasures of food, drink, and sex.  Both a 
licentious person and an incontinent person are concerned with bodily pleasure.  The 
licentious person differs from the incontinent insofar as he chooses the pleasant 
things, because he believes the pleasant thing should always be pursued, whereas the 
incontinent person pursues the pleasure at hand despite believing that he ought not to 
pursue it.  The licentious person is not marked by any internal struggle (Nicomachean 
Ethics VII.8, and VII.9.1151b34-1152a6)  See “continence and incontinence.” 
 
Opinion and Reputable Opinion (doxai, endoxai) 
An understanding of the world that most citizens hold by virtue of having been raised 
and educated in a particular city (polis), especially concerning what is good and noble 
or just.  Aristotle begins his inquiries from very common opinions, the things that are 
rather familiar to us (Physics I.1. 184a).  The goal or hope is that we will arrive at 
what is clearer by nature.  An Aristotelian dialectical syllogism (dialektikos 
syllogismos) reasons from these reputable opinions (endoxai, Topics I.100a25-27), 
but it does not necessarily evaluate all commonly held opinions.  To review all 
opinions (doxai), especially in ethical matters, would be rather pointless 
(Nicomachean Ethics I.4.1095b), and Aristotle thinks it would be sufficient to review 
those opinions that have the greatest prominence.   
 
Paradox (paradoxos) 
Something contrary to opinion or expectations, incredible.  Aristotle distinguishes 
Socratic inquiry from the use of term paradox, reserving the use of the word paradox 
as a term of disparagement (Nicomachean Ethics VII.2.1146a21-27).  See also 
Metaphysics Book Γ, Ch. 7 (1012a18 and ff.) and Rhetoric II.21, II.23 , and III.11, 
14, and 18.  Using Aristotle’s distinction between impasse and paradox, the phrase 
“Socratic Paradox” is a bit of a misnomer.  See “impasse.” 
 
Practical Wisdom or Prudence (phronēsis) 
One of the two potential peaks of intellectual virtue, along with wisdom.  Wisdom in 
practical matters, prudence is a “truth-disclosing active condition involving reason 
about human goods that governs actions” (VI.5.1140b20-21).  We believe, Aristotle 
says, that men like Pericles possess practical wisdom, as distinct from wisdom 
simply.  See wisdom (sophia). 
 




This word has a variety of meanings, such as speech, statement, word, argument, 
account, or reason. The capacity for reason, according to Aristotle, is what 
distinguishes a human being.   
 
Virtue (aretē) 
The excellence of any particular kind of being.  The virtue of a knife, for example, 
would be to cut well.  The Nicomachean Ethics as a whole can be seen as an attempt 
to discover what that human excellence is, on the grounds that such an excellence 
would make a human being happy. One of the important distinctions Aristotle draws 
is between moral and intellectual virtue. 
 
Wisdom (sophia) 
The most precise kind of knowledge, wisdom would consist of intellect (nous) and 
knowledge (epistēmē), a knowledge, so to speak, with its head on (VI.7.1141a19-20).  
People say, according to Aristotle, that Anaxagoras and Thales were wise, but lacked 











I. Primary Sources and Works in Translation 
 
A.  Aristotle  
 
The Complete Works of Aristotle.  (1984)  The Revised Oxford Translation, in Two 
Volumes.  Edited by Jonathan Barnes.  Princeton University Press, Princeton. 
 
Ethica Nicomachea.  (1894)  Ed. I. Bywater.  Oxford, Oxford Classical Texts. 
 
Eudemian Ethics.  (1992)  Trans. by Michael Woods.  Oxford University Press, New 
York. 
 
Metaphysics.  (2002)  Trans. by Joe Sachs.  Green Lion Press, Santa Fe, NM. 
 
Nicomachean Ethics.  (Forthcoming)  Trans. by Robert C. Bartlett and Susan D. 
Collins.  University of Chicago Press, Chicago. 
 
Nicomachean Ethics.  (2002)  Trans. by Joe Sachs.  Focus Publishing.  Newburyport, 
MA. 
 
Nicomachean Ethics.  (1985)  Trans. by Terrence Irwin.  Hackett Publishing, 
Indianapolis. 
 
Nicomachean Ethics.  (1962)  Trans. by Martin Ostwald.  Prentice Hall, New York. 
 
Nicomachean Ethics.  (1998)  Trans. by W. D. Ross, Revised by J. L. Ackrill and J. 
O. Urmson.  Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
 
On the Soul and On Memory and Recollection.  (2004)  Trans. by Joe Sachs.  Green 
Lion Press, Santa Fe, New Mexico. 
 
Physics.  (2005)  Trans. by Joe Sachs.  Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, NJ. 
 
Poetics.  (2006)  Trans. by Joe Sachs.  Focus Publishing.  Newburyport, MA: 2006. 
 
Politica.  (1957)  Ed W. D. Ross.  Oxford, Oxford Classical Texts. 
 
Politics.  (1984)  Trans. by Carnes Lord.  University of Chicago Press, Chicago. 
 
 
B.  Plato  
 





———Platonis Opera, Vol. 3.  (1903) Oxford, Oxford Classical Texts. 
 
———Platonis Opera, Vol. 4.  (1902)  Oxford, Oxford Classical Texts. 
 
———Platonis Opera, Vol. 5.  (1907)  Oxford, Oxford Classical Texts.  
  
Duke, E. A., W. F. Hicken, W. S. M. Nicoll, D. B. Robinson, and J. C. G. Strachan.  
Platonis Opera, Vol. 1.  (1995)  Oxford, Oxford Classical Texts. 
 
Johnson, David M.  (2003)  Socrates and Alcibiades: Four Texts.  Focus Publishing.  
Newbury, MA. 
 
Pangle, Thomas L.  (1987)  The Roots of Political Philosophy.  Cornell University 
Press, Ithaca. 
 
Plato.  Euthydemus (2009, forthcoming).  Trans. by Gregory A. McBrayer and Mary 
D. Nichols, with an Interpretive Essay by Mary D. Nichols and Denise 
Schaeffer.  Focus Publishing.  Newburyport, MA. 
 
———Gorgias.  (1988)  Trans. James H. Nichols.  Cornell University Press, Ithaca. 
 
———Laws.  (1988)  Trans. Thomas Pangle.  Universty of Chicago Press, Chicago. 
 
———Protagoras and Meno.  (2004)  Trans. Robert C. Bartlett.  Cornell University 
Press. 
 
———Republic.  (1991)  Trans. Allan Bloom.  2nd Edition.  Basic Books, New York.   
 
———Symposium.  (2001)  Trans. by Seth Benardete with commentaries by Allan 
Bloom and Seth Benardete.  University of Chicago Press, Chicago. 
 
West, Thomas G., and Grace Starry West.  (1984)  Four Texts on Socrates.  Cornell 
University Press, Ithaca. 
 
 
II. Secondary Literature 
 
Alfarabi.  (2001)  Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle.  Trans. by Mushin Mahdi.  
Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY. 
 
———.  (2001)  The Harmonization of the Two Opinions of the Two Sages: Plato the 
Divine and Aristotle.  In Alfarabi: The Political Writings: “Selected 
Aphorisms” and Other Texts.  Trans. by Charles E. Butterworth.  Cornell 





Alford, C. Fred.  (1992)  The Psychoanalytic Theory of Greek Tragedy. Yale 
University Press, New Haven, CT.   
 
Allen, R. E.  (1960)  “The Socratic Paradox.”  Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 
21, No. 2. pp. 256-265.  
 
Bambrough, Renford.  (1960)  “Socratic Paradox.”  The Philosophical Quarterly, 
Vol. 10, No. 41.  pp. 289-300.  
 
Barnes, Jonathan.  (2000) Aristotle: A Very Short Introduction.  Oxford University 
Press, Oxford. 
 
Bartlett, Robert C.  (2008)  “Aristotle’s Introduction to the Problem of Happiness: On 
Book I of the Nicomachean Ethics.”  American Journal of Political Science.  
Vol. 52, No. 3. 
 
———.  (2003) “Political Philosophy and Sophistry: An Introduction to Plato’s 
Protagoras.”  American Journal of Political Science.  Vol. 47, No. 4. 
 
———.  (2004)  Plato: “Protagoras” and “Meno.”  With notes and interpretive 
essays.  Cornell University Press, Ithaca. 
 
Bartlett, Robert C., and Susan D. Collins, editors.  (1999)  Action and Contemplation: 
Studies in the Moral and Political Thought of Aristotle.  State University of 
New York Press, Albany. 
 
Bodéüs, Richard.  (1993)  The Political Dimensions of Aristotle’s Ethics.  Trans. by 
Jan Edward Garrett.  SUNY University Press, Albany. 
 
Burger, Ronna.  (2008)  Aristotle’s Dialogue with Socrates: On the Nicomachean 
Ethics.  University of Chicago Press, Chicago.   
 
Cook Wilson, John.  (1879)  Aristotelian Studies: I. On the Structure of the Seventh 
Book of the Nicomachean Ethics, chapter I-X.  Oxford University Press, 
Oxford. 
 
Hardie, W. F. R.  (1968)  Aristotle’s Ethical Theory.  Oxford University Press, 
Oxford. 
 
Heidegger, Martin.  (1997)  Plato’s Sophist.  Trans. by Richard Rojcewicz and André  
Schuwer.  Indiana University Press, Bloomington, Indiana.  
 





———.  (1980)  “Reason and Responsibility in Aristotle.” Published in Essays on 
Aristotle’s Ethics.  Edited by Amelie Oksenberg Rorty. University of 
California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles. 
 
Jaffa, Harry. (1972)  “Aristotle.”  Published in The History of Political Philosophy, 
ed. Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey.  2nd Edition.  Rand McNally Press: 
Chicago. 
 
Klein, Jacob.  (1964)  “Aristotle, An Introduction.”  Published in Ancients and 
Moderns: Essays on the Tradition of Political Philosophy in Honor of Leo 
Strauss.  Basic Books, New York. 
 
Kraut, Richard.  (2006)  Editor.  The Blackwell Guide to Aristotle’s Nicomachean 
Ethics.  Blackwell Publishing, Malden, MA. 
 
Liddell, and Scott.  (2001 Impression)  An Intermediate Greek-English Dictionary.  
Founded upon the 7th Edition, Oxford University Press. 
 
Lord, Carnes (1987).  “Aristotle.”  Published in The History of Political Philosophy, 
ed. Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey.  3rd Edition.  University of Chicago 
Press: Chicago. 
 
Luckhardt, C. G.  (1975)  “Remorse, Regret, and the Socratic Paradox.”  Analysis, 
Vol. 35, No. 5. pp. 159-166.  
 
MacIntyre, Alasdair.  (1984) After Virtue, Second Edition.  University of Notre Dame 
Press, Notre Dame, Indiana. 
 
Marchant, E.C.  Xenophontis Opera Omnia,  Vol. 2.  Commentarii, Oeconimicus, 
Convivum, Apologia Socratis.  Oxford Classical Texts, Oxford: 1921 
 
———.  Xenophontis Opera Omnia, Vol. 4.  Institutio Cyri.  Oxford Classical Texts, 
Oxford: 1963. 
 
Merrill, Clark A. (2000)  “Leo Strauss' Indictment of Christian Philosophy,” Review 
of Politics, 62/1 (Winter) 77-105. 
 
Meyer, Susan Suavé. (1993) Aristotle on Moral Responsibility: Character and Cause.  
Blackwell Publishing, Oxford. 
 
———.  (2006)  “Aristotle on the Voluntary.”  Published in The Blackwell Guide to 
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics.  Blackwell Publishing, Malden, MA. 
 
Mulhern, J.J.  (1968)  “A Note on Stating the ‘Socratic Paradox.’”  Journal of the 





———.  (1974)  “Aristotle and the Socratic Paradoxes.”  Journal of the History of 
Ideas, Vol. 35, No. 2. pp. 293-299.  
 
Nietzsche, Friedrich.  (1998)  Twilight of the Idols.  Trans. Duncan Large.  Oxford 
University Press, New York. 
 
———.  (1989)  Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future.  
Trans. Walter Kaufmann.  Vintage Books, New York. 
 
Pangle, Thomas L.  (1988)  “Interpretive Essay.”  Published in Plato’s Laws.  
University of Chicago Press, Chicago. 
 
Price, A.W.  (2006)  “Acrasia and Self-Control.”  Published in The Blackwell Guide 
to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics.  Blackwell Publishing, Malden, MA. 
 
Robinson, T. M.  (1970)  Plato’s Psychology.  University of Toronto Press, Toronto. 
 
Rorty, Amélie O.  (1980)  “Akrasia and Pleasure: Nicomachean Ethics Book 7” 
Published in Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics.  Edited by Amelie Oksenberg 
Rorty. University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles. 
 
———. (1980) Editor.  Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics.  University of California Press, 
Berkeley and Los Angeles 
 
Santas, Gerasimos.  (1964)  “The Socratic Paradoxes.”  The Philosophical Review, 
Vol. 73, No. 2. 
 
———.  (1966)  “Plato's Protagoras and Explanations of Weakness.”  The 
Philosophical Review, Vol. 75, No. 1.  
 
Schaefer, David L.  (1988) “Wisdom and Morality: Aristotle’s Account of Akrasia.”  
Polity, Vol. 21, No. 2. 
Schofield, Malcolm.  (2006)  “Aristotle’s Political Ethics.”  Published in The 
Blackwell Guide to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics.  Blackwell Publishing, 
Malden, MA 
Singpurwalla, Rachel.  (2006)  “Reasoning with the Irrational: Moral Psychology in 
the Protagoras,” Ancient Philosophy, 26. 
Smith, T. W. (1994). “The Protreptic Character of the Nicomachean Ethics.” Polity, 
27(2), 307-330.  
———. (2000). “The Audience of the Nicomachean Ethics.” The Journal of Politics, 




Strauss, Leo.  (1991)  Natural Right and History.  University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago. 
Terchek, Ronald J., and David K. Moore. (2000)  "Recovering the Political Aristotle:  
A Critical Response to Smith." American Political Science Review 94, No. 4. 
Tessitore, Aristide.  (1992) “Aristotle’s Ambiguous Account of the Best Life.”  Polity 
Vol. 15, Number 2. 
———.  (1996) Reading Aristotle’s Ethics: Virtue, Rhetoric, and Political 
Philosophy.  State University of New York Press, Albany. 
 
———.  (1999) “Socrates in Aristotle’s “Account of Human Affairs.”  Published in 
Action and Contemplation: Studies in the Moral and Political Thought of 
Aristotle.  State University of New York Press, Albany. 
 
———.  (2002)  Editor.  Aristotle and Modern Politics: The Persistence of Political 
Philosophy.  University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, IN. 
 
Vlastos, Gregory.  (1969)  “Socrates on Acrasia.”  Phoenix, Vol. 23, No. 1, Studies 
Presented to G. M. A. Grube on the Occasion of His Seventieth Birthday. 
 
Franco Volpi, “The Rehabilitation of Practical Philosophy and Neo-Aristotelianism” 
Trans. By Eric Buzzetti, Published in Action and Contemplation: Studies in 
the Moral and Political Thought of Aristotle.  State University of New York 
Press, Albany.   
 
Weiss, Roslyn.  (2006)  The Socratic Paradox and its Enemies.  University of 
Chicago Press, Chicago. 
 
Xenophon.  (2001)  The Education of Cyrus.  Trans. Wayne Ambler.  Cornell 
University Press, Ithaca. 
 
———. (2001)  Memorabilia.  Trans. Amy L. Bonnette.  Cornell University Press, 
Ithaca. 
